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The VIEWS expressed in this magazine ARE THE AUTHORS' and not necessarily those of the US Army or the Command and General Staff College.
If enduring peace can ever come to Asia, all mankind will benefit. But if peace fails there, nowhere else will our achievements really be secure.

By peace in Asia I do not mean simply the absence of armed hostilities. For wherever men hunger and hate, there can really be no peace.

I do not mean the peace of conquest. For humiliation can be the seedbed of war.

I do not mean simply the peace of the conference table. For peace is not really written merely in the words of treaties, but peace is the day-by-day work of builders.

The peace we seek in Asia is a peace of conciliation between Communist states and their non-Communist neighbors, between rich nations and poor, between small nations and large, between men whose skins are brown and black and yellow and white, between Hindus and Moslems, and Buddhists and Christians.

It is a peace that can only be sustained through the durable bonds of peace: through international trade, through the free flow of people and ideas, through full participation by all nations in an international community under law, and through a common dedication to the great task of human progress and economic development.
It was Napoleon Bonaparte who once said that the secret of war lies in the secret of communications. This maxim has been valid whenever and wherever armies faced one another, but it has frequently been ignored by military leaders. An outstanding example of the negative attitude regarding this dictum is that of the German and Italian High Commands with respect to the Mediterranean theater of operations during the Second World War.

When German troops—with token help from the Italians—had victoriously concluded the campaign in Western Europe by the end of June 1940, the next logical step in trying to end the war successfully would have been the defeat of Great Britain. This might have been accomplished by direct invasion across the English Channel, but with few exceptions all the higher war leaders of the Third Reich were lukewarm, if not cold, regarding such an endeavor. This is witnessed by the uncoordinated planning and lack of cooperation among the three services. After futile efforts of the Luftwaffe to bomb England into submission, the invasion was postponed, and German military planners on orders from Adolf Hitler began to focus their attention upon Eastern Europe, specifically the Soviet Union.

After the direct assault upon the British Isles was abandoned in the late summer of 1940, some high-ranking Germans, including Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, pointed out that Britain could still be dealt a powerful, if not mortal, blow. This could be accomplished by severing her vital east-west line of communications through the Mediterranean Sea by occupying the British-held bases of Gibraltar and Malta.
Such a maneuver would interdict a significant part of Allied, especially British, seaborne traffic to and from the Middle and Far East, forcing it to take the long route via the Cape of Good Hope. It might, moreover, aid determined military efforts on the part of the Axis from Libya into Egypt.

Grand Admiral Erich Raeder recognized the strategic value of Gibraltar and Malta and the Nile Valley. This would deprive Britain of the use of the Suez Canal, threaten her petroleum sources in the Middle East, and pose a flanking threat to the Soviet Union.

It was suggested that an attempt be made to take Gibraltar by paratroopers backed by forces that had crossed Spain. However, after protracted negotiations with Spanish leaders, this plan was eventually dropped because the Spanish demands for such collaboration proved to be excessive and unrealistic.

**Strategic Location**

From a tactical standpoint, an occupation of the island of Malta would have been simpler to carry out than an assault upon Gibraltar. Strategically, it would certainly have been most beneficial to the Axis cause. This rocky island with an area of about 100 square miles has little to offer as far as raw materials are concerned. Practically all food and fuel must be imported. Its location made Malta strategically important since it is only about 60 miles south of Sicily, about 200 miles northeast of Tripoli in Libya, and a similar distance east of Tunisia. It lies about midway along the 2,200-mile-long sea route from Port Said and Alexandria to Gibraltar. During the war, it formed a key link in the Allied supply line, with docking and repair facilities and a refueling base.

For two years—July 1940 to midsummer 1942—an attempt on the part of the Axis to wrest this strategic crossroads from British hands might have been crowned with success. The period between summer 1940 and early spring 1941 seemed especially propitious for such an endeavor. The Germans during that time still had at their disposal a large force of highly trained paratroopers that could have been employed in occupying the British airbases on the island.

Even when the greater part of this elite force was ultimately destroyed...
during the struggle for Greece and Crete in April and May of 1941, a Malta invasion might well have succeeded. Axis airfields and embarkation ports were only 60 to 70 miles away in Sicily, a powerful Italian fleet was stationed on Taranto, and the Axis enjoyed air superiority over the mid-Mediterranean.

It is strange that so little attention was paid to Malta—apart from bombing and strafing raids—during the time that German and Italian troops under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel fought their seesaw battles with the British in the Western Desert and Cyrenaica. For, just as Malta was vitally important to the Allied cause, an Axis occupation of the island would have safeguarded the supply route from Italy and Sicily to Libyan ports, thus assuring Field Marshal Rommel’s Afrika Korps of much needed matériel and fuel.

Invasion Postponed

It appears that a determined effort to invade the island was contemplated only once, and that was during the early summer of 1942 when Field Marshal Rommel had entered Egypt and was poised for a thrust to Alexandria and Cairo. But the overconfident Axis partners decided to postpone the Malta invasion until the Nile Valley had been captured with a final, lightning thrust—a thrust that never materialized due to lack of fuel and armor, the exhausted condition of Field Marshal Rommel’s troops, and the determined stand by the British at El Alamein.

A thorn in the side of the Axis, Malta held out, surviving air raids, severe privation, and near-starvation. That it was never invaded is mainly due to the fact that Hitler could not be persuaded of the strategic necessity of a strong, continuous Mediterranean and North African war policy. His vacillating and often negative attitude for this theater of operations was reflected in his considerations of Field Marshal Rommel’s efforts as but a sideshow, aimed at containing the Allies with a minimum of men and equipment. It was not until the Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria in late 1942 that he finally awakened to the importance of North Africa, and tried to save Tunisia by pouring troops and armor into this battlefield.

As for Allied strategy in the Mediterranean theater after North Africa had been cleared of Axis troops in the spring of 1943, another statement credited to Napoleon comes to mind. Upon being asked whom he preferred to do battle against, the Emperor had said: “Allies, because they seldom agree.”
Of course, this was not entirely true during World War II, for the Allies as far as Europe was concerned were of one mind: the unconditional surrender of Italy and Germany. But it did hold true as to the ways and means of bringing this about.

American military and political leaders were staunch advocates of Franklin D. Roosevelt's strategy for Europe—namely, a knockout blow at Germany across the Channel while all other military operations in that theater were to be considered as secondary in importance. Most of the British, and in particular Winston Churchill, favored the exploitation of any weak spot in the armor of the enemy and so regarded Europe's soft underbelly. The Soviet Union, clamoring for a second front, obviously favored the cross-Channel invasion and, hence, played into the hands of the United States who by that time had become the senior partner of the Western alliance.

**Invasion of Sicily**

Because a large-scale assault on the west coast of France was not feasible then, a compromise was worked out—to invade Sicily and to attempt to cross over from this island to Italy. It was hoped this move would knock that country out of the war. The means for these undertakings, however, were to remain limited because the buildup of the invasion forces in England had to continue, and considerable US forces and equipment had to be channeled to the Pacific theater.

Sicily was, indeed, invaded successfully, and by the middle of August 1943 the island was in Allied hands. Then followed the crossing to the Italian mainland where, faced with relatively minor opposition, Allied forces rapidly moved north. The Americans, aided by an amphibious landing at Salerno, captured Naples on 1 October, and the British took the important Foggia airfields at about the same time.

In the meantime, Benito Mussolini had fallen, the newly created Italian Government under Marshal Pietro Badoglio had capitulated to the Allies, and German troops had begun to pour into central Italy.

**Enthusiasm Wanes**

It was then that a situation developed in many respects reminiscent of that faced by Field Marshal Rommel in Libya. The fighting continued—against stiffening German opposition, in extremely difficult terrain, and under appalling weather conditions—but it soon became apparent that the Allies, and the United States in particular, considered this Italian theater important only insofar as it continued to contain fairly numerous German forces. The result was that Allied gains were usually measured in feet rather than miles. An attempt to help speed up their advance by a landing at Anzio early in 1944 failed for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the lack of enthusiasm for this operation on the part of some of the higher US commanders.

Again, it is strange that no better use was made of the opportunities which offered themselves after the Italian collapse. Rather than persisting in the slugging match in the rugged mountains of the peninsula, it might have been more expedient to have employed such forces as were available for the occupation of Sardinia and Corsica, especially since the Germans had already evacuated them early in October 1943.

These two islands could then have become important aircraft carriers
from which to interdict movement of troops and materiel in the valleys of the Rhone and the Po and across the Alpine passes. They also could have become staging areas for a landing on Italy’s west coast, a maneuver which would not only have put the German forces in central Italy in jeopardy, but might well have led to an invasion of the Po Valley and an advance through the Ljubljana Gap in the direction of Vienna.

Occupation of that city would have had far-reaching political consequences regarding future developments in central Europe.

Nothing is certain in war. Hence, it is hard to say whether such a strategy would have succeeded. But a mind receptive and willing to exploit sudden opportunities rather than the single-mindedness of purpose exhibited in this case certainly would have benefited the cause of the Western Allies.

LESSONS LEARNED

The MILITARY REVIEW is particularly interested in receiving manuscripts covering lessons learned by US units in Vietnam. Problems of organization, command and control, equipment, tactics, and fire support merit informed discussion. After complying with appropriate local regulations, authors may submit manuscripts direct to the MILITARY REVIEW. We will obtain the necessary security review on those accepted.
SINCE World War II, most of the states of the world have become members of the United Nations "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." To this end, they have established as one of their purposes the maintenance of international peace and security, and they have agreed to unite their strength "for suppression of acts of aggression" and for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means "in conformity with the principles of justice and international law."

But the idea of using international forces to maintain peace and security is in direct conflict with the doctrines of national sovereignty and the rights to many questions involving the authority to control and employ those forces, the problem of financing such operations, the legal status of individual members of the forces, and the rights and obligations of the states and the organization involved.

UN PEACE FORCES

AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph M. Corvino, United States Army
Chapter VII of the charter provides for military forces under control of the Security Council to be employed in the maintenance of peace and security. These forces have not materialized, and the United Nations has had to develop new forms of peacekeeping in an attempt to fulfill its original purpose. The gradual change in thinking in the United Nations has been due to the lack of unanimity among the great powers since 1946 and to the radical change in the nature of war which has been brought about through the development of highly sophisticated and destructive weapon systems.

Realistic Approach
Collective security has given way to a more realistic approach to peacekeeping. The United Nations has abandoned the idea that it can employ war to counter aggression and to enforce peace. Forces from the less powerful nations have become an indispensable addition to the art of peacekeeping through persuasion. Today, the United Nations uses a military force which strives not to fight and which is contributed by the smaller powers.

Since the peace-keeping forces under consideration are not those authorized by chapter VII of the charter, both international law and the charter itself prohibit the United Nations from placing such forces on the territory of a nation-state without the consent of that government. It is also necessary that the United Nations have the consent of the members to employ their forces and materiel in such operations. UN forces of one kind or another have been employed at least a dozen times since the organization was founded.

Major Operations
In addition to a variety of observer groups and truce supervisory experiences, the United Nations has had several major operations which used military units provided by member nations. The United Nations Command in Korea was established in 1950 under chapter VII and is the only example of the use of war to repel aggression.

The United Nations Emergency Forces in Egypt (UNEF) were created in October 1956 to deal with the Suez crisis. These forces were not designed to fight against aggression, but rather were intended to bring about the peaceful settlement of one of the most dangerous crises which the world had seen since the end of World War II.

The United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon was created in 1958 to deal with the tense situation which had developed in that country. Probably the greatest challenge to the United Nations arose in the Congo in the latter part of 1960, when the Opération des Nations Unies au Congo was organized. Most recently, in March 1964, the United Nations Force in Cyprus was established.

The role of UN peace forces was summed up nicely by Secretary Gen-

October 1966
General U Thant in 1963 when, referring to the Suez, Lebanon, and Congo operations, he said:

All three were improvised and called into the field at very short notice; all three were severely limited in their right to use force; all three were designed solely for the maintenance of peace and not for fighting

International law and international organization are historical developments that have come about largely because of a revulsion against war. For at least 300 years, the nations of the world have been seeking ways of

in the military sense; all three were recruited from the smaller powers and with special reference to their acceptability in the area in which they were to serve; all three operated with the express consent and cooperation of the states or territories where they were stationed, as well as of any other parties directly concerned in the situation; and all three were under the direction and control of the Secretary General acting on behalf of the organs of the United Nations.

Turkey supplied units to the United Nations Command in Korea where war was used to repel aggression

avoiding war by more judicious use of political actions and legal procedures. Old international law recognized the use of force as an instrument of international relations. International law attempted to prescribe the rules for the conduct of wars that otherwise could not be prevented.

The most significant and revolutionary development in international
law has been the outlawing of aggressive force as a means of settling disputes. Contemporary law prohibits not only the use of force in an aggressive war, but also even the threat of force. The definition of "aggressive force," however, is one still subject to much debate.

**Contractual and General Laws**

Basically, there are two kinds of international law: contractual law based on bilateral and multilateral treaties, and general law which consists of the customary rules normally followed by states in their relations with other states. Thus, law can be taken as the coordinated will of various states.

The UN Charter is a multilateral treaty and constitutes contractual international law. As an international organization, the United Nations has only the powers and competences that are conferred upon it by the charter. However, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has rendered an advisory opinion that the organization must also be deemed under law to have those powers necessary by implication as being essential to the performance of its duties. The internal workings of the United Nations and its organs would, therefore, provide rules in the general law category.

One of the most important and most controversial problems of international law is the establishment of the legal limits within which states and the United Nations may use force. The basic rule—that force may not be used aggressively, but only in self-defense—is subject to interpretation of the terms "aggression" and "self-defense." Also, this basic rule governs the actions of states rather than those of the United Nations since the United Nations can hardly be pictured either as an unlawful aggressor or as a victim of aggression. To determine the legal limits governing the use of force by the United Nations, one must examine the charter and the Uniting for Peace Resolutions of 1950.

Article 2 of the charter prohibits members of the United Nations from either the threat or the use of force in international relations or against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Article 51 gives members the right of self-defense until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Chapter VII is the legal authority that permits the Security Council to take "action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." These terms, however, are not defined in the charter, and the Council has considerable latitude in their interpretation.

**Collective Security**

The collective security system contemplated in chapter VII pledges all members to refrain from the use of force and to participate collectively through the organization to act against any threat to peace. Peacekeeping, however, is seen as a continuous chain running through all of the methods of peaceful settlement. Military force to restore peace is provided as a last resort, and can be used only if all of the five permanent members of the Security Council are in agreement. Military forces, however, have not been available to the Council because the great powers could not agree on collective decisions that would become the "law" under which those forces could act.

The General Assembly's role in peacekeeping was originally intended to be secondary to that of the Secur-
ity Council, but in recent years the action of the Assembly has become increasingly important. The charter authorizes the Assembly to discuss and to make recommendations on any matter that might affect the maintenance of peace and security or might lead to international friction, but only when the matter is not being discussed in the Security Council. If the Council fails to take action, there is nothing in the charter which specifically prevents the Assembly from recommending appropriate actions.

Uniting for Peace

Since the charter was signed, the Council has never been able to agree on how to organize a UN police force, and, except for Korea, it has been unable to agree on the use of force as a coercive measure. The ability of the Council to take action without a veto on the Korean question was a freak condition arising out of the absence of the Soviet representation. Later debate in the Assembly resulted in the adoption of the Uniting for Peace Resolutions of November 1950 which can be considered as a secondary plan for UN peacekeeping.

The Assembly resolved that if the Security Council should fail to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly would consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to members for collective measures, including use of armed force when necessary in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression. This resolution raised some legal problems.

The broad recommendation authority of the Assembly is limited by the last sentence of paragraph 2, Article 11, which requires that the Assembly refer to the Council any matter relating to peace and security that requires action. Strictly interpreted, this limitation would appear to bar any recommendation by the Assembly for any type of enforcement action. A slightly broader interpretation, however, would permit the Assembly to make recommendations when there is need for enforcement action other than by the Security Council under chapter VII.

Legal Aspects

The legal basis for the Uniting for Peace Resolutions becomes rather involved if considered from the standpoint of the collective security powers of the Council and the Assembly. Professor Julius Stone, a noted authority in the field, argues that the legal and sociopolitical nature of the resolutions is keyed to the self-defense provisions of Article 51. The members have the right of self-defense, individually and collectively. They remain free to act or not to act on the recommendations of the Assembly.

It should be noted, however, that Article 51 states that members have the right of self-defense “if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” The Uniting for Peace Resolutions do not appear to be so restrictive.

Customary international law has recognized for a long time that friendly armed forces on the territory of another state have a certain immunity from the jurisdiction of the host state. It is almost always necessary for the two states to enter into some type of agreement to establish more specific rules for the clarification of many legal and procedural questions. History has recorded many examples of such agreements between states. The idea of international
forces, however, is a recent development, and the customary law applicable to two states, although related to the problem, does not apply directly. The agreement between the United Nations and the host state is, therefore, especially important.

The first real status of forces agreement concluded by the United Nations was the agreement with Egypt in 1957. The agreement provided that members of the force would conduct themselves as international personalities. The Secretary General was of the opinion that full loyalty to the aims of the organization had to be required, and that the individual could not be permitted to divide his loyalty between the United Nations and any other country. The maintenance of the international character of the operation was to be considered of primary importance.

When UNEF personnel were involved in a criminal action, they would come under the jurisdiction of their home countries. The Secretary General considered this principle to have set a most important precedent for future agreements because it provided some guarantee of legal status for those personnel who might otherwise not be covered by any provisions of international law. Civil jurisdiction was to be exercised by the Egyptian Government in any matter not related to the official duties of a member of the force. A Claims Commission would...
settle civil claims arising out of official duty.

The UNEF agreement also included provisions regarding freedom of movement of personnel and vehicles, use of communications and postal services, use of roads and other transportation facilities, and rights to public utilities such as water and electricity. It was agreed that the force, its commander, other officials, and members would have privileges and immunities in accordance with the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

Among other things, the agreement also covered exemption from passport and visa regulations, the powers of arrest and transfers of custody involving both the military police of the force and the Egyptian authorities, the right to bear arms, and the manner in which disputes that could not be settled by negotiation would be referred to a tribunal of three arbitrators.

As of October 1958 the Secretary General believed that the status agreement which applied to forces in Egypt had met the test of experience. He recommended that its basic principles be included in any similar agreements in the future. He also cautioned that, although UN peace forces are not fighting forces, they must have the right to self-defense, and that there must be a clear-cut definition of self-defense in order to avoid conflict between peace forces and combat operations under chapter VII. In the UNEF operation, the rule was applied that men engaged in the operation could never take the initiative in the use of armed force, but were entitled to respond with force to an attack with arms.

One of the greatest challenges to the United Nations arose in the Congo in 1960.

United Nations
The formal agreement with the Republic of the Congo was not completed until 27 November 1961, sixteen months after the initial request for UN intervention in the Congo. Comparison of this document with the UNEF agreement reveals much similarity. However, the Congo agreement seems to incorporate many of the basic rules which were developed through the UN experience in Egypt. The Congo agreement included a paragraph which differentiated the responsibilities of the Congolese Government and the United Nations in their mutual endeavors to maintain peace and security.

**Legal Stipulation**

A statement was also included to stipulate that the United Nations would have recourse to force only as a last resort, while the Congolese authorities had the right to resort to force in conformity with law when executing their legal duties. Both parties felt that the agreement would be considered as having been effective from the date of arrival of the first elements of the UN force. This provision was undoubtedly included to provide some legal basis for the settlement of juridical disputes and questions which had arisen in the preceding months of operation.

The status of forces agreement between the United Nations and the government of Cyprus was effected by an exchange of letters on 31 March 1964, less than one month after the Security Council had authorized the establishment of the force. Examination of this document reveals a close similarity to the agreements which had been made in Egypt and the Congo.

In examining the UN methods of financing peace-keeping operations, two particular aspects which become obvious are that dependence was placed on voluntary contributions and the solicitation of such contributions was left to the Secretary General. He has pointed out on more than one occasion that this method is most unsatisfactory, that there is a large degree of uncertainty about how much will actually be available, and that

UN peace-keeping forces have been employed at least a dozen times since the organization was formed

the planning and advance arrangements essential to the efficient and economical operation are sorely hampered.

The UN Charter deals with the question of financing all operations of the organization in Article 17. This article provides that the General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget, and that the expenses of the organization shall be borne by the members as apportioned by the Assembly. In its brevity, the article seems to leave no doubt as to its meaning. However, some members are still disputing the legality of peace-keeping assessments.

Article 19 provides that a member
which becomes two years in arrears in the payment of its financial obligations shall lose its vote in the General Assembly. By December 1961 the Assembly was faced with the fact that many members had not made their contributions to the peace-keeping effort because they questioned the legality of their obligation to pay on the basis that the operations had not been properly authorized. Faced with a financial crisis, the Assembly authorized a 200 million-dollar issue of 25-year bonds and decided to ask the ICJ for an advisory opinion. It took this action “recognizing its need for authoritative legal guidance” regarding the financing of UN operations in the Middle East and the Congo.

Legal Opinion

The Court found that the responsibility of the Security Council was “primary,” not exclusive. The General Assembly was also considered to have certain powers in connection with peace and security. The Court voted nine to five that the expenses were properly those of the organization and should be paid by assessment on the members. Although the Court’s opinion was advisory and does not have the binding force of a domestic law, the General Assembly would be inconsistent if it now took a view contrary to the legal opinion. The issue of Article 19—loss of vote in the General Assembly for those members two years in arrears—must still be faced.

The Soviet Union has taken the stand that the Security Council is the only organ of the UN that is authorized to take action when military forces are required. It contends that military forces should be used only as a last resort, and that the costs of those operations authorized by the Council should be assessed in accordance with “the generally recognized principle of international law that aggressor states bear political and material responsibility for the aggression they commit.”

The USSR held that the operations in the Middle East and the Congo were not conducted in accordance with the UN Charter and, therefore, did not place any financial obligations on the members of the United Nations. She based her argument on the fact that UNEF had not been authorized by the Security Council, and that the General Assembly, while it might recommend with regard to questions of peace and security, must refer cases requiring action to the Council.

In the case of the Congo operation, the USSR stated that, although the operation had been initially authorized by the Council, the Secretary General had violated the provisions of the charter by deciding for himself which nations would be invited to take part. Later, the General Assembly, without competence under the charter, made a decision to appropriate funds for the operation and to apportion the cost among the members.

British-United States Views

The British and US Governments have taken the stand that one permanent member of the Security Council cannot be considered to have the right to block completely the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations. Both governments point to the advisory opinion of the ICJ and to the opinions of the majority of the members as reflected in pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly.

The US statement concluded that the financial and constitutional crisis must be solved if the organization is to continue as an effective instrument.
It called for the cooperation of all members in an effort to find a solution which would avoid the requirement for application of Article 19, and which would strengthen the organization and enable it to continue its role as “Man’s best hope for a peaceful world.”

The 19th General Assembly carefully avoided any issue which might have required a public vote, thus avoiding the application of Article 19. Little meaningful business could be conducted under such circumstances. During the 20th Assembly, the United States agreed to abide by the majority will and not to press the Article 19 issue. In the meantime, there has been much backstage negotiation in an attempt to find a solution based on some United States-Soviet compromise. A committee of 33 nations has been directed to examine the problem, but no solution has been suggested.

**Voluntary Contributions**

It was expected that voluntary contributions would be made to cover outstanding peace-keeping costs. Only about 20 million dollars has been received to offset a deficit of over 100 million dollars. Neither France nor the USSR—heading the list of debtors—has made any contribution or a definite commitment to do so. The United States is still willing to pay her fair share, but insists that others bear their part of the burden. The United Nations is approaching the point where it may have to abandon those peace-keeping operations in which it is now engaged. Several countries have informed the Secretary General that they cannot go on absorbing the costs, and will have to withdraw their troops unless they are reimbursed for their expenditures.

A general conclusion can be drawn that the idea of collective security was overly ambitious and has not worked because the world was not yet ready for it. The great-power cooperation envisioned in the charter has failed to materialize, and the members of the United Nations have sought another method of achieving and maintaining peace in the world. The new art—peacekeeping by persuasion—when permitted to function has proved successful as a method of peaceful settlement of disputes. Thus, something new, something useful, but something controversial has developed from the aspirations of 20 years ago.

**“Legality” Dispute**

Although the world is changing and the old international law is not completely applicable, the nations of the world have come to accept the idea of conducting international relations according to a generalized body of contractual and customary international law. Although this law is admittedly not enforceable in the usual sense, it is binding in the moral sense. The present controversy over the financing of peace-keeping operations is a dispute over the “legality” of those operations. It is evident that the members of the United Nations are seeking legal answers to political questions.

The Uniting for Peace Resolutions were developed as an expedient plan for peacekeeping in the absence of great-power agreement—a matter of necessity and an attempt to give some practical meaning to the peace-keeping mission of the United Nations as contemplated in the charter. Supporters of the resolutions contend that the legal issues in peace-keeping finances are a matter of law and have been upheld by the ICJ.
The advisory opinion of the ICJ supported the majority opinion of the General Assembly, upheld the legality of the Uniting for Peace Resolutions, legalized the Egypt and Congo operations, and affirmed the legal responsibility of the UN members to share the financial burden of those operations. But there were five dissenting votes on that advisory opinion. Just as there is lack of agreement among the great powers, the legal opinion was lacking in unanimity. The Assembly is groping for a behind-the-scenes solution which will not be an utter disregard for the Court's advisory opinion—an opinion for which the Assembly asked.

If the world community is to continue to derive value from peacekeeping operations—in fact, if it is to forestall a serious blow to the future development of international organization—it must find some solution to the current impasse in the United Nations. This solution must, of course, be negotiated in the political arena, but the outcome must be a legal solution, legally accepted by and legally binding on all of the great powers and all members of the United Nations.

Possible solutions include amendment of the UN Charter and development of an international convention on the subject of peacekeeping. No solution seems possible, however, until those who now question the legality of past peace-keeping operations recall again that the preservation of peace in the world is a question of the preservation of law and order. With this obstacle overcome, the world community can then move closer toward the development of that world law which will contribute to world peace.

The road to world order, the road to a rule of law in the world is not an easy one. It will continue to be arduous, and beset by agonizing hurdles, painful decisions, difficult compromises, and, at times, disheartening setbacks. Traveling the road will demand the most from each of us. I pray that we shall be equal to the task.

Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg
In the generation leading up to World War I, the United Kingdom held the world leadership which has since passed to the United States. Like today’s American leaders, the British chiefs then gazed nervously across freedom’s ramparts in anticipation of a seemingly inevitable climactic struggle with authoritarian militarism.

Soviet Russia’s rocket-rattling diplomacy is a fitting successor to Kaiser Wilhelm II’s diplomacy by bluster, and the commissar’s “world revolution” has succeeded the Kaiser’s Weltpolitik. Communism’s new industrialism has risen to challenge the older industrialism of the United States just as German industry once threw down the gauntlet to England’s economic preponderance late in the last century.

There are differences between now and then, of course. Germans are not Russians, a point that needs some emphasis. The arena of the challenge today is the strato-
sphere and outer space, whereas before 1914 it was the salt water of the North Sea separating the British and German Fleets. Unmanned missiles have succeeded the manned warships of 1914.

After 1898 the British, as did their American cousins 40 years later, reluctantly abandoned a traditional splendid isolation in favor of substantial diplomatic commitments to foreign powers. The Kaiser's unman- nerly utterances and boundless ambitions for a "place in the sun" had already cast a pall on Anglo-German relations when, in 1898, the Germans announced a sudden new naval program calling for a sustained effort to build 38 capital ships and 20 armored cruisers.

Fear of Invasion

Smoldering British resentment of German commercial successes now ripened into fears of a future German invasion, a sentiment aggravated by a rising virulent anti-Germanism in England. British diplomacy soon created a Triple Entente with France and Russia to contain Germany's Triple Alliance with Italy and Austria-Hungary.

Facing the German threat, the British showed the courage, ingenuity, and perseverance of their ancestors. Dominating the seas around Europe since the late 16th century, they had survived every peril created by scheming enemies or the implacable advances of technology. The Spaniards, the Dutch, and the French had been repulsed in their turns. The Royal Navy had faced the challenge of converting to steam, iron hulls, steel armor-plating, torpedoes, and ever-greater ordnance.

Each threat had raised the fleet to new heights of superiority over vanquished or potential rivals. In all previous centuries, the Briton had shaken off every appearance of decadence, and he was to display the same qualities in the years leading to 1914.

German Challenge

Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, German Navy Minister, had hardly started his Imperial master's campaign to "seize the trident of Neptune" when a worthy opponent moved into the British Admiralty to take command of the fight to keep British supremacy on the North Sea. Admiral Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher, relentless, remorseless, and ruthless, became First Sea Lord in 1902, bringing to the Admiralty a sense of urgency that it badly needed and would continue to have until the outbreak of war justified his expectations.

The officers of the Royal Navy were put on notice that the enemies of Fisher's drive for security would have widowed wives and fatherless children, that the neutral officers would see their careers blighted. If you did not support Fisher *totus percutus*, as he loved to say, you might as well oppose him equally "whole hog."

For seven frantic years, the grim old seadog hammered away at the tremendous job of turning back the German's challenge. He established nucleus crews for mothballed vessels, thereby gaining precious future mobilization time. The submarine came into the British naval establishment, although scoffers secretly laughed for

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a while at "Fisher's toys." Sir John ruthlessly scrapped thousands of tons of obsolete shipping, battled Parliament year in and year out for bigger appropriations, and established the Home Fleet—a concentration of British naval power in the North Sea, headquartered at Scapa Flow, in the Orkneys.

In his ferocious effort to keep the Royal Navy supreme, Fisher came up with such a tremendous breakthrough in naval technology that even he was terrified at his success. In 1905 the HMS Dreadnought was placed in commission, a splendid behemoth 490 feet long, displacing 17,000 tons, and carrying ten 12-inch guns in its five turrets.

The Dreadnought had cost about 4.5 million dollars (the value of Horatio Nelson's entire fleet at Cape Trafalgar) and could make 21 knots. It was far superior to all those conventional pre-Dread, with their five and six-inch popguns. Some older ships, it is true, had a few 12-inch guns aboard, but their mixture of large and small ordnance had caused great confusion in spotting salvos at great ranges.

The new battleship, having no smaller artillery, was the all-big-gun type and thus a far deadlier kind of ship than its predecessors. Britain, with her long headstart in pre-Dread, now awakened to find the vast bulk of the Royal Navy obsolescent. Suppose Tirpitz now hurried up and launched a German Dreadnought—or two, or three? Technology had handed down the grim verdict that a new naval race must start, and Sir John bravely and unilaterally decreed that Britain would double Tirpitz' Dreadnought launchings "until charcoal sprouts."

Guns or Butter?

The new battleship was born under an unlucky political start. In the very year of its commissioning, the Liberal Party swept into power on a platform promising expensive social welfare programs to an England beginning to suffer the consequences of a fading industrial predominance. Guns or butter? With Tirpitz on one side of them and economic insecurity on the other, the voters meant to have both guns and butter. Let the politicians handle the details! Government circles shuddered, highly uncertain that the taxpayer could or would foot both bills.

Hoping against hope that somehow the German Government might let them off this hook, the Liberals decided to extend an olive branch to Berlin by unilaterally reducing Britain's naval program. Since the warlike Tories had started this Dread-
nought race, and had laid down four Dreadnought keels in 1905, while the Germans laid only two, the Liberals announced that they would lay only three keels in 1906. Tirpitz greeted the Liberal gesture by raising his 1906 program to three. Thinking that Tirpitz had failed to get the message, London reduced the 1907 estimates to two—only to find Tirpitz raising his to four.

The Liberal Cabinet had no choice but to go back to the naval race, and the game was played Fisher's way again, for a while.

Naval Supremacy Ended?

During these years, the British public and political leadership displayed a distressing tendency to over-dramatize the immediate significance of the Dreadnought. This had happened many times before in other cases. When Britain floated her first ironclad in the middle of the 19th century, and it was learned in London that France was getting two, the halls of Parliament rang with lamentations over the end of Britain's naval supremacy. As if the great mass of wooden warships in Her Majesty's Navy had suddenly vanished! As if their shells had lost the power to kill!

The British public in the last century, as with the American public today, seemed prone to hail each military innovation as rendering worthless all existing hardware.

But this is seldom the case in fact, and it was not so 50 years ago. Admiral Reinhard Scheer, who commanded the German High Sea Fleet at Jutland in 1916, later congratulated himself on a last-minute decision to take pre-Dreadnoughts into battle—after learning that the old outmoded vessels had saved his battle cruiser squadron from probable annihilation.

Before he retired in 1909, Fisher did it again. In that year, the Iron Duke was launched, a 25,000-ton vessel carrying ten 13½-inch guns in five turrets. Capable of landing seven tons of "payload" on targets 35,000 yards distant, the Iron Duke had armament half again as potent as anything Tirpitz had yet displayed. So far as gunpower was concerned, Fisher was pulling away from Tirpitz in 1909 and 1910.

Fisher had also faced up to the issue of armor versus speed. You need both, he reasoned. But did every all-big-gun ship have to be weighted down with speed-sapping armor? In naval warfare, there was more to do than just slug it out capital ship-to-capital ship. What about a ship capable of outshooting anything that could catch it and outrunning anything that could outshoot it?

The answer was the battle cruiser, an all-big-gun vessel designed for pursuit and outflanking work, with the firepower of a Dreadnought, but with only a fraction of the armor. Fisher's new creation, of which the Home Fleet had nine when war came, could make 25 knots to the average battleship's 21.

Churchill's Innovation

Two years after Fisher's retirement as Britain's senior admiral, civilian leadership of the navy passed to 37-year-old Winston S. Churchill. The new Liberal First Lord of the Admiralty, destined for greatness as a war leader, laid ample foundations for his reputation as a creative military thinker within the three short years of peace remaining after 1911.

Three great decisions were before Churchill, each of which contained the possibility of decisive strategic advantages—or devastating damage
to the nation's security. These were risks that demanded a Churchill, and the man and the hour met without ceremony and without trembling.

The 13½-inch gun had amply proved itself, but Churchill was anxious to "go one size better," an urge not unknown in the administration of present-day space exploration projects. Why not a 15-inch gun for the capital ships now being built? Fisher, when asked for his opinion, declared that adoption of the new naval rifle would be the equivalent of a great naval victory and agreed with Churchill that failure to investigate its potentialities would constitute "treason to the Empire."

**Increased Appropriations**

Problems arose, however. Bigger guns meant bigger ships, and this, in turn, meant hectoring a balky Parliament for increased naval appropriations. Moreover, the tense strategic situation on the North Sea made it necessary to avoid construction delays while redesigning vessels already on hand. Worse yet, no 15-inch gun had ever existed. Was it even feasible? Would it achieve the greater range and accuracy along with increased payload that the 13-inch gun had shown in comparison with the 12? Would it create unforeseeable stresses that would fatally mar the five great ships then being built?

Weighing the hazards, Churchill realized that it would take a year to prove out the new gun to the engineers' satisfaction. This meant that five capital ships would have to be commissioned "with an inferior weapon to that which we had it in our power to give them," or else that they would go to sea with untried 15-inch rifles that might ruin them. Either way you sliced it, a year of precious "head start" might be forfeited. But, backed by the enthusiastic Fisher, Churchill boldly took the plunge.

All the guns were ordered after a hasty test firing of a model rifle by the Ordnance Board and a private steel firm. It would be a year before the outcome of the gamble would be fully known. And if it failed? Churchill needed little imagination to picture an indignant House of Commons hounding him into political limbo as a brash and erratic lad who had substituted his immature judgment for that of older and wiser heads—and endangered his country in the bargain!

But it all came right in the end. The 15-inch rifle proved capable of landing a ton of explosive on targets 35,000 yards away, and with deadlier accuracy than older models. "I felt as if I had been delivered from a great peril," Churchill later conceded.

**Fast Division**

This coup led the First Lord directly to another. Eight of these new guns could throw a salvo greater by a ton than 10 of the 13½'s—and give a disproportionately higher explosive effect, too. The gleam returned to Churchill's eye. He pondered the outcome of putting just eight of these mighty guns on a regular Dreadnought, keeping the 13-inch armor-plated sides, and devoting the old fifth turret's space to increased engine power. He thought the result might be a battleship with the speed of a battle cruiser, but with superior armor and firepower. The Admiralty went right to work to build its Fast Division—the 31,000-ton Warspite, Barham, Malaya, Queen Elizabeth, and Valiant, ships fast enough and dangerous enough to fight two World Wars.
But brilliant advances have a way of leading into knotty problems. It turned out that the super-Dreads of the Fast Division could make 25 knots only by using petroleum fuel. Additionally, the Admiralty learned that oil would give the navy 40 percent more radius per ton of fuel consumed than it could get using coal. Tankers could refuel the battlewagons at sea, whereas a fourth of a coal-burning fleet was always back in port taking on coal. Under wartime conditions, the coaling operation would rob the entire crew of its shore leave. It was also found that converting to oil would cut maintenance and operating personnel in half. Weighty reasons for converting!

But this had its repercussions. Fleets of tankers had to be built to bring in petroleum from abroad since England had no oil resources of her own. Great storage facilities had to be built and protected. And a navy dependent on foreign oil sources would necessarily press the government to take the lead in prospecting for oil and purchasing oil properties in such places as India, Persia, and the Arab Middle East. “This led to enormous expense and tremendous opposition on the Naval Estimates,” Churchill admits, “yet it was absolutely impossible to turn back.”

The military literature of that “age of anxiety” on the eve of 1914 dramatically captures for the reader the apprehensions daily haunting London. Would the Germans some day pull a cataclysmic surprise?

Churchill had no fear of their gunnery. The worst “nightmare novel” he had ever read had portrayed a German fleet unmasking 15-inch artillery to inflict a climactic defeat on the Royal Navy. But Churchill could comfort himself that “this boot was on the other leg.” But what about torpedoes, increasingly sophisticated and
now deliverable with tenfold force by submarines? Might not fiendish new types of mines erase Britain's margin of safety on the day of decision?

To keep the navy alert, Churchill occasionally ordered surprise count-downs, asking the naval staff "What happens if war with Germany starts today?" Always on their toes, the admirals triumphantly demonstrated to Churchill how they could on short notice effect dispositions that would face the oncoming Germans with superior seapower.

The Home Fleet carefully chose the time for its cruises to Spain and back—waiting until the German Navy was having its winter refits. British North Sea maneuvers were conducted with careful regard for coaling and shore leave arrangements which would not unduly embarrass the Home Fleet should the Germans make their move.

Seeking Solutions

As in today's cold war, statesmen in pre-1914 Britain were continually searching for a release of the unbearable tensions created by the strategic situation on the North Sea. After the Liberal régime's attempt to achieve disarmament by example collapsed in 1907, Fisher began campaigning for a "Pearl Harbor" attack on the Germans after the fashion of the Japanese thrust at Port Arthur in 1904—or Britain's own ravishment of Denmark's Fleet in 1801.

Most British statesmen rivaled their American cousins in sentimentality, and they were also morally above Fisher's doctrine of the "pre-emptive strike," as we would call it today. The Committee of Imperial Defense secretly considered it very likely that Germany would, if decisive results were obtainable, try preemption against the Home Fleet.

But the British official policy, as enunciated by Churchill at Glasgow in 1912, was that "We have no thoughts . . . of aggression, and we attribute no such thoughts to other Great Powers." The Foreign Office shortly afterward declared to the Germans that England would "make no unprovoked attack on Germany, pursue no aggressive policy towards her."

Naval Holiday

Such expressions awakened no corresponding sentiments in Berlin, but the British Government decided in the winter of 1911-12 to approach Germany with proposals for a "naval holiday." As is so often the case in politics, the Cabinet had twin motives. The more idealistic Ministers primarily hoped for a relaxation of tensions on the North Sea diplomatic front. The more hard-boiled members argued that the government's hand would be stronger in the annual battle for military appropriations if the House of Commons were convinced that an honest effort had been made to mitigate the ruinously expensive naval race.

The negotiations with Germany culminated in the visit of the Secretary of State for War, Richard B. Haldane, to Berlin in early 1912. But the high British hopes for a naval settlement went to pieces in a hurry. The Kaiser gave Haldane a copy of proposed German naval construction for the years 1912-16. This revealed a naval program destined to give Germany a 29 to 22 lead in capital ships unless a naval moratorium were achieved right away—or a drastic increase in British construction undertaken.

A naval holiday, the German Foreign Office insisted, was unthinkable unless coupled with a general political settlement. Germany would be glad to
scrap her projected increase in capital ships, provided Britain gave a contractual guarantee of her future neutrality in the event of a conflict among the continental powers. Therefore, if Britain would junk the Triple Entente, the foundation stones of her security, and return to "splendid isolation," Germany would be pleased to scrap some of her unbuilt warships. Heads, Germany wins; tails, Britain loses. Britain's future security had to be left at the mercy of what Prince Bismarck had predicted would be "some fool thing in the Balkans."

There exists, then, a discernible similarity between the pre-1914 and the post-1945 eras. Whether the present era will end with a vast thermo-nuclear incineration of the human species is not within the competence of the historian to suggest. But while making all due allowances for large and for small differences between the two eras compared above, it is clear that we can draw valuable lessons from the British experience of the earlier day.

Each challenge posed by technical progress must be faced realistically, notwithstanding the tendency of military establishments to grow conservative toward familiar hardware. The value of vigorous and imaginative civilian and military leadership cannot be overstressed. Vigilance is no infallible guarantee of victory, but the lack of it will certainly bring swift and bitter retribution.

Purity of motive and sincerity of intent are by themselves of little value when dealing with opportunistic antagonists cynically determined to exploit every show of generosity toward them. Panic is not very helpful in such situations either, for human opponents never turn out to be supermen.

Finally, there has never been a better time in the history of the world than now to promote the education of the sovereign citizenry in the history and terminology of the profession of arms. In recent decades, it has become crystal clear that warfare can no longer be the exclusive province of a closed society of professionals.

Modern war has forced itself upon the people as a whole, obliterating once meaningful distinctions between civilian and military spheres. The voracious requirements of past wars and fears of future wars consume today more than half of the US Federal budget, a tenth of the gross national product.

The American public owes its military professionals the sympathetic understanding that comes only from a deepening acquaintance with the past and present of warfare. Such understanding seems the best guarantee that our society will win the endurance contest thrust upon it within the past generation.
BECAUSE the French lost their war in Vietnam, many Americans are prone to cast only a perfunctory glance at French experiences in that war. Americans are also quick to point out that consideration of the French experience is not appropriate today because the United States is far wealthier and more powerful than France was in those days. Besides, the accusation is sometimes made that the French Government and the French people were never fully behind the war effort.

Although these arguments may be valid, it would be foolish, if not dangerous, to ignore the mistakes which the French made in Indochina. There are a surprisingly large number of similarities between the French war and the one now being fought in Vietnam:

- The terrain and climate are the same.
The foe is virtually the same.

The enemy is using the same principles and tactics.

There is a contiguous sanctuary, and no feasible means to seal the border.

The battle environment facilitates guerrilla operations.

Importance of Ideology

Perhaps the most significant mistake that the French made in Indochina was not military at all. It was the political decision to reinstitute colonial rule after World War II. Just six weeks after V-J Day, the French soldiers who had been interned in Saigon by the Japanese took over the city in a coup d'état, and French colonial administration was soon reestablished on South Vietnam. By April 1946, North Vietnam had also been brought under French control.

These measures were out of step with the surge of nationalism which swept the colonial areas after World War II. Moreover, the new leader of the West, the United States, soon made clear her opposition to colonialism. In spite of these developments, however, France took positive measures to consolidate her position.

Almost immediately, she was challenged by Ho Chi-minh, a Communist, who capitalized on the nationalistic fervor of the people by demanding independence for Vietnam. But Ho Chi-minh’s was not the only voice clamoring for freedom. There were other nationalist leaders who also wanted independence and who were not Communists. As late as mid-1949, France still had an opportunity to come to terms with these non-Communist nationalists and thereby block Ho Chi-minh.

At that time, however, France did not see the problem in terms of independence or nationalism. She was not prepared to make concessions. She wanted to retain Indochina as a colony. Thus, Ho Chi-minh emerged as the strongest Vietnamese leader, and he led the revolution against French “colonial reconquest.”

Win Minds

Ho Chi-minh saw the struggle as an ideological one in which colonialism was but one element—albeit an important one. Although recognizing the importance of winning early battles against the French, he felt that it was an absolute necessity to win the minds of the people by convincing them that his ideology was better than that of the French.

This does not mean that Ho Chi-minh tried to dazzle the people—many of whom were peasants—with complex Marxist philosophies. On the contrary, he reduced his concepts to simple terms that all could understand. It was not difficult for him to explain that Vietnam should belong to the Vietnamese, that the Frenchmen were there to enrich themselves at the expense of the Vietnamese, that France as a nation was keeping herself strong by stealing the resources of her colonies, and that it was time for the hated colonial rule to come to an end. He blamed all the local problems—political, social, and economic—on the

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system which the French had imposed on Vietnam. He found fertile ground on many issues where reforms were, indeed, long overdue, such as reapportionment of the land.

Ideology was given primacy so as to provide a “noble cause” to both the people and the army. By thoroughly indoctrinating his troops, he was able to instill strong revolutionary zeal and a willingness to endure extreme privations and risks. Under the mantle of a common ideology, the people and the army were to function as a single entity.

Offensive Underestimated

The French underestimated the potency of this ideological offensive. They saw the problem as one which simply required military suppression in the conventional colonial manner. French ideology was based on a conviction that recolonialization of Vietnam was a sort of validation of their victory in World War II, and thus necessary for the maintenance of French greatness. They also rationalized that the Vietnamese would, thereby, benefit from French culture and civilization.

These views were convincing to most Frenchmen, but they had little appeal to the Vietnamese. Many thousands of Vietnamese, in both North and South, made their choice against communism. Many other Vietnamese might have preferred liberal democracy to communism if democracy had provided them with political independence instead of colonial status. France, however, was unwilling to make this concession, nor was she ready to make meaningful land reforms and social reforms.

When French officials finally realized their shortcomings in the ideological area, the corrective measures they took were too little and too late. The bulk of the population had allied itself with the side whose cause seemed to be closest to their own—the Vietminh.

Intelligence

Success in guerrilla war depends on intelligence. Good intelligence depends on the support of the people. Once the bulk of the people was lost, therefore, the French found themselves at a terrific disadvantage. Virtually every time the French made a move, the word was passed by local Vietnamese civilians to the nearest Vietminh agent who, in turn, got the word to the army. The French found themselves trying to conduct military operations in a “fishbowl,” thereby denying to them the important element of tactical surprise.

The possible use of helicopters to obtain surprise with speed was not feasible since there were only a handful of helicopters in the theater. The Communists always had a good estimate of French strength in a given sector, but the French seldom had a good idea of what was facing them. When the French made a mobile thrust into enemy territory, the Communists not only could tell the probable depth of the penetration and the probable duration of the operation, but also the probable intentions of the commander.

Recognizing the importance that intelligence would play in the struggle, the Vietminh in about 1948 formed an intelligence service that became an elite corps whose members were handpicked. Its functions differed from those of Western intelligence units. In addition to the traditional intelligence functions, Vietminh intelligence also reconnoitered retreat and advance routes, picked places for ambushes,
planted agents, taught and supervised camouflage, determined losses of men and arms, and performed many other duties.

From captured documents, the French found that Vietminh intelligence personnel prepared extremely detailed and accurate surveys of anticipated battle areas to include trafficability charts for coolies. Even the

important to the West, was reduced in effectiveness by the heavy vegetation, mountainous terrain, and the weather.

The French, of course, knew how important it is for guerrillas to get good intelligence. They had learned the lesson the hard way during the maquis operations against the Germans in World War II. Nevertheless, they lost the intelligence aspect of the war in Vietnam, and were never strong enough in combat power to make up for their intelligence deficit.

Strategy and Tactics

Prior to 1949, the French enjoyed a definite military superiority over the Vietminh, but they were not able during this period decisively to beat down the rebellion. When the Chinese Communists closed on the North Vietnamese border in 1949, the war took on an entirely new dimension. The French were able temporarily to counter this advantage through the genius of General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. His strategy was to try to bring about setpiece battles where the French could get the enemy out in the open and deal him a fatal blow.

In early 1951, General De Lattre enticed General Vo Nguyen Giap to attack the French in force, and the result was a number of bloody defeats for the Vietminh. These battles taught General Giap a lesson. Subsequently, he refused to be drawn into the type of meat grinder operation which the United States had used to such advantage in Korea. From then on, he accepted battle only on his own terms.

General Giap threatened the Thai Highlands in late 1952, and the new French commander, General Raoul A. L. Salan, decided to counter this move by hitting the Vietminh at their base of supply at Phu-Doan. General Salan dispatched four mobile regimental
combat teams—over 30,000 men—but these units were frequently ambushed, and never reached the main Vietminh depot.

General Henri Navarre took command in mid-1953, and tried to stem further Communist successes by building a series of forts along the Lao-Vietnamese border. The French, at one point, had over 80,000 troops in 900 forts.

The most important of the forts was Dien Bien Phu where the French ultimately lost about 12,000 men. The Vietminh losses were even higher by the time the fort finally surrendered, but here again was demonstrated the Vietminh's propensity for political considerations. At the time of the siege at Dien Bien Phu, the Geneva negotiations had begun, and the Vietminh decided that a victory over the garrison there would force the French to end the war.

Tactical Lessons

The battle of Dien Bien Phu provides at least two important tactical lessons: first, the fort was located too far from its source of supplies and reinforcements, and second, the French underestimated the capability of the enemy to innovate and to tailor his tactics to fit the situation.

Approach trenches were dug in ever-tightening circles, thus permitting the infantry to close within a few yards of the defenders before launching their attacks. Artillery pieces were disposed on the forward slopes of the surrounding hills instead of on the reverse slope. The artillery pieces were dismantled and carried into predug emplacements under the cover of night. Then shellproof roofs were erected. The camouflage was so good that even the paths of the ammunition handlers were hid-

100, was an elite force of seasoned veterans, many of whom had fought in Korea. Within seven months this group was so badly beaten that it no longer existed as a unit. GM 100, despite its strength, was always at a disadvantage because it was tied to the roads by its heavy equipment and was vulnerable to repeated ambushes. The last such ambush almost annihilated the unit.

The ambush was a primary tactic of the Vietminh. Ambushes were not spur-of-the-moment operations, but were carefully planned and prepared.
This Vietminh tactic recognized that the French enjoyed superiority in numbers and firepower, but were tied to the roads by their equipment and by the conventional tactics that they employed.

The Vietminh also had other advantages. They possessed a superior intelligence network, they could take advantage of heavily vegetated terrain for concealment, and their lightly equipped soldiers could move quickly across country to ambush much larger roadbound French units. Moreover, the Vietminh could stake out an area and lie in wait for days without fear that their position would be disclosed by the local populace.

For a long time, the French forces' antiambush tactics were based on an erroneous assumption that ambushes were being set up as conventional roadblocks that could be flanked by the rear elements of the convoy. After many defeats, they learned that most ambushes contained enemy blocking forces at both ends of the ambushed stretch of road, plus a main ambushing element on both sides of the road —thus pinning the column down and preventing it from maneuvering. The French found that it helped somewhat to stretch the column out to make it harder for the Vietminh to encircle the whole unit. It was also of some help to use helicopters for detection, but the French had only four helicopters in the entire theater in March 1954.

Early in the war, the French tried a program of pacification as a means of ultimately winning over the country. The program was both military and political. It aimed to crush the guerrillas, to assist the local people to defend themselves, and to restore
local administration to normal. The French enjoyed some success in this venture, especially in the military aspect. The political side, however, was doomed to failure by the reluctance of France to grant independence to the Vietnamese, and by its failure to initiate necessary reforms and improvements once military control had been gained.

Counterguerrilla Forces

Another tactic that the French tried was the use of counterguerrilla forces patterned after the *maquis* operations of World War II days. In the opinion of General Paul H. Ely, counterguerrilla forces were the only ones which could successfully cope with guerrillas since the same methods of trickery, flexibility, and mobility had to be used to defeat them. He felt that the French realized this too late, and that counterguerrillas were used in insufficient numbers. Not too much official information is available on these French "commando" operations, but apparently the French used several thousand mountain tribesmen as antiguerillas under French advisors.

Bernard B. Fall does not fully share General Ely's enthusiasm for the counterguerrillas. Mr. Fall points out that as long as the home area is highly infiltrated, it is extremely difficult to keep these units from being betrayed. He also reports that many of these tribesmen would not leave their families after the armistice was signed. Many of these men, together with French advisors who decided not to attempt to work their way through enemy territory, fought to the very end against the Vietminh mop-up operations.

From the purely military point of view, there were apparently three primary and interrelated factors that contributed to the military success of the Vietminh:

- The use of five, simple tactical principles—speed of movement, surprise, undermining of enemy morale, security, and collaboration with the populace.
- Good, accurate, and up-to-date intelligence.
- Detailed planning.

The "Sanctuary"

The "sanctuary" was another vital aspect of the war. In retrospect, it is now evident that the beginning of the end for the French came in late 1949 when the Chinese Communists occupied all of the Chinese provinces bordering on Tonkin. A sanctuary was thus provided the Vietminh where troops could be trained without molestation by the French, and where supplies could be stored and drawn as needed. This was probably the key development of the conflict. Because the French did not have the resources to seal off the border, they tried to block enemy movements by the traditional method of spotting forts as key points along main roads. Vietminh, however, did not rely on the roads and easily bypassed the forts.

Within a few months the Vietminh took the offensive, after being augmented by several battalions of troops trained in China, and after being supplied with large numbers of howitzers captured from the Chinese Nationalists. One by one the French forts fell, and by October 1950 almost the entire northern half of North Vietnam had come under Vietminh control.

The war was to last another four years, but the sanctuary on the north prevented the French from gaining a decisive victory. It also enabled the
Vietminh progressively to bleed the French Army until France was obliged to sue for peace. The French knew how important the sanctuary was to the Vietminh, but the French Army simply did not have sufficient military capability to seal off the border.

When pressure was brought to bear by the great powers to end the fighting in Indochina, both the French and the North Vietnamese tried to improve their military postures in the field so that they could be in a better bargaining position at the conference table. But here, again, the French were outfoxed by Ho Chi-minh. Realizing that the political stakes demanded a military victory of large proportions, and that the French did not expect him to accept a setpiece battle, Ho Chi-minh decided to go all out to capture Dien Bien Phu. When the fort eventually fell, his political objective was within his grasp.

There are several important lessons that the United States should have learned from the French experience, and that we should be applying in Vietnam today.

The Communists saw the situation in Vietnam as ripe for revolution, so they fought a revolutionary war. They recognized that in order to win a revolutionary war, they had to convince a sufficient number of people, peasants and elites, that their cause was more in the interest of the people than was that of the government. The people wanted independence.

Thus, the French experience teaches the United States that ideology should be given primary attention if we hope to win the war with the Viet Cong.

From a military standpoint, we are fighting a competent, dangerous foe in terrain that works to his advantage. He will try to avoid fighting a battle of our choosing and on our terms. He may make strategic and tactical mistakes, but he will correct them promptly. He will capitalize on US mistakes. He will move his forces faster than seems possible. He will employ ambushes of all types with telling effect unless we employ effective countermeasures. He will try to reduce our forces by ambushes, mines and booby traps, sniping, and overrun small posts. He will place a great deal more emphasis on intelligence than US forces ordinarily do in a combat situation. Our success in the intelligence field will depend to a large extent on our success in winning the Vietnamese to our side.

The Viet Cong may try to achieve a military victory after negotiations have begun so that they will enhance their position at the bargaining table. They may concentrate large numbers of units and hit a position like Da Nang with an enormous force. Their objective would be to destroy the entire complex and its garrison, and thus achieve a psychological victory that they would attempt to parlay into further concessions. They might also try to achieve the same effect with a commando raid against a supply depot. Thus, the United States should be extremely careful not to let down her guard when negotiations have begun.
THE SPECTER OF DIEN BIEN PHU

Colonel William F. Long, Jr., United States Army

POLITICAL pundits and military prophets periodically probe and peel the situation in Vietnam in order to produce parallels predictive of another "Dien Bien Phu."

Dien Bien Phu—or DBP—has become an acronym or shorthand symbol for the defeat of the West by the East, for the triumph of primitive, new doctrines and techniques of peoples' wars over the sophisticated principles and maxims of the heritage of Napoleon Bonaparte. Dien Bien Phu resulted in severe political consequences. The Communists glorified the results for political and psychological reasons. The net result has been the development of a DBP syndrome with reference to the war in Vietnam today. Whenever any one or several of the symptoms is present, the specter of Dien Bien Phu is raised.

Many tactical aspects of Dien Bien Phu are interesting. The dramatic aspects of selfless heroism in the face of a forlorn hope received—and will continue to receive—widespread romantic publicity. However, the basic distortion is that DBP made any difference at all. When the Vietminh Le Hong Phong II offensive cleared the Chinese Communist border of a
French presence, the logistic scales swung to the side of the Vietminh. By March 1954 the subversive political battle had been all but won in the entire Red River Delta. Tactically, the French at Dien Bien Phu were reduced by the application of superior firepower and siege tactics as classic as any devised by Napoleon.

Reasons for Defeat
The strategic facts are that the French lost the war in Indochina for three basic reasons:

- They could not present a political attraction equal to nationalism.
- Lacking a persuasive, attractive local appeal, the French home support for the war was not strong and direct enough to provide the military resources for continued colonialism.
- They did not have the physical resources to project sufficient military strength into the arena to prevail after Communist China appeared on the Indochina border in 1950.

The fear that the United States faces a new Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in the current situation is the specter that haunts many critics of the present US involvement. Also, much of the current criticism of US involvement in Vietnam reflects the French point of view that since they failed, the United States will also fail.

Perhaps the same was said about the Panama Canal after the French abandoned that effort. In any event, acceptance of this equation must be based upon the concept that the situation is parallel, and both countries are equal in their political orientation, national will, and national resources. This is not true, and any illusions based upon parallel thinking or romantic mysticism only works to the advantage of the Communists whose strategy it is to blur the military picture and distort the political issues.

US Position Clear
The United States does not labor under the political handicap of colonialism as did the French. The South Vietnamese Government is not the creature of the United States. Our position to ourselves and to the world is quite clear. Communist charges of colonialism or neocolonialism are raised only to distort the real political issue, which is not colonialism, but aggressive international communism and Chinese imperialism versus the growth of diverse nationalism.

There is no comparison between the physical resources of France in the early 1950's and the United States of today. France was exhausted by World War II. She was hampered by a large, disloyal Communist Party which was strong enough to play a major role in the government; rent by the frustrations of a crumbling colonial empire; and engaged in a war in which no amount of French gallantry and military dedication could substitute for sound political strategy.

France had to put together makeshift forces at the end of an 8,000-mile supply line without the services of the largest navy and air force in

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the world which is available to the United States. France could not pose a threat to the national existence of Communist China; while the United States could ruin China even without the use of nuclear weapons by destroying her transportation system and commerce by sea and air action alone.

**Psychological Weapons**

There is no doubt that China and the other Communist powers in Asia understand the real military situation and the awesome power available to the United States. Therefore, they have unleashed every weapon in their psychological arsenal upon their only hope of success—US homefront support for the war in Vietnam. Knowing the US concern for human lives, they play upon the war itself as the evil rather than the evil purpose behind the war. Thus, the major thrust of the Communist psychological campaign to erode US support is based on the simple but fallacious proposition that war causes death; death is bad; therefore, stop fighting.

There is another equally dangerous and potentially effective psychological weapon that they use to tranquilize distant observers. It goes like this: Communist subversion is merely civil war; overt help by the United States is aggression; therefore, stop the aggression and let events prevail.

Then there is the argument aimed at the intellectual, detached, objective audience in the West. This approach is that southeast Asia is legitimately in China’s sphere of influence—therefore, be reasonable and get out. Americans of this generation can certainly hear Adolf Hitler in the wings chuckling to himself as he sees his arguments at Munich being supported by some of the people who were so outraged when the Western Powers sacrificed Czechoslovakia for a transitory, temporary respite.

There is also a psychological argument which was used quite effectively in rationalizing the US position with reference to the Chinese Communist “agrarian reformers” in 1949. The fact that the Chinese Nationalist Government may have been inept and corrupt was ample excuse to some for abandoning resistance to a Communist takeover in China. Now, the new syllogism is: The South Vietnamese Government is unstable and corrupt; Ho Chi-minh is stable and puritan; therefore, let Ho Chi-minh (the Asian Oliver Cromwell) prevail. This approach subordinates the US national interest to a personalized view of collective government morality, and ignores that the Communists project a seemingly upright image of moral rectitude for totally evil reasons.

US troops in Vietnam are backed by vastly greater strength than their French predecessors.
There is also an argument which appeals to those who opt for inaction. This is one that a united Communist Vietnam would be better able to resist an imperialistic, expansionist China. Therefore, it would be better to abandon South Vietnam in order to strengthen Ho Chi-minh and make him better able to resist Chinese aggression. This assumes, of course, that Ho Chi-minh is both willing and able to deny the Chinese what they desire. It also does not cope with the reciprocal of this proposition that a united Communist Vietnam could also gobble up Laos and Cambodia and effectively isolate Thailand.

Another “reasonable” argument in the Communist psychological bag is that there is no political or social discipline in southeast Asia; the Communists have developed the mechanism for instituting and perpetuating discipline through the use of party cadres; therefore, let the Communists bring their kind of order out of political and social chaos in southeast Asia. Both arguments neglect the tragic local consequences for those who resisted Communist terror and persuasion, and the international impact upon those whose own future depends upon the strength and stamina of the Western democracies.

Elements of Truth

The danger is not so much that these psychological weapons have a total appeal, but that there are elements of truth and attractiveness in each of the arguments for different segments of the diverse Western World. There is also adequate proof in the Communist conquest and organization of mainland China that Mao Tse-tung has developed effective techniques for manipulating and managing the Eastern peasant mentality.

This gives rise to the frequently articulated apprehension that this is Eastern lore—too mystical and remote from the West for Western men to combat, much less understand. However, even if this point is conceded, it is well to remember that the Filipinos, Japanese, Thais, Malays—in fact, the Vietnamese—are also Eastern people, and that, perhaps, our best role is to hold open the opportunity and make way for the Ramon Magaysaysays of the free Eastern World when they do emerge.

Meanwhile, the US military forces should be permitted, and even encouraged, by the US people to do what they can. Military forces can win battles, they can restrict the military and
political maneuvers of the enemy, and they can reverse the psychological point of view—namely, that the Communists are winning. It will be increasingly hard for the Viet Cong to go on losing the military battles and retain their morale and political poise.

Finally, logistics can govern battles and change attitudes. As government and US military offensives force the Viet Cong to use their scarce supplies at an accelerated rate, and ground forays and air raids destroy enemy caches and interdict routes of supply, the Viet Cong will, of necessity, become increasingly oppressive in their attitudes toward the local Vietnamese people. Continued pressure in this respect can give lie to the Communist claim that they are the friends of the people, and can expose them as rapacious enemies of the people even before they consolidate their political power.

Lacking the physical and technological resources, the Communists aim at a political and psychological DBP. They depend upon the techniques of protracted war to wear out the people who are opposing them both in Vietnam and in the United States. They count upon their psychological arguments individually and collectively to sow dissension, develop inhibitions, promote feelings of guilt, and wear down the psychological stamina of their enemies. All of their published purposes and programs are based on their confident predictions that they have superior resources of psychological stamina and political will.

In our society, political will and moral stamina are based upon seeing the issues clearly, and then determining a resolute course of action. It will be well to review continually the true issues, and carefully chart the Communist psychological techniques that are used in an effort to convince us that wrong is right and weakness is strength. The Chinese Communists claim that all things are divisible, including the power of the United States. Therefore, it is quite in keeping with their advertised strategy and traditional outlook to attempt to use our own diversity to achieve by clever psychology what they can never achieve by force of arms—a new Dien Bien Phu.
DISCUSSING the subject of leadership, I am struck by two diametrically opposite concepts. One conceives leadership as an exact science capable of being understood and practiced by anyone. This view is ably developed by Colonel Sherman L. Kiser, US Army, Retired, in his book, *The American Concept of Leadership*. An opposite concept holds that “no amount of learning will make a man a leader unless he has the natural qualities of one.” This latter view was that of General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, and is expounded in his published lectures in *Generals and Generalship*. One concept treats leadership as a science; the other as an art.

I incline strongly to the Wavell concept. While recognizing that there are many principles, or truths, pertaining to the exercise of leadership, and while firmly believing that powers of leadership can be greatly increased in any individual through knowledge of these principles and practice in their application, I still think the variables of human nature combined with those of combat, and to a lesser degree with those in peacetime training, make the exercise of leadership far more of an art than a science.

There is, of course, a great deal of bad leadership as well as of good. It, too, deserves study so that its pitfalls may be avoided. But in general, I believe bad leadership is the result either of violation of basic principles, or the lack or failure to develop one or more of the qualities of good leadership. In any event, I want to speak now of the good type of military leadership with some specific reference later to combat leadership of large units—the division, corps, and army.

The chief ingredients of leadership, as I have known it to be exercised by those whose careers I have studied, or under whose command I was privileged to serve, are three. I call them the three C’s—character, courage, and competence.

Character is the bedrock on which the whole edifice of leadership rests. It is the prime element for which every profession, every corporation, every industry searches in evaluating a member of its organization. With it, the full worth of an individual can be developed. Without it—particularly
in the military profession—failure in peace, disaster in war, or, at best, mediocrity in both will result.

Types of Character

We often use this word "character" carelessly. There are those of notoriously evil character, as well as those of an exemplary one. Yet in its usual acceptation it stands for those magnificent traits which placed George Washington first among his countrymen and, in fact, made him the Father of his Country—the unanimous choice for our first Presidency. It stands for the time-honored code of the officer corps. It stands for self-discipline, loyalty, readiness to accept responsibility, and willingness to admit mistakes. It stands for selflessness, modesty, humility, willingness to sacrifice when necessary, and, in my opinion, for faith in God. Let me illustrate.

During a critical phase of the Battle of the Bulge, when I commanded the 18th Airborne Corps, another corps commander just entering the fight next to me remarked: "I'm glad to have you on my flank. It's character that counts." I had long known him, and I knew what he meant. I replied: "That goes for me, too." There was no amplification. None was necessary. Each knew the other would stick however great the pressure; would extend help before it was asked, if he could; and would tell the truth, seek no self-glory, and everlasting keep his word. Such feeling breeds confidence and success.

Self-Discipline

Only those who have disciplined themselves can exact disciplined performance from others. When the chips are down, when privation mounts and the casualty rate rises, when the crisis is at hand, which commander, I ask, receives the better response? Is it the one who has failed to share the rough going with his troops, who is rarely seen in the zone of aimed fire, and who expects much and gives little? Or is it the one whose every thought is for the welfare of his men, consistent with the accomplishment of his mission; who does not ask them to do what he has not already done and stands ready to do again when necessary; who with his men has shared short rations, the physical discomforts and rigors of campaign, and will be found at the crises of action where the issues are to be decided?

I know your answer: self-disciplined, self-controlled, and so in control of others, no matter how tough the going—Washington at the Battle of Long Island and at Valley Forge; Grant at Shiloh; Mackenzie of the 4th Cavalry in his epic raid; the junior officer pursuing hostile Indians in sub-zero weather on our western plains, closing up at dark for a dawn attack, with no fires permitted and only cold rations, if any, before H-hour—much the same many times in Korea, I might add, and I am sure under equally arduous conditions in Viet-
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nam today; the young ship commander named Kennedy, his patrol torpedo boat sunk in action, his crew safely on the beach, then swimming out in shark-infested waters to try to intercept a friendly destroyer and rescue his men.

The world's annals and our own are studded with the names of such men, General Washington wrote to Congress from Valley Forge:

... without arrogance or the smallest deviation from truth, it may be said that no history now extant, can furnish an instance of an Army's suffering such uncommon hardships as ours have done, and bearing them with the same patience and fortitude. To

General George Washington shared the privations and short rations of his men and earned their unswerving loyalty

of all services and all grades. Always ready to assume responsibilities, they could always assign them to others and know they would be willingly accepted. True to themselves and to their conscience, their men sense they will be true to them, giving them full credit, and frankly admitting mistakes and accepting responsibility when they themselves are to blame.

see men without clothes to clothe their nakedness, without blankets to lie on, without shoes, by which their marches might be traced by the blood from their feet, and almost as often without provisions as with; marching through frost and snow, and at Christmas taking up their winter quarters within a day's march of the enemy, without a house or hut to
cover them till they could be built, and submitting to it without a murmur, is a mark of patience and obedience which in my opinion can scarce be paralleled.

And what Washington did not say—a mark of his own unexcelled leadership.

An eyewitness report of Lee after Pickett's failure stated:

*His face did not show the slightest disappointment, care or annoyance, and he addressed to every soldier he met a few words of encouragement: ‘All will come right in the end, we'll talk it over afterwards.’ And to a Brigade Commander speaking angrily of the heavy losses of his men: ‘Never mind, General, all this has been my fault. It is I who have lost this fight, and you must help me out of it the best way you can.’*

For leadership through willingness to admit mistakes and instantly to accept responsibility, I think, history can offer few examples to surpass this.

**Willingness to Sacrifice**

Archibald Rutledge once wrote that there can be no real love without a willingness to sacrifice. Tuck this away in your inner minds. It may pay off in some crisis coming to you in the years now hidden beyond the horizon. Do you love your country and its flag? Do you love the branch in which you are serving, the men with whom you will be privileged to share service and to command? If you do, then you will be prepared to sacrifice for them, if your responsibilities or the situation so demands. The commander of Torpedo Squadron 8 at Midway; the four Army chaplains on the torpedoed SS Dorchester off Iceland in predawn darkness in February 1942; the many aircraft commanders who have ordered “abandon ship,” then stuck overlong to the controls to insure that their last man was out.

Courage, the second “C,” could well be treated as a trait of character, as, indeed, it is. Yet it deserves, I believe, a separate category, for I know of not one recipient of history's accolade for battle leadership of enduring fame who was not known for great gallantry.

**Physical and Moral Courage**

There are two kinds of courage, physical and moral, and he who would be a true leader must have both. Both are products of the character-forming process, of the development of self-control, self-discipline, physical endurance, of knowledge of one's job and, therefore, of confidence. These qualities minimize fear and maximize sound judgment under pressure and—with some of that indispensable stuff called luck—often bring success from seemingly hopeless situations.

Putting aside impulsive acts of reckless bravery, both kinds of courage bespeak an untroubled conscience, a mind at peace with God. An example is Colonel John H. Glenn who was asked after his first rocket flight if he had been worried, and who replied: “I am trying to live the best I can. My peace had been made with my Maker for a number of years, so I had no particular worries.”

Examples of physical courage are neither confined to combat nor limited to a stouthearted few, but are common throughout the world among men and women of every color, creed, race, and age, in peace as well as in war. However, examples of moral courage are less well known. They can be considered as proof of true greatness of soul. Where the individual has not measured up, he has generally failed fortune's bid to fame.
To me such incidents most frequently found in war are those where the career of the leader is at stake, and where his actions or decisions will determine the saving or slaughter of many of his men. History is full of these cases. The lure of glory, the fear of being thought afraid, of losing personal power and prestige, the mistaken idea that blind obedience to orders has no alternative—all have been followed by tragic losses of lives with little or no gain.

History often glosses over the countless thousands of lives which have been fruitlessly sacrificed to the pull of power, prestige, and publicity. Haig’s Flanders Campaign in 1917 is a conspicuous example. Here, 100,000 men were sacrificed for the gain of 1,000 yards of almost bottomless morass.

It is easy to gamble with other people’s money, and sometimes easier still with other men’s lives, particularly when your own is in no great danger. You remember the commanders’ conference prior to one of the big offensives of World War I, when a corps commander—whose command post was miles behind the front—spoke out during a lull in the meeting, saying: “I’d give 10,000 men to take that hill.” And a liaison officer from a frontline infantry unit remarked to a brother officer standing beside him in the back of the room: “Generous, isn’t he?”

Opposition to Orders

The military services deal harshly, as they should, with failure to carry out orders in battle. The commander present on the scene is entitled to full, instant, and enthusiastic execution by subordinates. Yet when faced with different situations from those anticipated, as well as in the transition from plans to orders, there sometimes comes the challenge to one’s conscience, the compelling urge to oppose foolhardy operations before it is too late, before the orders are issued and lives are needlessly thrown away.

Or the leader may be faced with the decision: Shall I take the responsibility of discarding the original mission? Shall I take the initiative and strive for success along different lines? He will have to put those questions to his conscience. “Blind obedience,” said Napoleon Bonaparte, “is due only to a superior present on the spot at the moment of action.” I concur.

I still support a statement of mine of some years ago:

It has long seemed to me that the hard decisions are not the ones you make in the heat of battle. Far harder
to make are those involved in speaking your mind about some harebrained scheme which proposes to commit troops to action under conditions where failure seems almost certain, and the only results will be the needless sacrifice of priceless lives. When all is said and done, the most precious asset any nation has is its youth, and for a battle commander ever to condone the unnecessary sacrifice of his men is inexcusable. In any action you must balance the inevitable cost in lives against the objectives you seek to attain. Unless the results to be expected can reasonably justify the estimated loss of life the action involves, then for my part I want none of it.

General George C. Marshall, one of the noblest men who has worn an American uniform since Washington, once said of decisions of this kind: "It is hard to get men to do this, for this is when you lay your career, perhaps your commission, on the line."

Twice in my personal experience as a division commander I felt compelled to protect against tactical decisions that were about to be assigned to my 82d Airborne Division.

The first occasion was the planned drop on Rome in September 1943. I have recounted the incident in some detail in my book, Soldier. Recently, however, published memoirs of German generals then present in the Rome area have confirmed my views. One passage from the account of that incident illustrates the point I wish to make:

When the time comes that I must meet my Maker, the source of most humble pride to me will not be accomplishments in battle, but the fact that I was guided to make the decision to oppose this plan, at the risk of my career, right up to the Theater Commander.

The drop was not ordered.

The second experience was a proposed attack by the 82d across the Volturno River where the Germans had brought the Allied advance to a halt. The sector chosen involved getting across an unfordable river and, then, after an advance of roughly 1,000 yards across open flat terrain, the attack and seizure of a line of hills, curving away from the river on one flank, then like a bow curving back almost to the stream again on the other flank of the zone of attack, so that the assaulting troops would be under concentrated fire from the front and both flanks.

While the proposal to use the 82d was a high compliment—since it was the weakest numerically, and much
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the most lightly armed of any of the divisions in the 5th Army—I could only view the proposed operation as a suicide mission that would result in the loss of most of the assaulting troops and, then, with small chance of success. I could not accept such a mission without protest. But first I decided to discuss the plan with Gen-

eral Lucien K. Truscott, Commanding General, US 3d Infantry Division, a field commander conspicuous for competence and gallantry, and an old friend. He said he wouldn't touch it with a 40-foot pole, even with his heavier division. So I spoke my mind, first to the corps commander, under whom the operation was to be mounted—and I used the word "fantastic"—and, finally, to the army commander. The plan was canceled.

In action and out, there is often a thin dividing line between recklessness, boldness, and caution. Even later study of battle records may fail to erase that line, for it is next to impossible to reconstruct the exact picture as it was thrown on the screen of the commander's brain at any particular crisis of combat. Yet experience, your own and that of others which you have absorbed, together with commonsense, will be your best guides, and with good luck will see you through.

Physical Fitness

Physical fitness comes under competence, the third of my three basic ingredients of leadership. It plays a great part. My own earlier training at Fort Leavenworth, Fort Benning, Fort Sam Houston with the 2d Division, with the 33d Infantry in the Panama area, and with the airborne paid off in battle—first as a division, then as a corps, and, finally, as an army commander. Because of strenuous and unremitting physical training, I was able to keep up with the best of my troops in the hottest sectors and the toughest terrain and climate.

Let me mention briefly what I think the standards should be for commanders of large units. The division commander should have the physical endurance, stamina, and reserves of his best infantry battalion commanders, because that is where he belongs—with them—a good part of the time; the corps commander, those of his infantry regimental commanders; and the army commander just about the same.

And remember this, since no one can predict today when you may be thrown into combat, perhaps within hours of deplaning in an overseas theater—as happened to thousands in Korea, and as I have no doubt to many in Vietnam—you will have no time to
get in shape. You must be in shape all the time.

There is another element in battlefield leadership which I want to mention and illustrate. It is a cardinal responsibility of a commander to foresee insofar as possible where and when crises affecting his command are likely to occur. It starts with his initial estimate of the situation—a continuing mental process from the moment of entering the combat zone until his unit is pulled out of the line. Ask yourself these questions. What are the enemy capabilities? What shall I do, or what could I do, if he should exercise that one of his capabilities which would be most dangerous to me, or most likely to interfere with the accomplishment of my mission?

**Personal Presence**

As commander of a division or smaller unit, there will rarely be more than one crisis, one really critical situation facing you at any one time. The commander belongs right at that spot, not at some rear command post. He should be there before the crisis erupts, if possible. If it is not possible, then he should get there as soon as he can after it develops. Once there, then by personal observation of terrain, enemy fires, reactions, and attitudes of his own commanders on the spot—by his eyes, ears, brain, nose, and his sixth sense—he gets the best possible picture of what is happening and can best exercise his troop leadership and the full authority of his command. He can start help of every kind to his hard-pressed subordinates. He can urge higher commanders to provide additional fire support, artillery, air, other infantry weapons, and, in the future, perhaps, nuclear strikes.

No other means will provide the commander with what his personal perceptions can provide, if he is present at the critical time and place. He can personally intervene, if he thinks that necessary, but only to the extent that such intervention will be helpful and not interfere with his subordinates. He is in a position to make instant decisions, to defend, withdraw, attack, exploit, or pursue.

If, at this time, he is at some rear command post, he will have to rely on reports from others, and time will be lost, perhaps just those precious moments which spell the difference between success and failure. Notwithstanding the console capabilities of future television in combat, I still believe what I have said is true. In any event, keep this time factor ever in mind. It is the one irretrievable, inextensible, priceless element in war.

**Relief of Commanders**

The occasion for the relief of commanders may regrettably arise. If it does, there are three points to consider: Is your decision based on personal knowledge and observation, or on secondhand information? What will the effect be on the command concerned? Are you relieving a commander whose men think highly of him—even with affection—regardless of professional competence? And, finally, have you a better man available?

Every man is entitled to go into battle with the best chance of survival your forethought as a leader can provide. What best helps you discharge this responsibility? Sharing things with your men; to be always in the toughest spots; always where the crisis is, or seems most likely to develop; always thinking of what help you can give your commanders who are executing your orders; doing your ut-
most to see that the best in rations, shelter, first aid, and evacuation facilities are available; being generous with praise, swift and fair with punishment when you have the facts, intolerant of demonstrated failure in leadership on which lives depend, yet making full allowances for human weaknesses and the stresses and strains of battle on individuals.

Know Your Men
Know your men, and be constantly on the alert for potential leaders—you never know how soon you may need them. During my two years in command of the 82d Airborne Division in World War II, I was in close and daily touch with every regimental and most battalion commanders. Before acceding to command of the division, and while I was General Omar N. Bradley's assistant division commander, I had learned to call by name every infantry officer in the division.

Later, by frequent exchange of views with the infantry regimental commanders and the divisional artillery commander, I knew in advance whom they had earmarked for battalion command. I do not recall any instance where I thought the regimental commander had not picked the right man. The payoff came in Normandy. I went in with 12 infantry battalion commanders—four regiments—and I had 14 new ones when we came out, for some battalions lost as many as three commanders during the 33 days we were in that fight.

The qualities of a leader are not limited to commanders. The requirements for leadership are just as essential in the staff officer, and in some respects more exacting, since he does not have that ultimate authority which can be used when necessary and must rely even more than his commander on his own strength of character, his tact and persuasion in carrying out his duties.

Between the commander and his chief of staff in a division or larger unit there should be thorough mutual respect, understanding, and confidence with no official secrets between them. Together they form a single dual personality, and the instructions issuing from the chief of staff must have the same weight and authority as those of the commander himself.

But this does not mean that a commander who delegates such authority to his chief of staff can allow his chief to isolate him from the rest of his staff. If that happens, the commander will soon find himself out of touch, and the chief of staff will be running the unit.

There is a fine balance here. The chiefs of staff sections should know that they always have access to their commander. He should see them and visit their sections with sufficient frequency to understand their problems, to let them know he appreciates their efforts, and that he stands ready to help where he can.

Inform Subordinates
Closely akin to the relationship with staff officers is keeping in close personal touch with your principal subordinate commanders—in the division, with your brigade and separate battalion commanders; in the corps, with your division commanders, their chiefs of staff, and as many of the commanders of attached corps units as you can; and in the army, with corps and division commanders and their chiefs of staff. There is always time for these visits; administrative work can be done at night. By day you belong with your troops.
Keep them informed of your thinking and plans. When you have the concept of an operation first in mind, consult your principal commanders without delay and get their reactions. No matter how sound a tactical plan may be, the chances of successful execution will be greatly increased if you have first secured the willing acceptance by commanders responsible for execution of the missions you plan to assign them. Insure that they receive notice of your decision and the principal details of your plan as approved in ample time to permit them and their subordinates to make their necessary reconnaissances and issue their orders.

These are some of the reasons why I hold that leadership is not a science, but an art. It conceives an ideal, states it as an objective, and then seeks actively and earnestly to attain it, everlastingly persevering, because the records of war are full of successes coming to those leaders who stuck it out just a little longer than their opponents.

Some suggestions for leadership are:

- Read widely and wisely all the history and biography possible. Soak up all the personal experiences you can of battle-tested brother officers. This broadens your understanding of an art of which you can never hope to know all.
- Study thoughtfully the records of past successful leaders and adapt their methods to yours.
- Work hard to keep fit. That little extra stamina may some day pull you out of some deep holes.
- Work hard, in your own way, at being tops at your job.
- Keep the three C's—character, courage, and competence—always before your mind, and with faith in God, be yourself.
- Remember there are many others on your team, and be inwardly humble. Every man's life is equally precious, although all are at the disposal of our country, and the contribution each makes in battle is of equal potential value.

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October 1966
SOVIET troops were last committed to battle 20 years ago in the brief campaign against the Japanese in Manchuria. That campaign has received little attention in the West, but is of interest as the one real Soviet preplanned offensive, those of 1942 through 1945 in Europe having been generated in the course of a war initiated by the other side.

During the four months from April to August 1945, the Soviets moved 39 divisions and brigades and other units from Europe to bolster their forces in the Far East. They collected a total force of over one and one-half million men for the campaign—with 5,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, 5,000 combat aircraft, and 27,000 artillery pieces and mortars.

A special high command of Soviet
forces in the Far East was set up under Marshal Aleksandr M. Vasilevsky who was, until the summer of 1945, chief of the general staff. Three fronts were established, with the Transbaikal Front being under Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky. The other two fronts were the 1st Far Eastern Front under Marshal Kirill A. Meretkov, and the 2d Far Eastern Front under General of the Army Maxim A. Purkayev. Admiral Ivan S. Yumashev was commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

**Strategic Plan**

The strategic plan was simple although some elements of its execution were complicated and bold. The two main thrusts would be made by the Transbaikal Front from the west, cutting through most of Manchuria to Mukden and Changchun, and by the 1st Far Eastern Front from the east, breaking through the Japanese fortified area facing the Maritime Provinces and moving to Kirin and on to Changchun. The 2d Far Eastern Front in the north would make a lesser thrust up the Sungari toward Harbin.

The Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria had a total of 24 divisions and 11 brigades, but few had been in existence more than six months, few were properly equipped, and the Japanese rated their effectiveness equivalent at only seven divisions.

The main and, in many respects, the most interesting operation of the campaign was the 625-mile advance across Manchuria by the Transbaikal Front.

Marshal Malinovsky was 47 years of age in 1945; so was his Chief of Staff, General of the Army (now Marshal) Matvei V. Zakharov—now, too, his Chief of Staff in the Ministry of Defense. Marshal Malinovsky's staff, a guards tank army, and a combined arms army were all transferred to Siberia and Mongolia from Prague during the period from May into July.

**Composition of Front**

The Transbaikal Front comprised five ground armies, the supporting 12th Air Army, and a joint Soviet-Mongolian composite "cavalry-mechanized group" composed of about six divisions, mainly horse cavalry. The front forces totaled 654,040 men, of whom 416,000 were in combat units.

Nearly half of the Soviet military power in the Far East was assigned to this front which faced the weakest Japanese concentrations. It had, however, unusually challenging terrain and a difficult supply problem. The Soviets calculated, and authoritative Japanese sources have subsequently confirmed, that the enemy would not expect a major offensive over hundreds of miles of desert in Inner Mongolia and across the Great Hsingan Mountain Range.

The first problem was getting the troops to the concentration areas in Outer Mongolia. The Trans-Siberian
Railroad was taxed to the utmost to meet the demands. Nearly 750,000 men were moved, and 136,000 carloads of materiel were sent in the period May through July. Due to the overall demands on the rail system, it was decided that all motorized units of the Transbaikal Front would move on their own from the Chita-Karymskaya sector of the Trans-Siberian to the concentration area in eastern Mongolia—requiring up to 750 miles travel, mainly over desert.

Even the infantry of the 17th and 36th Combined Arms Armies had to make the last 160 to 300 miles by foot march. The infantry averaged about 25 miles per day while the tank and mechanized units averaged about 95 miles per day. Almost all movements were made in evening and early morning marches, partly for reasons of security, but also due to the high daytime temperatures—up to 112 degrees Fahrenheit. The existence of only a single rail line in Mongolia from Choibalsan to Tamsag-Bulag led to off-loading of materiel along the last 125 to 375 miles of the rail line across eastern Mongolia.

The three armies moved from Europe to the Transbaikal Front brought all their weapons and equipment, with the exception of the 6th Guards Tank Army. It left all its tanks and self-propelled guns in Czechoslovakia, and at Choibalsan received nearly a thousand new ones sent directly from the Ural factories to Mongolia.

Water Supply Problem

Perhaps the greatest problem of all was the water supply. Only about one-third of the subsistence requirements was available for the entire front. Accordingly, all local engineer units and five other engineer battalions sent in advance from the armies already in Siberia were detached to dig wells and build water stations. From 10 June to 8 August, 635 new wells were opened.

There still remained the problem of water supply during the offensive. Since there were no known wells in the first 100 to 125 miles of enemy territory, it was necessary to carry water needed during the first phase of the advance. Metal water canisters received just prior to the operation were not considered entirely satisfactory or sufficient, and the front staff resorted to the expedient of filling all available rubber inflatable rafts with water instead of air.

In addition to preparations for water supply, large numbers of logs were brought in from Siberia, and each tank and self-propelled chassis...
carried no less than two logs and other construction materials needed for the mountain and river crossings. All fuel, parts, and construction materials had to be brought from the Soviet Union.

Among the host of lesser problems was that of finding fuel for cooking—petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) had to be used, in many cases, where there was no firewood. Also, in view of the known prevalence of epidemic diseases in northern China, all the Soviet troops were inoculated against the plague and other diseases.

**Bold Action**

The plan of the front operation was bold. The entire 500-mile distance to Changchun and Mukden from Tamsag—the main axis of the attack—was to be taken without pause. The first mission for the spearhead and core of the front, the 6th Guards Tank Army, was to overcome the Great Hsingan Mountain Range and take the Lupei-Lichuan line, about 280 miles away, in five days.

The Stavka (general headquarters staff) planners were aware that this was the first Soviet operation to employ a tank army as the first echelon of a major striking force. This decision was based on appreciation of the need to move rapidly in order to surmount the Hsingan Range before the Japanese could bring up their main forces, which were known to be deployed about 175 to 250 miles from the western frontier, to defend that natural terrain barrier.

Supporting units for the 6th Guards Tank Army included the 36th and 17th Armies, which were fully accustomed to the theater, and a joint cavalry group (mainly four Mongolian and one Soviet horse cavalry divisions, with one tank, one mechanized, and one motorized infantry brigades). In addition, one local Siberian motorized infantry division was added to each field army, and two to the 6th Guards Tank Army.

The 6th Guards Tank Army was composed of two mechanized corps, one tank corps, two motorized infantry divisions, two self-propelled brigades, and four independent tank brigades. Each mechanized corps was reinforced to have 400 tanks and self-propelled guns, and about 450 artillery pieces (including heavy mortars), as well as 19 motorized infantry battalions.

**Opposing Forces**

The opposing Japanese 3rd Area Army (Army Group), under General Jun Ushiroku, had the 44th Army facing the main Soviet thrust, and the 30th Army in east-central Manchuria. Only four of its nine divisions, all infantry, were west of the Changchun-Mukden line in central Manchuria.

The Japanese rated the effectiveness of these divisions from 40 to 65 percent. The 3rd Area Army had enough ammunition for only three and one-half divisions parceled out among its nine divisions and three brigades. Two divisions had just been transferred to Manchuria from north China within the preceding two months. In fact, several battalions of one division were still in China when the war came, and they never reached Manchuria.

Under a different command—the independent 4th Army in northern Manchuria—were the 119th Infantry Division and the 80th Independent Composite Brigade in the Hailar area. Other units of that army were either never committed, or faced the Soviet 2nd Far Eastern Front on the north-
eastern frontier of Manchuria. The 119th Division was one of the best units in the Kwantung Army, but it still was rated only 70 percent effective. The 80th Brigade was one of the weakest; composed of only five understrength infantry battalions, and was rated by the Japanese as only 15 percent effective.

The 6th Guards Tank Army was expected to lead the Transbaikai Front in a lightning thrust to Changchun and Mukden, with the aim of breaking up the enemy's main strategic deployment, preventing his withdrawal to south Manchuria, and destroying him. The final phase was to continue the rapid advance the entire way to Dairen and Port Arthur on the Liaotung Peninsula.

Its planned schedule was to allow two days to cross the 125 miles of desert steppe to the mountains while seizing terrain suitable for building airfields; three days to cross the mountains, secure the range, and move down to the Lupei-Lichuan line, a distance of 155 miles; then within five days to take Mukden and Changchun.

**Constant Reconnaissance**

Considerable stress was placed on reconnaissance. Aviation was assigned responsibility for the area from 30 to 625 miles beyond the advancing forces. Each corps was given a reinforced motorcycle battalion to maintain constant forward reconnaissance 45 to 50 miles in advance of the main forces. These battalions were given the strongest available radio transmitters. Finally, each point brigade was responsible for forward and flank reconnaissance for 15 miles. This was especially important since there would not only be gaps between each army, but even within the 6th Guards Tank Army there would be a gap of up to 45 miles between the two columns of its advance.

**Red Army Offensive**

At 0001 on 9 August, immediately after the presentation of a declaration of war to the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, the Red Army opened an offensive on all fronts. Due to the general absence of enemy forces, there was no artillery or air preparation on the Western Front.

The 36th Army in the north, crossing from Soviet territory at Manchouli, hit a Japanese "fortified area" near Manchouli where there were some pillboxes and emplaced artillery. They rapidly overcame the border defenses and advanced 25 miles the first day. Advance detachments, skirting small centers of resistance, raced 60 miles to the outskirts of Hailar.

The main Soviet forces bypassed Hailar and engaged the Japanese at Wunoerh on the 13th. Hailar fell on 18 August. Since they were cut off from higher headquarters, the defenders had not known of the Japanese capitulation on 14 August. Also, on 18 August the troops still defending their positions at Wunoerh learned of the capitulation and surrendered to the 36th Army.

The 39th Combined Arms Army faced strong and immediate opposition in the Anshan area where there were field defenses, including 126 pillboxes, in an area 25 miles wide and four miles deep. A Japanese regiment held out in Anshan against the Soviets until 12 August. The main blow of the 39th Army was actually thrown to the south of the Anshan fortified area, with the mission of crossing the Great Hsingan Mountain Range and taking Solun and Wangyehmiao.

The 5th Guards Rifle Corps moved
on Solun, meeting with no resistance until 12 August when they encountered and defeated a Japanese infantry division withdrawing from Anshan. After defeating these units and a 2,000-man cavalry force the next day, Solun fell on 13 August.

Parallel with this movement, the 113th Rifle Corps moved toward Wangyehmiao. Harsh terrain and gross cartographic errors slowed the advance. Fuel consumption ran one

ments of the Japanese 107th Infantry Division, unaware of the capitulation of Japan, attacked approximately 45 miles north of Wangyehmiao about 22 August. The Soviets counterattacked and killed about 1,000 Japanese; the remaining 7,850 surrendered on 24 August. Other elements of the same division, however, fought on until 30 August.

The Soviet-Mongolian cavalry force had advanced rapidly on two axes and one-half times the normal rate due to column formations on the roadless but erratic terrain. Nonetheless, the Hsingan Range was crossed by 16 August, and Wangyehmiao was occupied on the 21st.

The war was presumably over for the 39th Army when suddenly ele-

with no opposition at first and very little later. Mongolian casualties, out of 80,000 committed, totaled only 674. Motorized infantry took Dolonor (Dolun) on 13 August and reached Chengteh by 19 August. On the 20th the Japanese in the garrison at Chengteh surrendered.
The other column took Changpei against some opposition and then moved on to Kalgan—not far north of Peiping. It fell on 19 August after two days of combat. These forces were, however, stretched very thin by that time, and only advance detachments went the entire way to Cheng-teh and Kalgan. These detachments had advanced nearly halfway from Kalgan to Peiping when on 20 August they received Marshal Malinovsky's orders to stop at the border of China Proper, whereupon they withdrew to the Great Wall of China.

**Enemy Forces Absent**

The advance of the 6th Guards Tank Army following the declaration of war on 9 August is worth review. It met no resistance at all for four days and no real opposition during the entire campaign. Its northern axis—toward Changchun—was led by the 7th Mechanized Corps, its southern axis by the 9th Mechanized Corps.

Due to the complete absence of enemy forces, extended march order was used with the two mechanized corps, each in six to eight parallel columns. In this way, speeds of up to 25 miles per hour were reached despite an absence of roads. PO-2 biplanes and Mongolian scouts were used to help maintain the march order. Spacing of about 110 yards between vehicles helped to maintain the speed of advance. Reconnaissance units fanned out as planned.

The main force advanced 75 to 100 miles the first day, and by noon of 10 August the mountains were reached. Marshal Malinovsky then decided to advance by one day—to the end of 12 August—the target time for reaching the Lupei-Lichuan line.

During the night of 10 August, the units started crossing the range. The crossing involved sharp turns, 30-degree inclines, narrow passages, and the need to shore up the road at places. Command and control were difficult to maintain; radio faded out frequently even at moderate distances. The 5th Guards Tank Corps crossed the 25 miles of mountain roads in seven hours, which was very creditable for a night armored crossing in rough unfamiliar terrain.

After crossing the range, the 5th Guards Tank Corps assumed battle formation and spearheaded the advance on the morning of 11 August. Heavy rain soon began to slow the advance. There were no roads along the route, and POL expenditure was high.

By the end of 11 August, the advance detachment of the 5th Guards Tank Corps took Lupei, and Lichuan was taken a day later. There had been no contact with the enemy, and the first phase line had been reached on time.

**Fuel Shortage**

At that point an unplanned and undesired two-day holdup of the advance was compelled by serious fuel shortage. Air transport flew in hundreds of tons of POL which was a big help, but far from enough. There were too few aircraft, and they used nearly half their carrying capacity for their own fuel on the round trip.

Marshal Malinovsky now ordered each corps to form advance detachments which assumed the corps' missions and received the full fuel reserves and allotments of their corps. The main forces were to follow as fuel subsequently became available to them. With no enemy forces yet encountered, this was reasonable. As it developed, smaller advance reconnaissance detachments usually fulfilled
the corps and army objectives. On 16 August the larger advance detachment of the 5th Guards Tank Corps took the city of Tungliao, and that of the 7th Mechanized Corps took Kaitung. The main forces reached these areas on 18-19 August, advancing very slowly.

The Kwantung Army Command had declared its readiness to surrender on 17 August and did so the next day. However, some units continued to withdraw to the southeast. Accordingly, Marshal Malinovsky ordered the 6th Guards Tank Army to reach Changchun and Mukden as quickly as possible and, leaving a reinforced brigade at each, to proceed by forced march to reach Port Arthur by 25 August.

To accomplish this, Marshal Malinovsky ordered the advance detachments reduced to tank battalions, and instructed them to ignore the fact that they would become separated from the main force. Corps commanders were told to move their forces by rail from Mukden to the Liaotung Peninsula.

Air Activity

On 18 August a company-sized force was air landed at the airfield at Harbin, and on 19 August small forces were landed at the airfields at Mukden (225 men), Changchun (200 men), and Kirin. These air landings were undertaken to prevent organization of resistance by those who might later decide to fight on, to prevent withdrawals to Japan, and to prevent destruction of installations and supplies.

The 36th Army took Tsitsihar without opposition on 19 August. The advance detachment of the 5th Guards Tank Corps occupied Mukden on the 20th, and on the 21st the 7th Mechanized Corps advance detachment took Changchun. Small air landings were made at Port Arthur and Dairen (250 men at each) on 22 August, and from 24 to 29 August the main force of the 6th Guards Tank Army concentrated in Mukden, Dairen, and Port Arthur. On 30 August Marshal Malinovsky ordered the 5th Guards Tank and 9th Mechanized Corps to halt their advance and concentrate at Tungliao and Mukden.

Ammunition Expended

During the entire campaign, the Transbaikal Front expended only 14,746 shells and 42,134 bullets from a total of 361,079 shells and 1,023,697 bullets fired by Soviet forces on all fronts in the Far Eastern campaign. Serious difficulties with fuel, and to a lesser extent with communications, had developed, but were overcome.

Reconnaissance was, perhaps, the most important role of the air forces—after the critical mission of transport of POL to advancing tank and mechanized units. There were, however, insufficient reconnaissance units, and other combat units were quickly converted.

What happened to the main force of the Japanese Kwantung Army facing the Transbaikal Front? From the outset of the war, the main Japanese forces in the east, facing the 1st Far Eastern Front in the Maritime Province, were heavily engaged. On the Western Front, however, with a vast virtually uninhabited area, the Japanese forces were deployed well to the rear.

The Japanese contingency war plan called for moving troops forward to engage in delaying operations and guerrilla warfare to harass the Soviet forces as they advanced. General Jun Ushiroku, commander of the 3d Area
Army (Army Group), opposed this plan for piecemeal commitment of forces to delay and harass the Soviets. He favored pulling the entire 44th Army back to the Dairen-Mukden-Ssuing-Changchun railway line, counterattacking when enemy supply lines were overextended and the forces tired from crossing the vast desert, steppe, and mountain areas.

Either plan had merit, and probably a combination of the two concepts would have been optimum. But General Ushiroku decided to change the plan, "recommending" his alternative, but simultaneously giving operational orders to the 44th Army in accordance with it, and advising Kwantung Army Headquarters of his action. General Otsuzu Yamada, commander in chief of the Kwantung Army, objected to General Ushiroku's action, and regarded it as damaging; but it
was accepted as a fait accompli, and for the honor of all concerned was formally "endorsed."

At the close of hostilities, nearly all units of the 44th Army were in the Mukden area. None except one infantry division had had more than nominal, if any, contact with enemy forces.

Capitulation Intervenes

The 30th Army was deployed in the Tailai-Changchun-Ssuping-Tung-hua areas without having been committed to battle, except for the 107th Infantry Division. On 14 August General Yamada persuaded General Ushiroku to abandon his plan to defend the Changchun rail line, and withdraw south to the planned redoubt in southeastern Manchuria, but the capitulation intervened.

The course of operations ended without a decisive military confrontation and, on the front facing Marshal Malinovsky's Transbaikal Front, with scarcely any combat. The average tempo of advance was 51 miles per day—closer to current Soviet doctrine than any other past Soviet performance. The Japanese had preserved their forces, but the confusion in communications and command was appalling. Also, they had failed even to attempt to take advantage of the exposed Soviet position about 14-15 August.

The low level of Japanese air activity remains perplexing. The Japanese had a total of about 1,200 aircraft of all types in Manchuria, including a small Manchukuoan element and the Japanese Air Academy. Almost all of the aircraft, however, were obsolete. Japanese frontline fighters in Manchuria had a maximum speed of only 295 knots, while Soviet fighters had speeds of 350 to 365 knots; Japanese bombers had a maximum bomb load of one and one-half tons and speeds of up to 250 knots.

Most of the effective air defenses—fighter aircraft as well as antiaircraft artillery—had been deployed in southern Manchuria in the year preceding the Soviet attack to meet the US B-29 raids beginning with the raid on Anshan in July 1944.

Standing War Plans

Upon notification of the outbreak of war on 9 August, the 2d Air Army was ordered to implement its standing war plans. On that basis, it began reconnaissance, bombing of advancing Soviet forces in the west, and fighter defense—but all on a very modest scale. Plans to attack Soviet forces in Mongolia and the Trans-Siberian Railroad near Chita were for reasons unknown never actually attempted.

There is little information available on the volume of Japanese air activity in the first days of the campaign, but judging from both Soviet and Japanese accounts it was not great. In what was probably the maximum effort, a total of 184 fighter sorties were mounted on 12 August. On the 13th bad weather hampered operations, and there were only seven attack sorties.

On 14 August, Japanese reconnaissance reported that the enemy was massed along the Lupei-Lichuan-Linhsi line ready to resume advance, that about 1,500 trucks were coming up from the rear, and that the Soviets had speedily constructed two new airfields near Wangyehmiao and Taipsi. Air elements attacked, but claimed only three tanks.

At noon on 15 August the Imperial order on the cease-fire was received,
and all planned air combat operations were canceled. While ground operations continued in some sectors, there was no further air action except for reconnaissance.

A Japanese Imperial army order, dated 16 August and received 17 August, formally directed General Yamada to negotiate a surrender. General Hikosaburo Hata flew to the field headquarters of Marshal Vasilevsky to arrange the surrender. These arrangements were formalized on 19 August with a technically effective date of 25 August, but, in fact, were put immediately into effect in most areas.

So ended the Manchurian campaign. Soviet victory would no doubt have come soon even if the surrender of Japan had not precipitated it. But the Japanese forces might have held up the Soviet forces for some weeks in their redoubt areas in southeast Manchuria and northern Korea.

The bulk of the Kwantung Army was never committed to battle. Although the 1st Area Army in the east had been heavily engaged and driven out of its main positions by the Soviet 1st Far Eastern Front, it was not destroyed, and by Japanese estimate remained two-thirds effective at its cessation of hostilities. The bulk of the 3d Area Army had withdrawn in the face of the advance of the Transbaikal Front without engaging in combat, and they were concentrated in a position to impede the Soviet advance and then to join the 1st Area Army in the Tunghua redoubt area.

Marshal Malinovsky's Transbaikal Front was the major element in Soviet plans, and packed a powerful punch—but it hit mostly empty desert, steppe, and mountains. The capitulation of Japan interceded before battle between the main forces of the opposing sides could be joined. Nonetheless, if there are qualifications to the Soviet record, it also was impressive in other respects—to mount such a campaign only three months after being bled for four years in Europe represented a major achievement.

In the words of the official Soviet history of the war, "The defeat of the Kwantung Army was a model of a real lightning strike, one accomplished by the Soviet armed forces."
IN THE American effort to cope with the nuclear problems of the alliance, one theme has been dominant: We must somehow devise for Germany "an appropriate part in the nuclear defense" of the West, as the joint communique of last December's Johnson-Erhard meeting put it.

Due in large measure to this preoccupation, public debate about nuclear sharing within the Atlantic alliance has left the universal impression that the central problem is how best to satisfy the German desire for further control of nuclear weapons. All but lost sight of is the crucial issue of how many and what kinds of nuclear weapons are required to defend Europe; who makes the decision to use them; and how they shall be deployed.

Because it is now both economically and technologically feasible for Europeans to think about developing their own nuclear weapons program, it is only natural that there are differences within the alliance over ownership and use of nuclear weapons. At the root of the problem is European awareness that there may be alternatives to complete dependence on the United States to deter the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe.

Of all the complex of issues stemming from these changing nuclear circumstances, however, none has proved more vexing than how best to offset the 700 midrange ballistic missiles (MRBM's) that the Soviet Union has pointed at Western Europe. And no other issue illustrates so well the liabilities of allowing a European problem of the first order to be portrayed as a "German problem."

Over the past few years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) has acquired a number of pretargeted nuclear systems—British V bombers and the Polaris missiles of three US submarines now operating in the Mediterranean—capable of covering some of the missile sites in western Russia which threaten Western Europe. But there is a gap in the target coverage, and that gap is now covered by non-NATO forces located outside continental Europe and beyond the control of SACEUR.

In 1959, General Norstad, then Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, first stated SACEUR's military judgment that MRBM's were required for the defense of Europe. General Lem-
NITZER, his successor, has reaffirmed this need. Because the strategic necessity and political advisability of putting MRBM's in Europe has been seriously questioned on both sides of the Atlantic, however, no action has been taken on SACEUR's request.

Nevertheless, many European political and military leaders have great confidence in SACEUR, and the commander's expressed requirement for MRBM's has raised questions as to both the military effectiveness and the availability in a moment of crisis of the US "external" forces targeted on the Soviet missiles. This uneasiness and apprehension have been stimulated and exploited by President de Gaulle who argues that the credibility of our deterrent against a Soviet attack on Western Europe has declined since we became directly threatened by Soviet missiles.

US Position

The United States has taken the position that, although SACEUR's requirement for an MRBM defense is fully met by our strategic forces, we appreciate the problems of European political confidence caused by the NATO nuclear "gap."

Consequently, we have sought in consultation with our allies to devise a means of meeting this "need" which will also serve to dampen European interest in independent nuclear forces, eliminate the need for further "two-key" or bilateral nuclear weapons arrangements, and avoid the political and military disadvantages of deploying nuclear missiles on the continent of Europe. As to the last objective, it should be noted that, for all the talk in Europe about the MRBM gap, there is little enthusiasm anywhere for land-based missiles in "their" country.

Multilateral Force

The various multilateral schemes considered by the United States, such as the MLF (multilateral force) are attempts to fulfill the objectives of providing MRBM coverage without putting strategic missiles in Europe. The emphasis on collectively owned and managed nuclear forces is designed not only to discourage national nuclear efforts, but to help create a framework or model of Atlantic partnership which could be of major importance to the future of European unity.

Although there are strong critics of this collective approach to the alliance's nuclear problems, the objectives that the US Government hopes to achieve through multilateral nuclear management—that is, avoiding further bilateral nuclear arrangements and avoiding the emplacement of strategic missiles in Europe—are generally accepted by most Americans and Europeans. Nevertheless, in reporting the nuclear problems of the alliance, the press seems almost entirely concerned with sterile exchanges of cliches about West Germany having a "finger on the nuclear button" and the feasibility of mixed manning.

In such an atmosphere, any US proposal for meeting what we consider to be the political, not military, need of giving the Europeans greater influence in nuclear matters was
NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHARING

bound to encounter trouble. Our first such proposal, the ill-fated MLF, was undermined by a combination of the differences between the United States and most of her allies as to just how urgent the project was, its unfortunate image as an answer to the German "nuclear problem," and the deadly derision heaped on the mixed-manning idea. Any new proposals on nuclear sharing seem destined for the same fate unless we clarify for ourselves and our European allies just what requirement a collectively owned and managed nuclear force is designed to meet, and how urgent that need is.

German Aspirations

In the public mind, the collective nuclear force concept is designed primarily to meet German aspirations to play a greater role in the nuclear affairs of the alliance. This identification has been stimulated not only by the press, but by the public and private concern of many US officials that Germany will follow France along the path to a national nuclear force if her energies, ambitions, and finances are not channeled into a collective force. The sense of urgency has caused attention to concentrate on this issue, rather than on the more fundamental problem of how best to deter the Soviet MRBM threat to Europe.

Our preoccupation with the German nuclear problem has reinforced suspicions throughout Eastern and Western Europe that the real US purpose in suggesting nuclear sharing within the alliance is simply to provide a convenient way of giving the Germans nuclear weapons. Consequently, talk of nuclear sharing immediately turns to the issue of Germany and nuclear weapons, eliciting reactions varying from uneasiness to near pathological fulminations. Memories of German oppression are too tender and distrust of the German national character is too widespread to permit rational discussion of nuclear sharing within the alliance if that discussion begins with a plea for German nuclear "equality."

Nevertheless, German and American officials who insist on the urgency of enlarging the German role in the nuclear field are apparently prepared to pay the political costs of a program of nuclear sharing advertised as a means of giving the Germans nuclear equality within the alliance. These costs will include increased French hostility, the risk that the Soviets will shatter whatever hopes remain that German reunification can be achieved, and the prospect that the East European countries now

A nuclear powerplant at Gundremmingen, West Germany, one of nine scheduled for completion by 1969
in a process of political and economic diversification will consolidate in the face of a German nuclear threat.

Much of this reaction could be expected whatever form increased German participation took, but US pressure for rapid solution and concentration on the purely German aspect of the larger problem of the nuclear defense of Europe are guaranteed to intensify and exacerbate the reaction.

Economic and Political Stature

West Germany's economic resurgence and evidence of growing political confidence, it is argued, indicate that Germany cannot be forever denied what nations of lesser stature can now obtain. Hence, the United States and the "honest Germans" should move swiftly to give Germany a measure of nuclear participation before the forces of latent German militarism demand a national nuclear force à la française.

Moreover, the argument goes, West Germany, as the most exposed country in Western Europe, is in the uncomfortable position of having to depend totally on the US nuclear deterrent for her defense. Therefore, West Germans are particularly vulnerable to the Gaullist argument that the United States will not expose her own cities to nuclear destruction for the sake of Germany. As for the physical presence of some 200,000 American troops in Germany, these "hostages" to American fidelity could be withdrawn at any time.

F. W. Mulley, a British expert on defense issues and recently appointed Minister of Aviation, wrote in 1962:

One may deplore the risks attendant upon a proliferation of nuclear powers but it is hardly surprising that France, for example, is seeking to join the nuclear club for reasons of prestige and in order to exert greater influence upon the affairs of the alliance. All of the arguments which led Britain to decide to develop her own nuclear weapons are equally valid from the French point of view for France herself, and there is no reason why other members of NATO should not decide to follow suit.*

The logic of this argument has been compelling, particularly to Washington. The specter of a West Germany with an independent nuclear force apparently has so disturbed Washington that it has hardly been questioned whether the French or British experience has, in fact, any relevance for Germany. It is, perhaps, time that this question be asked.

Nuclear Technology

To be sure, West German advances in nuclear technology since 1958 have been impressive and help create the impression that the Germans are laying the foundation for a weapons program. Notable accomplishments in recent years include a program of nine power reactors scheduled for completion by 1969, including a 237-megawatt plant at Gundreimmening; a fuel fabrication plant; and a national investment in nuclear energy programs that is now running over 200 million dollars a year.

In the ultracentrifuge field, German scientists were among the pioneers. However, little has been heard about German activity in this field since October 1960 when it was announced—amid a flurry of newspaper comment—that henceforth the work would be classified.

The composite picture of West German prospects in the nuclear field is,

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therefore, one of increasing strength and diversity. In a very few years, if present plans are carried out, West Germany will not only become one of the leading commercial competitors in the nuclear field, but will have the capacity to build a bomb in a very short time and at little cost.

But to say that Germany has a strong chance to become a leader in the nuclear power field is clearly not the same as saying that the Germans will press on to nuclear weapons if the United States fails to discover some way of sublimating this very natural drive. A look at West Germany's national circumstances may help to show this.

On the incentive side of the ledger, it is true that Germany would be in an extremely dangerous position if she were forced to defend herself against the Soviet Union with conventional arms alone. The vast open northern plain which carried German armies into the Soviet Union can also serve as a gateway for the Soviets into West Germany. Because West Germany, either alone or even in concert with her allies, could not hope to block this channel with conventional arms for very long, the incentive to acquire an assured nuclear weapons defense is very high.

On the other hand, although West Germany is a large country by European standards, with a decentralized industrial and population pattern, her physical circumstances are not favorable for a nuclear weapons program. Adequate underground testing sites would be difficult to find, and the country is too small and crowded to satisfy the requirements for dispersal of a fixed missile system. And although West Germany has the technological and economic base to duplicate the nuclear weapons programs of France and Great Britain, does she have the political incentives?

Alone among the major powers in Europe, West Germany is a nation with a strong sense of national grievance. The reunification issue has a direct bearing on Bonn's position on the acquisition of nuclear weapons, as Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder indicated in July 1965 when he stated that West Germany was not prepared to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons until the Soviet Union consented to Germany's reunification.
Mr. Schröder thus brought into sharp focus a major German incentive for creating the option of acquiring a nuclear capability but also for refraining from doing so. For the usefulness of the nuclear weapons issue in gaining reunification would almost certainly be shattered once Germany actually acquired weapons.

It is at this point that comparison with France breaks down. President de Gaulle needed nuclear weapons in being to pursue his objective of reasserting French influence on the Continent; Germany needs the threat of acquiring nuclear weapons to force progress on reunification. West Germany has serious reservations about a nonproliferation agreement, not because she wants nuclear weapons, but because the Germans do not want to be deprived of the threat of acquiring them.

To look at the other side of the coin for a moment, suppose West Germany did actually decide to build a nuclear force. If it were to be more than just a prestige symbol, if it were designed actually to threaten the Soviet Union, it would run a high risk of drawing a Soviet attack while still in the development stage.

Few countries would have a more precarious ride to a nuclear capability than West Germany, exposed as she would be to a preemptive Soviet strike. At the moment, she has five heavy fighter-bomber squadrons of F-104's which could be used as delivery vehicles, but their chances of success against Soviet defenses would be very low indeed. West Germany would have to make a great investment in armaments even to come up to the standard of France's present nuclear force.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHARING

In summary, Germany's incentives to develop an independent nuclear force are clearly outweighed by the restraints imposed by her special circumstances. But this conclusion rests precariously on a structure of assumptions: that German policy will be rational; that our commitment to defend West Germany will retain some credibility; and that we will not sacrifice German reunification for an accommodation with the Soviet Union.

**Bargaining Power**

Under these conditions, the Germans are not likely to want their own nuclear weapons, for they are surely aware that nothing would so permanently solidify the division of Germany. What they do want is the bargaining power that the threat of acquiring nuclear weapons may give them.

In the rush to give West Germans a voice in the management of nuclear affairs within the Atlantic alliance, let us then ask again whether West Germany is really the France of tomorrow in respect to nuclear weapons. If their respective national circumstances are as different as they appear to be, then, perhaps, we should proceed more slowly before we inadvertently excite a nuclear appetite through creating uncertainty about the nature of our commitment to West Germany's defense and national goals. Equally important, we should move with all care and deliberation if we are not to prejudice the chances for a solution to the MRBM problem in Europe.

The problem of nuclear sharing seems destined to remain with us. Whatever satisfaction the critics of the MLF may derive from the difficulties the alliance has encountered in devising a formula for sharing nuclear weapons, they would be well advised to bear in mind that the basic issue—the nuclear defense of Europe—has not been resolved.

Moreover, any decision on the nuclear defense of Europe will of necessity involve West Germany; and it has been argued here that any decision on the further involvement of Germany in the nuclear weapons field should take account of a number of factors often overlooked in the American approach to this emotionally charged issue.

**Two Factors**

First, national attitudes toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons are the end product of a highly complicated and often shifting array of national circumstances. To describe the process of nuclear spread as something infectious or organic is highly misleading. We are not dealing with a modern-day black plague slowly spreading its way across the continent of Europe.

The doctrine that the arguments which led France to a nuclear weapons program are equally valid for West Germany is a very questionable one at best. West Germany is, of course, concerned about her nonnuclear status, but the arguments for or against nuclear weapons are clearly not the same as those which motivated France—either in kind or intensity.

Second, and obviously related to the first point, we must realize that, unless the Soviet MRBM menace to Europe vanishes, Europe will have to have an MRBM response, be it land based or sea based, "one key," "two key," or many "keys" as in the multilateral solution. This is West Germany's nuclear problem, and one that is shared with the rest of Western Europe.
What is argued here is not that a collective nuclear force is the best or only answer to this problem, but that if the nuclear-sharing issue could be portrayed as what it really is—a European problem requiring careful and deliberate attention, not primarily a German problem demanding an "urgent" solution—then much of the irrational and destructive heat will go out of the alliance's deliberations on where we go from here.

To this end, the emphasis in American pronouncements on nuclear sharing should center on the necessity of strengthening the military security and political unity of Europe—not on "satisfying" the Germans by giving them nuclear "equality," presumably equality with France and Britain.

As a first step, we should resist any actions which give the impression that the United States and West Germany have the responsibility for drawing up the nuclear-sharing plans. This will be particularly true now that France has withdrawn her forces from NATO. Nothing would so prejudice the future of the Atlantic alliance as for the United States, in the interest of somehow compensating Germany for France's defection, to rush in with a nuclear-sharing scheme devised in Washington and Bonn.

One way of emphasizing the multilateral nature of the nuclear problem is to use NATO's Special Committee established last year and composed of the Defense Ministers of Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, Canada, Greece, Italy, Turkey, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. At the moment, this committee has a mandate only to discuss means of improving allied participation in nuclear policy and planning and could not officially discuss nuclear sharing.

Nonetheless, it can serve the purpose of establishing an information base on nuclear affairs from which multilateral discussion of nuclear sharing will obviously profit. Whatever the means, it seems imperative to move the nuclear-sharing issue to NATO-wide discussions, thereby lessening the emphasis put on the German problem. And we can begin to put that problem in perspective by remembering that Bonn is not Weimar—nor is it Paris.
Strategic Implications of the Developing Areas

Lieutenant Colonel Lewis D. Overstreet, United States Army

The sudden emergence of the United States into the role of world leadership has forced the military services to assume new and different responsibilities. For example, in addition to the requirement of being constantly prepared for the usual range of armed conflict, General Harold K. Johnson, US Army Chief of Staff, stated in the Army 1965 Green Book:

A year ago I presented . . . 'a perspective on Army capabilities' as they related to the broad range of operational demands that could be placed upon our Armed Forces. I stated my belief that for some time to come elements of the Army would continue to be called on for peacekeeping or stability operations.

These thoughts reflected a growing realization in the last ten years that the employment of military forces of the United States, and particularly its land forces, is inseparable from political actions designed to maintain or restore a condition of stability in turbulent regions of the world.

US military forces have been employed in various kinds of stability operations during the postwar period. From small groups of advisors to the
larger scale commitments in Korea, Vietnam, and the Dominican Republic, the serviceman has been used in this all-important role of helping nations to manage their countries' internal growth.

Military Deployment

Today, there are more than one-half million US military personnel deployed in over 65 nations. Most are in combat and combat supporting units. About 20,000 are serving in advisory and training functions. Although already larger than any other overseas deployment of US troops during peacetime, this figure is likely to increase in direct response to the aggressive actions of the Free World's opponents.

Without doubt, the American soldier will continue to respond militarily to this different form of conflict in the same exceptional manner as in the past. Likewise, he will be properly clothed, well fed, given the best of equipment and military training, and sent into the far corners of the world by the most modern means of transportation. It would appear that our military planners have thought of everything—and no doubt they have.

Yet when US military forces were sent into the Dominican Republic in April and May 1965, wire service reports indicated that many of the servicemen knew very little about the country and its people and accordingly were not fully successful in properly influencing the people of that country.

There are reasons to believe that this is also true in other areas. A 5 December 1965 article by Ruben Salazar in the Washington Post reports on a Vietnamese teacher saying that, "Americans don't understand our intellectual problems." This statement was made in front of two "new magnificent white modern buildings of the University of Hue" which were paid for largely by American money and, according to the report, contained anti-American students.

New Military Skills

Our Nation's role and its military commitments in today's world have changed greatly in the past two decades. Also, the young men who now comprise our combat and combat support units are products of a different era from that of World War II and Korea. Today's young soldier opened his eyes into a Free World that is "United States centered." He grew to manhood during a period of prosperity in our Nation. He has not personally experienced war.

Because of the changed world situation and the role that the United States commands today, the requirements of this young soldier have been altered. He needs special instruction if he is to master these altered requirements that include contact and communication with a greater variety of people and cultures than heretofore faced by American soldiers.

The presence of US military personnel can have beneficial social and political consequences for both US foreign policy and the internal dy-
namics of the countries in which the personnel are stationed. According to Lincoln Gordon, public opinion has received increased recognition in the last 75 years as a major force in shaping national policies, especially in the more advanced states.

The less-developed states are also familiar with the value of group opin-

ions. A great deal has been learned about how to influence even underde-
veloped nations through pressure and persuasion directed at groups and leaders—in and out of government—who have access to the reins of power.

Today's military personnel at all levels can serve US political purpose through proper contact with individuals and groups whose attitudes help to shape the policies of their govern-

ment. The soldier can and should play a key role in influencing people and governments in addition to the usual military responsibilities of learning and reporting.

In order to insure that the results of individual contacts and associations with people in foreign countries are

Stability operations involve more than the ability to control people and their land by the application of armed might

beneficial to our Nation and to the host country, it is necessary that new military skills be developed or older skills be more fully adjusted to cope with the wide range of new relations between our soldiers and the peoples of the world.

Army civilian and military leaders, without hesitation, have stated repeatedly that “man is the ultimate weapon,” “people are the Army’s
most important asset,” and “the real strength of our Nation’s landpower is in its soldiers.” Concerted effort is made to get the most capable and interested young men into the services. Thereafter, they are given appropriate military training to prepare them for their assigned role in today’s military service.

**Combat Readiness**

Soldiers soon learn the meaning of combat readiness—the target of all Army activities. It receives attention at all levels of command. A readiness reporting system helps to identify problems within troop commands and to promote their solution. REDCAT, REDCAPE, and REDCON—terms used to describe readiness category, readiness capability, and the readiness condition of units—are familiar. Plans are made and actions are taken at higher levels of command to coordinate all efforts for developing and maintaining the most suitable forces in the best state of readiness.

As a result of these actions, the entire spectrum of Army preparedness—organization, military training, deployment of forces, and the development, procurement, distribution, and maintenance of materiel—is in a high state of combat readiness today.

Despite this high state of readiness for military encounters, there appears to be a sizable gap in our stability operations—in the area of basic human understanding. We need to give increased attention to preparedness for actions, within stability operations, that do not involve the use of physical force and, in fact, may serve to avoid the use of our destructive military power.

Reports by the American press during the stability operations in the Dominican Republic in May 1965 and the afteraction report on the operations indicate the successes that were achieved. This may be a source of pride to those involved, but it should not make them completely satisfied. There were some aspects of the operation that could have been stronger.

**Orientation Gap**

The earliest reports by the American press on the ground were filed on 1 May 1965. Thereafter, a steady stream of news was sent worldwide. However, US troops on the ground received their first command newspaper seven days after arrival. Additional information-type materials were received between three and 13 days later. This would appear to be a weakness in one link of the total US effort. It is almost certain that our troops were essentially uninformed on the Dominican Republic and her people prior to being sent into that country.

This is not to imply that US troops were not told why they were sent there. That was surely done by unit commanders just prior to movement. However, the troops apparently were not fully educated and oriented on the people and the country of the Dominican Republic prior to their sudden landing on that foreign island. This also applies to some other overseas areas where US military personnel are assigned.

Do we now have informational, orientational, and educational-type material available in each of the areas where our forces may be sent? For the most part, we do. They are scattered, however, in various classified and unclassified forms and studies, and apparently have not been used effectively in training our soldiers.

We could also ask if there is a requirement within the Army for train-
**STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS**

These include courses at selected service schools and special orientation tours with overseas Military Assistance Advisory Groups for selected senior officers. These, of course, do not provide this education and training for all officers and enlisted men in the service.

**On-the-Spot Education**

An item in *The New York Times*, dated 5 December 1965, reported that the following “Ten Commandments of War” were issued to a US Marine battalion in Vietnam:

- Wave at all Vietnamese.
- Shake hands when meeting people whether it be for the first time or upon subsequent meetings.
- Respect graves, tombs, and other religious buildings or shrines.
- Afford normal courtesies such as deference and respect to elders, and respect for authority of the village and hamlet officials.
- Give the right-of-way on the road and paths whenever possible.
- Treat women with politeness and respect.
- Recognize that hand holding among Vietnamese males is a custom of comradeship in South Vietnam and not an indication of homosexual tendencies subject to ridicule and mockery.
- Keep your word. Be slow to make promises, but once made do your best to keep them. Remember, though, that promises involve a command decision. Your commander must be given an opportunity to rule in such a matter.
- Enter into the spirit of bartering without abuse, and respect the local methods for conducting business.
- Return what you borrow, replace what you break, and avoid unnecessary “liberation of local items” for your personal or unit’s use.

While this effort to fill the orienta-

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US soldiers were militarily prepared for the Dominican Republic, but were not fully educated and oriented on the people and the country once the soldier arrives in the overseas command and his unit.

Some units do a fine job in such training and orientations. Many others do not. These orientations are not necessarily designed, however, to provide the soldier all he needs to know about the country and its people or how best to represent the United States.

There are several other kinds of training for personnel going overseas, and some are specifically oriented toward stability operations.
tion and training gap in stability operations was apparently needed and may be a step in the right direction, it pointedly brings to our attention a serious weakness in the nonmilitary education of the US marine and is equally applicable to the US soldier.

Similar Rules

This type of makeshift education for the soldiers and marines of the wealthiest and most advanced nation in the world falls short of the high standards that we establish in the more tangible military areas. In fact, these “Ten Commandments of War” are similar to the following points used by Mao Tse-tung almost four decades earlier to instruct his illiterate Chinese Communist soldiers on how to treat people and their property:

- Replace all doors when you leave a house.
- Roll up and return the straw matting on which you sleep.
- Be courteous and help out when you can.
- Return all borrowed articles.
- Replace all damaged articles.
- Be honest in all transactions with the peasants.
- Pay for all articles purchased.
- Be sanitary, and especially establish latrines at a distance from people's houses.

In 1947 the People's Liberation Army had, instead of the last two points:

- Don't flirt with women.
- Don't kill prisoners of war.

Stability operations involve more than the ability to control people and their land by the application of armed might. This was one of the lessons learned from the recent operation in the Dominican Republic that high-lighted the need for complete integration of our effort. The political, economic, sociopsychological, and scientific-technological effort of the United States must accompany such overt military effort.

Human Understanding

It is imperative that the soldier today be trained to fulfill his important role in operations which require the use of all elements of national power. He must know more about the people and the country in which our troops are stationed or may be needed. He must be educated so that he projects the best possible image of the United States. This can be done only if our soldiers understand their own country and also know about other peoples and their countries. Senator J. William Fulbright expressed the need as follows:

Our massive defense expenditures are an unfortunate necessity, but they will avail us little if we fail to make an adequate effort in the field of ideas and human understanding.

Most military training results in mastery of tangible items of military hardware and tactics. Other areas of education and cultural understanding are more elusive, and, partially because of this, they receive less of the commander's attention. Also, it is generally accepted that such education is of a civilian nature and, therefore, may be considered as a fait accompli.

The commander is informed if his vehicles need repairing or his mess-hall needs cleaning. However, before going overseas, he may be completely uninformed on whether or not his soldiers will know how to get along with the people of other nations while stationed in their home territory.

What can the services do to elimi-
strate or minimize this gap? Some actions have been taken through the various educational programs, informational fields, courses at some service schools, and individual educational effort. More positive and organized actions are needed, however, if the military man is to help other people understand the values of our society. To be most beneficial, it is essential that our soldiers have a better understanding of the people and nations where our forces are now stationed and where they may be required in the future.

What Can Be Done?

There are four major agencies, in addition to the Department of Defense, engaged in various forms of international activities that fall in the field of education and culture. These are the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the United States Information Agency, and the Peace Corps. What actions can be taken to resolve the gap in our stability operations?

A first step should be a coordinated effort by the five major governmental agencies to reach agreement on the over-all national objectives to be achieved and the broad concepts that each should mold to their special needs.

Thereafter, the Department of Defense, through the Office of Armed Forces Information and Education, could be the focal point for planning, organizing, and producing the educational materials for the military services. However, this educational program can neither be relegated to off-duty time nor to a voluntary-type activity if it is to accomplish the desired purpose.

Regardless of whether the materials are produced by the Department of Defense or as a contracted research project by a university or college, the materials should be produced and published in packet form ready for use by the small unit or detachment commander in teaching his soldiers and their adult dependents when appropriate.

Educational Program

To be of maximum effectiveness, the educational and orientational courses should be designed for all service personnel and should:

- Make maximum use of audiovisual materials to include closed-circuit television when appropriate. Motion pictures and film strips with recorded and printed narrations should be made into completed packets for the small unit commander to use with a minimum of rehearsal on his part.
- Provide general instruction appropriate to all the overseas areas where service personnel are or may be stationed.
- Be sufficiently detailed to provide fully for an understanding and appreciation of the different people and their culture.
- Provide complete coverage of the country and people—the attitudes, beliefs, values, and interests should be explained. Classes and groups within the society, the family system, political backgrounds, ideology, educational facilities, health and sanitation, governmental policies, historical and current relations with foreigners, police powers, and environmental and operational difficulties are areas which must be covered.
- Include a useful comparison of the “American Way of Life” with that of the subject country. This would include clearly defined guidelines for the soldier and his family.
To supplement the educational program, specially selected soldiers could be grouped and provided with organized, expense paid, short tours to the various countries where our personnel are stationed or may be sent. In particular, tours to countries of the developing areas of Latin America, south Asia, Africa, and the Far East where we have few military personnel stationed could help us to understand these people better and would serve as a basis for them to understand us. Special consideration should be accorded those areas where soldiers are most likely to be deployed in stability operations.

Selected soldiers or civilian leaders from the developing areas could be brought to this country for brief visits with military personnel and units as well as to historical spots in the United States. This would provide for expanded use of the training program now conducted for selected officers of foreign countries and would improve our preparations for stability operations.

General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, has established nine rules designed to help the United States win support from the Vietnamese people:

○ Remember we are special guests here; we make no demands and seek no special treatment.

○ Join with people: understand their life, use phrases from their language and honor their customs and laws.

○ Treat women with politeness and respect.

○ Make personal friends among the soldiers and common people.

○ Always give the Vietnamese the right of way.

○ Be alert to security and ready to react with your military skill.

○ Don’t attract attention by loud, rude or unusual behavior.

○ Avoid separating yourself from the people by a display of wealth or privilege.

○ Above all else you are members of the US Military Forces on a difficult mission, responsible for all your official and personal actions. Reflect honor upon yourself and the United States of America.
SINCE the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan in 1952, Communist China has been heavily involved in training technicians and improving scientific research to attain her goals for industrial development. She capitalized on the research organizations and the scientists who had been associated with the Republic of China (ROC) before the mainland fell into Communist hands. Little was accomplished initially, however, since research was poorly planned and her objectives were scattered.

In view of this fact, a Scientific Planning Committee was established in March 1956, and in June of the same year a draft of a 12-year plan...
for long-range scientific and technical research and development was drawn up with the assistance of Soviet scientists. The main purpose of this plan was to enable Communist China to catch up to the scientific level of industrialized nations by the end of 1967. To achieve this objective, the Communist Party specified that:

- The Scientific Planning Committee would be the supreme supervisory body for scientific research and development.
- Military science and civilian research would be combined.
- Emphasis would be on the applied sciences.
- The Ministry of Advanced Education would reshape educational guidelines, placing more stress on physics and technology.
- Top priority would be given to budget allocations for scientific research and development.

**Major Points**

In the fall of 1957, a group of some 60 scientists, headed by Professor Kuo Mo-jo, president of the Red Chinese Academy of Science, went to Moscow for a joint conference with their Soviet counterparts. During the three months of that conference, two major points reportedly agreed upon were that the Soviet Academy of Science would make an over-all study on Red China's long-range plan, and that, in a period of five years, 100 of the 580 projects in that long-range plan would be undertaken jointly by the scientific forces of the two countries.

In 1958 the Chinese Communist regime launched the Great Leap Forward movement in an attempt to accomplish the plan five years ahead of schedule. Many scientists, however, were unenthusiastic and held contradictory views which actually impeded the progress of the Great Leap Forward. Many scientists were either forced out of their research, or compelled to work in the backcountry or in factories. In some cases, projects were even partially suspended.

**Shift to Agriculture**

A series of economic crises forced Red China to shift her efforts to agriculture, where failures had greatly affected scientific progress. In August 1960, when Sino-Soviet relations were at their lowest ebb, the Soviet Union unilaterally abrogated the Scientific and Technical Agreement and withdrew her scientists and technicians, together with blueprints and technical data. This blow virtually paralyzed the long-range plan.

Communist China then realized that a scientific system blindly patterned after that of the Soviet Union—establishment of a greater number of research institutes and facilities—would not work if there were not enough well-trained technicians. It had drained away huge financial strength from Red China's shaky economy, and also had held back military advances.

New guidelines were established to:

- Develop scientists by augmenting the research elements in colleges and universities.
- Enlist scientists and technicians from abroad to correct the deteriorating situation that resulted from suspension of Soviet aid.

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- Reappraise the scientists who had earlier associated with the ROC.

The Communists changed their attitude and treatment of these scientists radically.

The result was two nuclear detonations on the Chinese mainland, the first on 16 October 1964, the second on 14 May 1965. They revealed for the world to see the grim fact that Communist China, with her own men and resources, could have considerable success in developing nuclear weaponry.

To expedite their scientific advancement and technological revolution, the Chinese Communists had established two types of organizations, one for steering and coordinating science and technology, the other for scientific research and development. Generally speaking, the entire setup for development of science was organizationally modeled after that of the Soviet Union.

In January 1956 the Chinese Communists fired out a thunderous slogan, "Grand March to Science," decreeing that a crash program for the most urgent projects in the scientific field be on a par with those in the advanced countries. The Scientific Planning Committee established in March was directly under the Communist Party's Central Committee, and headed by Marshal Chen Yi, to provide guidance as well as to coordinate and supervise scientific research of both a military and nonmilitary nature. In May 1957 the Planning Committee was reorganized by merging with the National Technological Committee as the State Scientific and Technical Committee. This organization was the supreme steering body for scientific research and was charged with the missions of:

- Coordinating research among all scientific research organizations and developing long-range plans.
- Eliminating conflicts and duplications among the departments of the Academy of Science, the research institutes within universities, and various Ministries.
- Insuring adequate attention to research for military purposes.
- Allocating and employing funds for research and development.
- Controlling and harnessing scientists and technicians.

Research and Development

The Academy of Science had been established in November 1950 by merging 22 research institutes which had been set up earlier to control the scientists and intellectuals who had not been able to evacuate with the ROC when the Chinese mainland fell.

Included within the Academy of Science are the departments of biology; geology; physics, chemistry, and mathematics; technology; and philosophy and sociology. In 1958 the Chinese Communists, after the pattern of the Soviet Academy of Science, established branch academies of sci-
ence in various Provinces and major cities as the next higher authority over all institutes, but under the control of appropriate local Communist Party headquarters. Once the State Scientific and Technical Committee was set up, the Academy of Science was put under its general supervision and guidance, although not in direct subordination.

Military Science

In October and November 1957 the Soviet satellites, Sputniks I and II, were launched into orbit. In order to cope with modern warfare, the Chinese Communists felt that adequate emphasis had to be placed on military science. Consequently, on 15 March 1958, with full support of the Soviet Union, they established the Academy of Military Science under the Ministry of National Defense. Marshal Yeh Chien-ying was appointed president. Its essential task was to intensify study on military applications of science and technology.

The Chinese University of Science and Technology was established at Peking in 1958 with 30 departments. Requirements for admittance were strict; only party or Youth Corps members could be enrolled. Duration of this education was five years. In 1963 there were 1,600 graduates, 1,400 in 1964, and 1,650 in 1965. These were all assigned to the major institutes of scientific research and development.

Since the Communists did not fully trust the returned overseas scientists or those who had a record of association with the ROC, the new graduates naturally became the hard core of science and technology research staffs. In addition to their own research work, they were responsible for surveillance and rating of their "elders."

Research organizations at colleges and universities, designed and set up by the Academy of Science and the Ministry of Advanced Education, started research work in 1956. Because the Communists emphasized military applications of science, colleges and universities placed their main efforts on nuclear energy re-
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grew to 133 million dollars. From 1958 to 1960 the investment was one billion dollars, and from 1961 to 1964 it was 2.2 billion US dollars. According to a conservative estimate, the Chinese Communists must have spent the greatest portion of their budget in the development of nuclear energy and rocketry.

Nuclear Energy

It was the Italian scientist Bruno M. Pontecorvo’s arrival in mainland China in August 1953 that sparked the interest of the Peking regime in the development of nuclear energy. Chien San-chiang, a French-trained nuclear physicist, was assigned to oversee the entire project. In April 1955 the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union signed an Agreement on Development of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes which provided that the USSR would aid in building, in the Peking suburbs, an experimental nuclear reactor of the heavy water type. The experimental reactor was completed in June 1958 and turned over to the Chinese on 27 September.

From this nuclear pile the Chinese Communists were able to obtain the first batch of radioactive isotopes, and from the cyclotron they were able to obtain high-energy particles for use in nuclear research. At the same time, according to the agreement, more than 20 Chinese nuclear physicists were handpicked to participate in research work at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubno, USSR.

The Chinese scientists thus made great progress in nuclear physics research during the period 1956-59. In 1960, Liu Shao-chi, the heir apparent and Chairman of the People’s Republic, proclaimed at the Moscow International Communist Congress that there were at least four nuclear reactors on the Chinese mainland. He further stated that three of them were in operation and could be applied for military as well as for peaceful purposes. Information from high-altitude photoreconnaissance made around 1963 revealed a giant nuclear energy plant in Lanchow. Judging from the extensive area it occupied, it could be a gaseous diffusion plant.

Analysis of information from various sources supports the belief that in Communist China today there are at least six reactors, five radioactive ore extraction plants, and one gaseous diffusion plant.

Experimental Reactor

The Peking experimental reactor, built with Soviet aid, has been in operation since 1958. It was generally assumed that before 1960 the raw materials and products of this reactor were strictly under Soviet control, and thus confined only to the field of experimentation. But from 1960 onward, since Communist China was no longer bound by the agreement she had with the Soviets, she was free to use as she saw fit the products and byproducts such as plutonium yielded by her nuclear reactors.

The construction of the gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow was apparently started in 1960 and completed in 1963, at which time the plant went into operation. Since the separation of U 235 from natural uranium required an enormous amount of electric power, and electric power supply in the underdeveloped region of northwestern mainland China fell critically short, the Communist regime had to build a hydroelectric plant in the vicinity of Lanchow on the Yellow River as a makeshift for supplying electric power to the gaseous diffu-

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sion plant. It is assumed that the Communists have also used the reactor at Lanchow to provide a needed portion of electric power for the gaseous diffusion plant in that area.

The nuclear reactor in Paotow is considerably larger in scale. Since Inner Mongolia is a vast, open steppe region, under no circumstances would the Communists sink a huge investment into such an area by setting up a reactor merely for power-generating purposes. It can, therefore, be inferred that the principal task of the reactor is to produce plutonium for the development of nuclear weapons.

Analysis of the fallout produced by her first nuclear explosion indicates that Communist China must have used an implosion-type device in detonating U 235. The following technical conclusions on the development of nuclear weaponry in Communist China are worth serious consideration.

- Technologically speaking, they have made remarkable progress in the development of nuclear weapons.
- The Chinese Communists tried to take a shortcut toward the development of a hydrogen bomb by production of U 235.
- Communist China would have serious technical problems in producing plutonium.
- It is likely that U 235 produced in the Lanchow gaseous diffusion plant was insufficiently concentrated, with the result that the Chinese Communists had to resort to the implosion-type device instead of the gun tube type for detonation.

When the Chinese Communists mapped out their 12-year plan for the development of science and technology in 1956, the delivery system was assigned as one of the major items with a priority below only that of nuclear energy. The over-all rocket project was headed by US-educated Chien Hsueh-sen, a rocket specialist.
Reliable sources revealed that test firing of a short-range ballistic missile with a range of approximately 300 miles was completed by the 3062d Arsenal at the suburb of Sian in 1963. It is now in production. Almost at the same time, the Chinese Communist Science Bulletin disclosed that some institutes within the Academy of Science had made remarkable achievement in research work on rocket development—such as solid fuel, high temperature resisting material, and aluminum alloy. Other sources also reported that the Communists had conducted midrange missile test firing in 1963, but failed due to defects in the guidance system, outer casing material, cooling, and propellant.

These achievements obviously were still limited. For this reason, the Chinese Communists had to import from Britain, France, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Japan a great quantity of precision instruments and materials relating to the development of rockets so as to solve the difficult problems. The Chinese Communists remain determined to develop the launching tools for medium-range missiles.

Chinese Communist aircraft provide another launching system. According to information from US sources, the Chinese Communists were capable of assembling MiG-15's, MiG-17's, and MiG-19's with Soviet assistance. After suspension of Soviet aid, the Chinese Communists have been confronted with problems not only in assembling such aircraft, but in providing adequate maintenance for the original ones due to shortage of spare parts.

We may assume that the Soviets had delivered some MiG-21's to the Chinese Communists before 1960, and that the manufacture of MiG-21's is probably underway at present. Judging from the techniques and experience they have acquired over the years, the Chinese Communists—with the knowledge of Chien Hsueh-sen and other top scientists—should not have much difficulty in producing fighter bombers similar to the MiG-21, even without the Soviet aircraft of the latest type.

In addition, Peking has about 275 Soviet-built Il-28 bombers which are capable of carrying nuclear bombs to targets up to 600 miles away. It also has five Il-28 jet transports capable of carrying a 15-ton load 4,000 miles. Thus, most major Asian cities—Tokyo, Manila, Bangkok, Rangoon, New Delhi, Taipei, Saigon, and others—may find themselves within Red Chinese nuclear range sometime in 1966.

It is anticipated that, in order to achieve a nuclear weapon system, Communist China will have to invest more money in scientific research and development. This may have either of two results; it may further decrease economic resources and cause a new crisis; or it may make her the number three nuclear power, next only to the United States and the Soviet Union.

With her tremendous manpower and the relatively untapped resources in an abundant land mass, Peking may well become the single force which most threatens the entire world. If the free nations still content themselves with simply ignoring or trying to argue away this hard fact, they may find themselves being swallowed up by a dragon with “nuclear teeth.”
THE imperialists cannot reconcile themselves to the victorious march of the Soviet Union to communism, the building of socialism in the people’s democracies, and the spread of the liberation struggle. They have not rejected the frenzied idea of destroying the Socialist countries by force.

The US imperialists rage in particular; they have taken upon themselves the role of saviors of the Capitalist system. The ruling circles in the United States are stubbornly whipping up the arms race. They are persistently perfecting their military machine by equipping it with predominantly offensive military means such as intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear submarines armed with Polaris missiles.

Other Western Powers are also taking an active part in this arms race. The leaders in Washington are trying hard to strengthen the aggressive military-political blocs, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the forefront. But events show serious contradictions in the North Atlantic aggressive bloc.

Carrying through her colonialist policy, the United States brazenly interferes in the internal affairs of other countries by organizing reac-
tionary coups and setting up regimes
suiting herself. The United States at­
tacks independent states and commits
unheard-of atrocities, thus calling
forth the hatred and condemnation of
the whole world.

Vietnam Conflict

The war unleashed by US imperial­
ists in Vietnam is a serious threat to
peace. The transoceanic brigands have
turned Vietnam into a kind of firing
range for testing all types of poison
gases, modern weapons, and military
technology. Bringing to life the mem­
ory of the grim times of fascism, the
Pentagon bosses are subjecting the
towns and villages of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam to barbarous
bombing and are carrying out
scorched-earth tactics in South Viet­
nam.

We are profoundly convinced that
these invaders will not be able to
break the will of the Vietnamese pa­
triots and force them to their knees.
The Vietnamese people do not stand
alone; on their side are the peoples
of the Socialist countries—millions
and millions of people throughout the
world. The USSR has given and will
continue to give selfless and resolute
aid to heroic Vietnam in her just and
courageous struggle for freedom and
independence.

In relating events in southeast
Asia, one should not forget Europe.
The embers of the last war continue
to smolder here, and could kindle the
fire of a new, nuclear war even more
destructive and catastrophic. The
United States is trying to legalize the
access of West Germany to the nuclear
arsenal. On her part, West Germany
is taking all measures to become one
of the leading members of the NATO
nuclear club, even claiming leadership
in it.

In the last 10 years, Bonn's mili­
tary expenditure has amounted to
200,000 million deutsche mark, twice
as much as the Hitlerites spent on
preparations for World War II. The
West German rulers openly demand
approval of their revanchist policy by
the Western allies and the recognition
of West Germany's hegemony in
NATO on a par with the United
States, including equal rights in plan­
ing and use of nuclear weapons. All
these demands are included in the
framework of Bonn's foreign policy.

Lenin's Policy

The Communist Party Central Com­
mittee and the Soviet Government
firmly and consistently implement
Nikolai Lenin's peace-loving policy.
They persistently struggle for the
creation of favorable conditions for
building a Communist society in the
USSR, developing the world Socialist
system, and preventing a new world
war. At the same time, the party can­
not fail to take account of the grow­
ing aggressiveness of the imperialist
powers led by the United States. Safe­
guarding the security of all peoples of
the Socialist countries, it takes all
steps to strengthen the defense of the
USSR.

The USSR cannot be indifferent to
the imperialists' military prepara­
tions. Under such conditions, our main
task is to raise the combat strength
of the army and navy and their pre­
paredness for crushing any adversary
if war is forced upon us.

For the Soviet armed forces, the
period since the 22d Party Congress
has entailed the solution of many com­
plex and important problems of mili­
tary construction. The measures car­
rried out in that direction have made
it possible to increase the reserve of
nuclear warheads for various pur-
poses and to reinforce sharply the delivery equipment of all the armed forces.

The Central Committee and the government have paid close attention to the development of the strategic rocket forces and nuclear submarines equipped with rockets. The main efforts of our military industry have been subordinated to the rapid expansion of these forces which are the chief means for restraining an aggressor and decisively routing him in war. All the latest achievements of Soviet science and technology have been used in perfecting them.

A number of basically new types of rocket armaments have been created. A whole complex of varied strategic means of warfare has been made operational in a short time. A large number of new—and this is of special importance—mobile launching installations have been built for the strategic rocket forces.

We have also created a submarine fleet equipped with rockets which is capable of fulfilling the strategic tasks of striking enemy targets on both sea and land. It includes new nuclear submarines equipped with ballistic rockets that can be launched while the vessel is submerged.

The nuclear strength of our long-distance, rocket-carrying air force has also been increased. Simultaneously with the improvement of strategic nuclear weapons has been the development of operational and tactical nu-

Savage, a Soviet three-stage intercontinental ballistic missile. Development of strategic rocket forces has received close attention.

clear weapons, especially those of the land forces and the navy.

Equipping the armed forces with conventional weapons has also been expanded in corresponding proportions. The tank and motorized infantry divisions have received improved armored, artillery, and special equipment. In some important respects, Soviet tanks are superior to the latest models in the United States and other NATO countries.

The armored protection of military personnel against the lethal effects of nuclear weapons has been greatly increased; the mobility and maneuverability of land forces have increased;
and communications, engineering, and other forces have been further developed. Highly effective new antiaircraft rocket systems and interceptor aircraft complexes have been developed. Our defenses insure the destruction of any aircraft and many of the enemy's rockets.

The long-range air force has been improved. Many of the combat aircraft of the frontline, naval, rocket-carrying, and especially military transport air forces have been renovated. Our airborne assault troops have been considerably reinforced. During recent years, the results of combat training have been good. The navy has been equipped with new rocket vessels, forces, and the means for antisubmarine defense, especially to combat rocket submarines.

Combat Readiness Increased

The improvement of technical equipment for the armed forces has been accompanied by increasing their combat readiness and raising the level of military and political training. Army and navy personnel are successfully mastering the new equipment and learning the methods of its use in battle and operations.

In recent years, the number of long-distance voyages by our nuclear submarines has increased five times, which shows that our sailors can perform any military tasks while at sea. An around-the-world voyage was recently completed by a group of submerged nuclear submarines. All this makes it possible to say with confidence that the Soviet armed forces are capable of carrying out any military tasks which may be set by the party and government for the defense of our homeland.

I should like to stress that in recent years military collaboration has broadened and strengthened with the armies of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact. The fundamental qualitative changes which have taken place in the Soviet armed forces compel the Pentagon leaders to assess our military power more soberly and adopt a different approach to their evaluation of the balance of military forces which has developed in the world.

People Are Protected

We stand calmly and confidently guarding the peaceful work of our people—the more so now that the establishment of the "Blue Defense Belt" of our state has been completed. In any event, should the imperialists attempt to unleash war against the Soviet Union and other Socialist states, let there be no doubt that our blow will prove to be devastating to the war's organizers.

The strength of our armed forces consists not only in the first-rate armament at their disposal, but also in the morale of the troops, their whole-hearted devotion to their people, and their loyalty to the ideals of the party. The Soviet armed forces possess highly qualified, well-educated officer cadres who are devoted to the party and government and are, owing to their qualifications, able to lead troops in peace as well as war. Our officers, generals, and admirals are the backbone of the army and navy.

Much continues to be done in the way of training politically and theoretically mature military cadres who are highly qualified and devoted to their motherland. At present, one out of every four officers in the army and navy has a higher military or specialized education. The proportion of engineering and technological personnel in the armed forces is steadily growing.
The command staff, political bodies, and party organizations are the leading inculcators of party ideals. They skillfully and purposefully educate personnel in the spirit of Socialist patriotism, proletarian internationalism, boundless devotion to their people, and hatred toward the imperialist aggressors.

Our enlisted personnel have a high political consciousness and a boundless devotion to the party and the people. Every day of their service is filled with persistent training and the will to excel in military and political training.

As always, Communists lead the way. Communists and Comsomol (Communist Union of Youth) members are a vast force in any army and navy. They comprise over 80 percent of the armed forces and are the bedrock on which the high political awareness and morale of the troops are founded.

Also, the young men who arrive for conscript service in the armed forces are well educated, technologically knowledgeable, and physically fit.

The strength of our armed forces is founded on the inviolable unity of the army and people. Therefore, we consider an all-round expansion and consolidation of the ties between army and navy party organizations, political bodies, and military councils, on the one hand, and local party, administrative, and trade union organizations, on the other, as one of the main methods for enhancing the fighting capacity of our armed forces.

The Soviet people have surrounded their armed forces with deep respect and care. They regard them as the reliable shield of the homeland. In this unity with the workers of the country lies the inexhaustible source of the strength of our army and its superiority over the armies of imperialist states.

To strengthen the defenses of the country requires continuous attention to the military and patriotic education of the Soviet people, especially the youth. Military knowledge must be widely disseminated, and the citizens must participate in perfecting the civil defense system. The further strengthening of fraternal ties and the unity of the Soviet armed forces and the armies of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact and the entire Socialist community must also be an object of our unremitting concern.
CHOOSE YOUR WEAPON
Throughout centuries of military history, weaponeers have sought advances in weapon lethality. The "bigger bang per buck" search typifies this objective in the nuclear era.

Although not necessarily synonymous with enhanced combat effectiveness in every case, the greater lethality of each new system enabled the side using it to achieve victory more readily. In the general wars of the past century, victory came through attainment of one or more objectives such as the defeat of the enemy's armed forces, destroying the industrial and mobilization base supporting those forces, or overcoming the will of either the armed forces or the homefront civilians to continue to wage war.

However, in a counterinsurgency campaign, the objectives are quite different. Much of the weaponry for general war proves to be ill suited for counterinsurgency. Throughout the first two of Mao Tse-tung's three stages of revolutionary war, and even to some extent in the third stage, the insurgents are intermingled with often innocent civilians and, indeed, may not be distinguishable from them. If the "industrial base" of the insurgency is in-country, these workshops, too, as well as food and other resources, are similarly mixed with those of innocent and loyal civilians.

Reasons for Constraint

A difficult problem of identification must first be solved. Even then, assuming its solution, the use of available weaponry will be constrained for two reasons: if avoidable, the innocent should not be harmed; and the objectives of a counterinsurgency campaign will be quite different from those of a general war between two countries, even though some of the objectives may be, in theory at least, common to both.

In a war between two countries, each strives to terminate hostilities on acceptable terms and with minimum expenditure of its manpower and other resources. The damage and casualties inflicted on the enemy are a secondary consideration. In the past, even the victor's expectation of helping the rehabilitation of the vanquished has not restrained his use of massive military power to achieve the earliest victory possible.

The political and psychological objectives of a counterinsurgency campaign restrict use of the available military power. In such a campaign, operations are designed, to use a trite phrase, "to win the hearts and minds of the people," including as many insurgents as possible. Injury of the innocent and damage to their property must be avoided lest their loyalties
CHOOSE YOUR WEAPON

...turn from the government to the insurgency.

In overcoming the insurgents, only that level and kind of force should be used which will accomplish the military and political objectives and still minimize the postcounterinsurgency legacy of hatred resulting from the memories of the dead, the presence of the maimed, and the destruction of personal property. Damage to resources also needs to be minimized, not only to avoid increasing the refugee and aid-to-civilians problems, but also to minimize the task of postcounterinsurgency rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Weapony Objectives

The selection and use of weaponry and tactics should be designed to achieve the following objectives without, of course, undue increase in the cost to the government forces:

- Defeat or capture of insurgent forces while inflicting the fewest possible casualties.
- Avoidance of injury to women and children and to innocent males.
- Complete destruction of purely military installations.
- Neutralization only of installations and resources useful in a peace economy, or limiting damage to the extent necessary to deny their use to the insurgency.

To inflict higher levels of damage and casualties will not only hinder the government's longer term tasks, but it will also risk loss of support and sympathy in collaborating and neutral countries.

The first problem faced in trying to use selective and discriminating weaponry and techniques is that of identifying and separating the insurgent from the innocent. Considerable research and developmental effort has been directed toward its solution with only partial success.

The problem takes its simplest form in the identification of the innocent at checkpoints through use of identification cards and similar techniques. Typical of its more complex forms are innocent-looking farmers observed by an aircraft pilot—farmers who might have been manning a machinegun a few minutes earlier—or the vehicle spotted on an airfield defense ground surveillance radar screen which might be a farmer and his produce or an insurgent mortar crew intent on attacking the airbase.

Even when hostile insurgent activity is detected, the insurgents might have commingled themselves with the activities of a village or their positions might be adjacent to innocent civilian activity. In cases like these, it may be impossible for government...
forces to differentiate between insurgent and innocent from a distance.

Even if they can, government forces then face the second problem of employing suitable weaponry so that, despite the commingling, contiguity, and difficulty of identification, the objectives can be achieved. Available alternatives in weaponry have many discriminatory and selective characteristics.

**Point and Area Effects**

One consideration is point versus area effect. When viewed in small-scale, counterinsurgency operations, very few weapons can be used with a point effect, limiting casualties and damages to a single insurgent or a small radius. In this category may be placed the bayonet, the rifle and carbine, the machinegun, the concussion grenade, and the small antipersonnel mine like the spike trap. When suitably aimed or delivered, the effect of these weapons can be localized on practically an individual basis.

On the other hand, artillery, napalm, bombs, rockets, and chemical-biological agents are typical of the many weapons with area effects of various sizes. The smaller the area, the more frequently a suitable homogeneous target can be found for defeat without undesirable consequences. Although the larger area weapons like napalm may be far more efficient, the probability of homogeneous insurgent targets of these sizes becomes smaller and the possibility of unwanted damage greater.

Although most weapons are directed during delivery at a previously acquired target, some are not. Predominant in this category are antipersonnel, antitank, and naval mines, spike traps, and similar planted devices. Their effect is delivered on the actuating individual or vehicle, whether friend or foe, except in the abnormal circumstance when visually controlled firing—as of a river mine—has been improvised. If placed along routes in general use, injury to the innocent, as well as to insurgents, is virtually certain.

**Accuracy**

The larger the circular error probable (CEP) of a weapon, the greater the possibility of damage to commingled or contiguous friendly personnel and facilities. The bayonet thrust or rifle fired at close range may involve a negligible CEP, but that of practically all ordnance achieved by high-performance aircraft is 40 yards or more. Delivery of chemical agents can be subject to the vagaries of wind and weather.

The level of materiel destruction can vary considerably. Use of the exclusively antipersonnel weapons—such as small arms, mines, and chemical agents—or of herbicides would limit physical damage to facilities to minor levels. On the other hand, the larger artillery calibers, and aircraft fragmentation and incendiary bombs would, if delivered accurately against suitable targets, produce extensive physical damage.

There are also various levels of personnel injury. In the case of the chemical agents, this level could range from the temporary incapacitation of riot control and incapacitating agents to serious, long-term illness or death from others. As for mechanically produced injuries, those resulting from the uncontrolled fragments of high-explosive bombs and shells would produce larger and more complicated wounds with a higher proportion of deaths and permanently maimed.

The smaller particles of some gre-
CHOOSE YOUR WEAPON

Grenades and bomblets are more effective in that they produce a greater number of casualties for a given weight of metal, but also produce smaller and more readily treated and healed wounds. The use of such ordnance seems better to meet the psychological, political, and humanitarian needs of a counterinsurgency situation.

In insurgencies in the near future, use should be made of those weapons which fall toward the low-severity (of wound inflicted), high-discrimination (capability) end of a spectrum of weaponry already described. Those weapons toward the high-severity, low-discrimination end should be avoided if an alternative is available.

How much of the spectrum of weaponry can be used will be determined by the level of success achieved in target identification. This level can be optimized in two ways. First, as one facet of a counterinsurgency campaign, the government should carry out programs which seek to separate the insurgent from the loyal popula-

Grenades from this grenade launcher are effective in counterinsurgency because the many casualties have smaller and more readily treated and healed wounds

tion. The fortified hamlet program successfully achieved this end in Malaya, but has been only partially successful in South Vietnam.

As a related measure, it should be possible to improve the “labeling” of loyal persons and activities—whatever the extent of separation or mixing—by use of identification systems employing visual, electronic, infrared, chemical, or other recognition systems.

Second, use of the best available
systems of target acquisition and identification can best exploit the degree of success attained in the separation and labeling efforts.

Here are some principles for use of available weaponry. Adequate target identification is presumed, and the use of a weapon in one situation may be precluded in another, as when a high-performance aircraft cannot locate its target in sufficient time to use its machineguns:

- Do not use undirected weapons such as antipersonnel and antitank mines except where they cannot be activated by friendly elements.
- Use ordnance with area of effect matched to the size of the target. Individual weapons, mortars, the smaller calibers of artillery, small bombs, and missiles will all find far greater scope for employment than the larger items of ordnance. The latter will be needed for the fewer instances in which large targets are identified.
- Where materiel or facilities destruction is sought, high explosives would be preferable to napalm or incendiary bombs except in cases where fire effects cannot spread outside the target area.
- For defeat of personnel, grenades, bomblets, and nonlethal temporarily incapacitating chemical agents should be used in preference to high-explosive bombs, shells, or missiles, and to lethal and permanently incapacitating chemicals.

The fortified hamlet is one means of separating the insurgent from the loyal population.
CHOOSE YOUR WEAPON

lected munitions like grenades and small bombs and shells, these chemicals can be used with some discrimination. Also, their low level of effects that disappear in a short time places them at the low-severity, high-discrimination end of our spectrum.

Since the effects of these agents disappear spontaneously after a short time, the severity can be considered zero, making for a most favorable severity-discrimination factor under all conditions and even when used without discrimination. These agents best achieve the objectives and also solve the difficult discrimination problem in counterinsurgency warfare.

There are politicolegal questions involved in use of such agents which have been studied extensively. Article V of the Washington Treaty of 6 February 1922 sought to prohibit "use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices."

The question of the force of this prohibition—either as a treaty provision or as a part of international law—has been extensively debated. In any event, it has been apparent that public opinion and political feelings can run high on the question of use of so-called "gases," into which category even mere riot-control agents like tear gas have, through misunderstanding and distortion, been placed.

It appears clear that the intent of the framers of the Washington Treaty was to prevent use of lethal and permanently or severely incapacitating agents like the mustard gas and lewisite of World War I. It is somewhat anomalous that use of the temporarily incapacitating agents would be far more humanitarian than the great fire raids of World War II on German and Japanese cities.

In the light of the order-of-magnitude superiority of the incapacitating agents over other weaponry available in counterinsurgency warfare, from the humanitarian, political, psychological, and military effectiveness viewpoints, it would appear that US forces should make use of them when appropriate. This will require a careful program of educating public and official opinion worldwide. It will also require the political determination to proceed even if all the voices expressing objections are not stilled. It must be realized that some of these voices will inevitably be propaganda.

Wars of revolution appear to be with us for the foreseeable future. The problems of selectivity, discrimination, and limitation of effects—largely ignored in past weapons research—need much attention in the future.
Malaria Drug
A new antimalarial drug now authorized for use among US troops in South Vietnam can cut in half the number of men stricken by the disease according to Army medical researchers.

Recent field tests conducted in Vietnam by Army researchers show that diaminodiphenylsulfone (DDS), a drug long used in treating leprosy, will combat a severe form of malaria which has resisted the usual treatment.

Troops will be given one 25-milligram pill each day and continue to take the pills for one month after leaving southeast Asia.

Soldiers receiving the drug who still contract malaria should now be able to return to duty in two or three weeks instead of six or eight weeks as before. Chances of a relapse, according to the researchers, are expected to be cut from 40 to four percent.

In 1965 malaria caused a loss of 63,035 man days in Vietnam.—Army News Features.

‘F-111A’ Flies At Mach 2.5
An Air Force F-111A fighter bomber has flown at a speed of Mach 2.5—equivalent to 1,446 knots—during a high-speed test run.

During other tests, F-111’s have exceeded Mach 1.2 at extremely low levels and have taken off and landed in less than the required 3,000 feet.—News release.

Communications Network
A major segment of the defense communications network in Europe has been activated as part of the European Tropo-Army system spanning a number of Western European nations.

The activation adds more than 1,200 channel miles to the Army Strategic Communications Command’s (STRATCOM’s) worldwide communications complex. The system will support all US forces in Europe and the NATO armies.

It ties in communications from Leghorn, Italy, through the Italian Alps up to Bremerhaven, Germany, and from Heidelberg to within a few miles of Paris.

“Tropo” signifies tropospheric scatter, a method of long-range radio transmission where signals are deflected off a layer of the atmosphere to an over-the-horizon receiving station.—DOD release.

Super Searchlight
The Air Force is testing the Airborne General Illumination Light (AGIL) as a possible substitute for illumination parachute flares. The system employs two banks of 14 high-intensity lights.—DOD release.
Three Navy air-cushion vehicles are being used to patrol the extremely shallow coastal waters along the Vietnam coast in search of craft carrying smuggled Viet Cong supplies.

The air-cushion vehicles travel at speeds in excess of 50 knots over water, marsh, mud, land, and snow on a thick cushion of air forced downward beneath the craft by a horizontally mounted fan. It appears to ride only a few inches above the surface, but the hard bottom of the craft actually travels on a cushion of air more than four feet thick. The 39-foot craft is manned by an officer and three enlisted men.—US Navy release.

New Air Conditioner

Waste heat from the exhaust of turbine engines will be put to use by the Army to power a radically new air conditioning system now under development at the Engineer Research and Development Laboratories.

The new system will be used with the Army's missile fire control vans and similar mobile shelters that are linked to gas turbine generators which power their electronic equipment.

According to reports, the system will cut fuel consumption by 40 percent while reducing the size and weight of the equipment by 30 percent.—Army News Features.

Training Centers

Almost 700,000 young Americans will pass through the Army training system during Fiscal Year 1967. This is more than double the number in 1965.

Currently, 15 training centers are operating. Twelve are full-scale basic training centers, and three are limited to advanced individual training, Women's Army Corps training, and conscientious objector training.

In 1965, when the Army trained about 300,000 individuals, 11 training centers were operating. Seven of these were basic training centers.—US Army release.
‘M551 General Sheridan’

The Army’s newest fighting machine, the M551—better known as the General Sheridan weapons system—has rolled off the production line in Cleveland, Ohio.

The fast-moving General Sheridan, which can reach speeds up to 45 miles per hour, mounts a 152-millimeter launcher that fires conventional rounds and guided missiles (MR, Jan 1964, p. 96).—Army News Features.

Landing Field Tests

An instant landing field for helicopters and short and vertical takeoff and landing aircraft is being tested by the Air Force. During tests, a chlorinated polyester resin formulation reinforced by fiberglass was sprayed over the desert floor in 30 minutes. Vehicles and helicopters used the surface without causing damage or permanent deformation.—DOD release.

Replaceable Track Shoe

The tank on the left is fitted with the new T142 track while the vehicle at right has the current standard track

An experimental track shoe assembly, the T142, which may double the service life of tracks on the M60A1 tank, is being developed by the Army.

The development will make it possible to replace individual rubber pads on the track shoe, to reverse the track shoe assembly or the pads to equalize wear, and to remove the rubber pads to allow the steel grousers to function as cleats on soft ground or snow.

The standard track, the T97E2, must be replaced as a unit. It cannot be reversed, and its rubber road pads cannot be removed. Replacement of the standard track is necessary after approximately 2,200 miles of use.—US Army release.

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Buoyant Body Armor

Buoyant body armor has been developed by the Navy's Clothing and Textile Laboratory in Bayonne, New Jersey. It is undergoing tests in Vietnam for protection against explosive ordnance and for buoyancy in water.

Conventional body armor weighs eight pounds or more, while the tested armor weighs less than three pounds, the weight of a standard life preserver.—DOD release.

Space Maneuvering Unit

Development of a Dual-Purpose Maneuvering Unit (DMU) which can be worn by a space pilot or operated by remote radio and television signals has recently been started by the Air Force.

The dual-purpose unit will combine the best features of the Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (AMU) used during the Gemini 9 flight and the Remote Maneuvering Unit (RMU) which has been laboratory tested. The AMU is worn on the astronaut's back for both propulsion and environmental control. The RMU is designed for remote operation by a crewman inside a spacecraft.

With the DMU, an astronaut could assemble a station in space, repair a space vehicle, or perform other tasks. In unmanned missions, the DMU could be guided remotely by an astronaut inside a space vehicle and might include inspection of satellites and space vehicles, rendezvous, assistance in docking, and transfer of space equipment.—US Air Force release.

'Walleye' Weapon

Technical evaluation of the Navy's Walleye, described as a "television-guided glide weapon," is underway at the Naval Missile Center, Point Mugu, California.

Launched from an aircraft, the Walleye, having no propulsion system, glides to the target. A television camera in the Walleye locks on the target and guides the weapon (MR, May 1965, p 99).—DOD release.
Reserve Fleet

The Navy is releasing 25 C-4 type cargo ships from the reserve fleets. The ships will first be offered to the Military Sea Transportation Service to transport military supplies to southeast Asia. Then they will be used to "update" the cargo fleet of the Merchant Marine. The C-4 cargo ships being offered are at least 21 years old, but have been described as in "good" condition. They were used as troop carriers during World War II and the Korean War.—DOD release.

Floating Repair Base

CH-47A Chinook helicopter landing on the Corpus Christi Bay with a load of combat-damaged aircraft parts

The Corpus Christi Bay, the Army's first floating aircraft maintenance ship, is supporting US forces in Vietnam from Camranh Bay.

The 538-foot Military Sea Transportation Service vessel is equipped to repair all types of Army aircraft flying in Vietnam. The 305 technicians aboard the ship are trained for work in sheet metal, hydraulics, instruments, electronics, armament, avionics, and other fields.

A closed-circuit television system on board expedites the flow of data from the ship's technical library to other parts of the vessel. The library contains more than 500,000 items of information on repair and maintenance of Army aircraft.—News release.
The Soviets have developed a new air defense weapon by using the chassis of a PT76 reconnaissance tank and a radar-controlled ZPU4 14.5-millimeter machinegun mounted in a turret. The weapon has a 360-degree traverse.

It will probably be used by motorized infantry regiments. Up to this time, these units have been equipped with ZPU4 machineguns mounted on two-axle carriages and towed by light trucks.—News item.

North Vietnam Airlift
The Soviet Union is using more than 100 large transports in her airlift to North Vietnam. Some of the aircraft fly the airlift route nonstop to Hanoi or Nanning, a Communist Chinese airfield near the border of North Vietnam. In addition to small arms and ammunition, the aircraft haul large mortars, guns, radar equipment, and air defense missiles.—News item.

Armored Personnel Carrier
The BTR60PB armored personnel carrier is the latest member of the Soviet Army's BTR60 family. Compared with the open and closed-in versions, it features a lightly armored revolving turret with an automatic weapon which is believed to be a 14.5-millimeter gun.

The vehicle is reportedly equipped with infrared driving and firing lights.—News item.
FRANCE

'Mirage' Aircraft

France's Air Force will receive 362 Mirage aircraft by the end of 1966. Tactical units will receive 150 Mirage III-E interceptors, 50 Mirage III-C fighter bombers, 50 Mirage III-R reconnaissance aircraft, and 50 two-seat Mirage III-B's.

Production of the Mirage III-V, a vertical takeoff aircraft, is scheduled for 1967-70.—News item.

Naval Forces

At the beginning of 1966, the total tonnage of France's warships was 320,000 tons. Included in this total were three aircraft carriers, 64 destroyers, and 19 submarines.

Under construction are three guided-missile frigates of the Suffren class which are to be armed with Masurca and Malafon missiles.

Three nuclear-powered submarines are to be the nucleus of France's strategic naval force. Each will carry 16 missiles, comparable to the US Polaris, with an estimated range of between 1,800 and 2,500 miles.—News item.

WEST GERMANY

'LARC's' For The 'Bundeswehr'

The West German Defense Ministry has placed an order in the United States for 200 LARC-5's and 60 LARC-15's for the amphibious units of the Bundeswehr.—News item.

Air Defense Weapon

A contract for the development of a new armored self-propelled air defense weapon system has been awarded by the West German Defense Procurement Office to a consortium of German manufacturers.

The weapon system will mount twin Hispano Suiza 30-millimeter guns.—News item.

Submarine Fleet

West Germany's submarine program calls for the construction of 30 submarines, six of which are to be used in the antisubmarine role.

The submarine fleet will consist of three squadrons and a training group. The only squadron now operational, the 1st, has four submarines. By mid-1967 this squadron will be equipped with 10 to 12 submarines.

The 2d Squadron will have six submarines for antisubmarine warfare and the 3d Squadron 12 submarines. Each squadron is to have its own submarine tenders.

West Germany's combat submarines will displace about 450 tons and have eight torpedo tubes. The antisubmarine craft will displace 800 to 900 tons.

The construction program should be completed in 1970.—News item.

COMMUNIST CHINA

South Sea Command

A South Sea Command was established by Communist China in 1965 when the US troop strength was increased in South Vietnam. It embraces the Canton and Kunming military zones in the Provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow, and Hunan.

Under this command are six armies, each with an estimated strength of 40,000 men; eight air force divisions with an estimated total of 1,000 aircraft; an unknown number of air defense divisions whose equipment includes surface-to-air missiles; a few marine units; and some engineer and security forces. Total strength of the command is estimated to exceed 400,000 men.

Three of the armies—the 40th, 42d, and 47th—were part of the 4th Field Army Group which took part in the Korean War.—News item.
AUSTRALIA

Reconnaissance Role For 'F-111A'

Australia is to use the US-built F-111A strike aircraft in an advanced reconnaissance role. The Minister for Air in Australia says the F-111A will completely revolutionize the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) reconnaissance capability.

Twenty-four F-111's are scheduled for delivery to the RAAF in late 1968. Two years after delivery, six of the aircraft will be returned to the United States to be fitted for reconnaissance work.

The reconnaissance modifications will not affect the planes' striking power since they can be reconverted for the strike role within a few hours. —News release.

'Oberon' Class Submarine

The keel of the Ovens, Australia's third of four Oberon class submarines on order, has been laid at a shipyard in Scotland. Launching is scheduled in 1968.

The Royal Australian Navy's first Oberon class submarine, the Oxley, will be commissioned at the end of 1966, and the second, the Otway, is scheduled to be launched this year (MR, Sep 1963, p 106).—News release.

GREAT BRITAIN

'Martel' Missile

First details of the Martel (Missile Antiradar and Television), a new generation air-to-surface precision tactical strike missile jointly designed by Great Britain and France, have been released.

Martel is claimed to be the first air-to-surface tactical missile in the Free World which offers a real standoff capability. This feature gives a new element of surprise in attack, together with a high degree of invulnerability to the launching aircraft.

Designed to function in an electronic countermeasures environment, Martel is interchangeable, depending on mission requirement. The antiradar version has an all-weather attack capability and can operate against multiple targets. The television version flies toward the target area automatically, with final guidance by the weapon's operator.

The missile's weapon-support facilities can cope with either version.—News release.

Hovercraft

Orders for the development and construction of two prototype hovercraft, one designed as a fast patrol boat and the other as a logistics support craft, will be placed with a British manufacturer by the Ministry of Defense in Great Britain.

Military tests of hovercraft in the Far East and Canada have been encouraging. Arrangements are now being made to equip a British Army unit with SRN-6 hovercraft for service in the Far East early in 1967. The SRN-6 is a larger version of the SRN-5 which carries 20 passengers at 75 knots.—News release.
ITALY

Marine Corps

Italy's marine corps, formerly known as Piedimontese Fanti di Marina (soldiers of the navy) and which was disbanded more than 50 years ago, will be reactivated this year.

Reforming the corps with the name of "marines" is part of Italy's program to bring her armed forces into line with allied sea forces in the Mediterranean.—News item.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Gaza Naval Base

The government of the United Arab Republic has allotted 120 million dollars for construction of a harbor and naval base at Gaza. Work on the project is scheduled to begin this year. According to the report, the first phase of construction is expected to be completed in 1969, and the last phase in 1973.—News item.

PAKISTAN

'T54' Tanks

Communist China recently supplied Pakistan with an unknown number of T54 battle tanks. It is not known whether the tanks were built in Communist China or the Soviet Union.

The tanks, first displayed in a military parade in March 1966 in Rawalpindi, are of the B type which has a smoke discharger but no infrared equipment.—News item.

BELGIUM

Armored Car

A new lightweight, wheeled, armored reconnaissance vehicle, designated the FN4RM/62FAB, has been developed by Belgium. One version mounts a 90-millimeter cannon in its turret, and the other a 60-millimeter mortar and two machineguns. The latter version is primarily for guerrilla-type warfare.

The vehicle weighs approximately eight tons, is powered by a 130-horsepower six-cylinder engine, has four-wheel drive, a maximum speed of just over 60 miles an hour, and a range of action of about 350 miles.—News item.

SWEDEN

Bottomless Oil Tank

A bottomless oil tank made of polyester resin has been successfully tested in Sweden. The gigantic plastic bell, which holds about 90,000 gallons, is anchored in the sea.

Since water and oil do not mix and oil is lighter than water, a tank bottom is unnecessary. In contrast to conventional storage tanks, there is no loss through evaporation and no danger of explosion due to the formation of gas.—News item.
A 200-ton, 150-foot Royal Canadian Navy antisubmarine warfare ship scheduled for launching late this year will introduce a radical design for large oceangoing vessels—a fixed, surface-piercing hydrofoil system permitting speeds up to 60 knots.

The ship, designated FHE-400 (for Fast Hydrofoil Escort), will be named HMCS Bras d’Or. The FHE-400 concept combines aerodynamic and marine engineering designs for the ship’s hydrofoil system which is comprised of huge, winglike foils and struts that are combined to form the bow and main foil systems.

The bow foil, which provides 10 percent of the ship’s lift when it is foilborne, consists of two foil units mated to a center strut that takes the place of a conventional ship’s rudder. The main foil is made up of a combination of large, winglike foils and struts.

Propellers mounted at the main foil strut intersection provide the thrust for foil-borne hydrofoil speeds.—News release.

By LTC George D. Eggers, Jr., USA

Dr. Bobrow has compiled and edited a representative group of 26 essays on defense policy analysis. In his view, the major aspects of defense policy analysis fall into four broad categories: strategic context, defense policymaking, strategic alternatives, and quality control.

The four essays which comprise the strategic context portion of the book survey the present international environment with specific emphasis on the USSR, Communist China, NATO, and the nonaligned nations.

The papers on defense policymaking analyze the diverse policy roles of Congress, Department of Defense civilian leadership, military professionals, scientists, and the general public.

The section on strategic alternatives contains excellent coverage of nuclear deterrence, conflict limitation, guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency, civil defense, and arms control and disarmament.

Finally, four articles depict the character of the basic elements of quality control: information, rationality, flexibility, and innovation.

This book has value for the professional military reader because of its insight into the complexities inherent in the theory and practice of defense policymaking in the mid-1960's.


By LTC Joseph D. Hynes, USA

The title is drawn from the World War I allegory of General John J. Pershing and the American Expeditionary Forces as the point of the sword, and General March, Chief of Staff, and the home organization as the hilt. This book is a biography of a relatively little-known but important figure in the Army who served as Chief of Staff during 1918-21.

Although obscured by the publicity given General Pershing, General March was instrumental in galvanizing the war effort and establishing the supremacy of the Chief of Staff and the general staff system. General March's views of the Army General Staff and how it should function closely parallel the Army's current staff structure.

Based largely upon papers and interviews heretofore unpublished, this work throws new light upon the conflicts which arose between the Chief of Staff—who was a brigadier general commanding artillery units in the American Expeditionary Forces when tapped for the Chief of Staff post—and General Pershing.

Mr. Coffman, Assistant Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin, has produced a scholarly biography which is a noteworthy addition to World War I literature.
MILITARY BOOKS


In this compact volume, the author describes how the Allies broke through the German seawall defenses to begin their conquest of Nazi Europe. Illustrated with maps and photographs, this book is a handy reference work.


By LTC CARL F. BASWELL, USA

An eyewitness account of German concentration camps in general and Dachau in particular. It describes the dramatic story of the liberation of Dachau by the 42d and the 45th Infantry Divisions of the US Army. The history of Dachau is traced from its opening in March 1933 as a model prison to accommodate 5,000 political prisoners through April 1945 when it had become an overcrowded, typhus-infested camp of 35,000 starving civilian and military prisoners of many nationalities, religions, and political beliefs.

By the day of liberation, Dachau had accumulated the "hostages of honor" who numbered some 137. They included Leon Blum, Premier of France; Kurt von Schuschnigg, Chancellor of Austria; and General Franz Halder, Adolf Hitler's Chief of Staff. Heinrich Himmler stated that this group of prisoners of honor, "are worth more than a whole Armored Division." The author follows the lives of a number of these important personages after their liberation.

This is an unemotional and factual accounting of man's inhumanity to man as practiced in Hitler's concentration camps.


By LTC HARRY J. MAHAFER, USA

In this latest West Point history, Stephen E. Ambrose describes the Military Academy with objectivity and scholarship. It differs from similar histories by concentrating on the Military Academy's difficulties as well as its triumphs.

The book begins with the early struggles for recognition, moves slowly through the various stages of West Point development, and traces skillfully the influence of Thayer, Mahan, Partridge, Church, Delafield, MacArthur, and others.

While the organization is generally chronological, the later chapters—arranged functionally—are, perhaps, the most interesting. Especially recommended is the section on Douglas MacArthur, with its description of the conflict between the innovating young superintendent and the powerful, ultraconservative academic board of the early 1920's.


By LTC Luiz de A. Araripe, Brazilian Army

Written while in confinement before his execution as a war criminal, the author dwells on the background of Germany's annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia; the campaigns against Poland, France, and the Soviet Union; and the last days of the Third Reich.

BY JOHN R. CAMERON

Drawn together in this volume are most of the threads of man's knowledge of himself and his society.

This is not a sociology textbook. Rather, it embodies a multidisciplinary approach drawing on research produced by all branches of the social sciences. Dr. Rodnick chronicles the emergence of man and the rise of the first stages of civilization.

This primary civilization was replaced by the current secondary civilization of science and technology. In time, it will be replaced by a tertiary civilization, one of automation, with poverty abolished and living and educational standards at high levels. It will be an age where problems may be solved as quickly as they are raised.

This brief glimpse of the future is a fitting capstone to a long and extensive discussion of man's society.

This book provides a valuable orientation for the beginning reader in the field of social sciences. From it he can determine the course of his future studies.


BY CPT JAMES N. SNADEN, USAR

Essentially a condensed treatment of the extent and content of modern military geography, the book describes how geography may be used in the conduct of military affairs and explains how various environments place limits on the exercise of military power.


BY COL CORNELIUS M. SCHMELZLE, USA

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed 16 years ago to stave off a Communist menace which threatened to engulf all of Europe. The alliance, since its inception after World War II, has been part of the crisis that it was designed to meet.

This volume, consisting of a series of essays by distinguished personalities, examines the crisis in light of the altered circumstances existing in the world today.

The contributors offer a number of solutions for the problems faced by NATO. All authors feel that political cooperation within the alliance is essential, and actions taken must be in stages which ultimately will achieve new unity within NATO.


BY LTC ROBERT E. MILLER, USA

The Roman Emperor Claudius undertook a military campaign in A.D. 43 to attempt what Julius Caesar had been unable to achieve almost 100 years earlier—the conquest of Britain.

This book details the course of Roman operations in Britain during the period A.D. 43-57. It covers the overt and guerrilla warfare during the years when the Claudian concept of limited conquest was in effect. The result is a book which should appeal equally to the student of archeology and to the student of military history.

BY MAJ DONALD S. MAHLBERG, USA

Although of limited value to a student of military affairs, Prisoner on the Kwai affords interesting and entertaining reading to anyone curious about the life of a prisoner of war held by the Japanese in Thailand and Burma during World War II.

The author, a former British officer, traces his experiences as a prisoner from the time of his capture at Singapore until the Japanese surrender.


BY MAJ ANTHONY P. DE LUCA, USA

In this volume, B. H. Liddell Hart covers the years immediately preceding Great Britain’s entry into World War II when he served as military correspondent for one of his nation’s leading newspapers. The years 1937-39 were marked by continued attempts by the author, acting as unofficial advisor to the War Minister, to reform the army and to gain recognition for the purpose of its existence.

As in Volume I, the stress is on the continued struggle for an acceptance of the concept of armor forces. With the approach of World War II, the author, recognizing a weakness in Britain’s air defense system, adds to his struggles by pushing for a reorganization and expansion of the air defense forces.

This book can best be described as a detailed recording of a “struggle for a professional principle” by a man who was highly instrumental in establishing new rules for future warfare.


BY MAJ FRANCIS A. IANNI, USA

The cold war has become so much a fixture of the international scene that many of us have forgotten just how it started. In this short and easily read book, the author tells the diplomatic story of the early months of 1945 when relations between the Soviet Union and her Western allies changed from wartime comradeship to peacetime rivalry. The major beginnings of the cold war are concisely summarized and highlighted.

Rather than providing neat, clear-cut answers to the question of responsibility for the start of the cold war, this book shows that no simple answers are possible. Its virtue is that it does not expound a thesis, but attempts to show exactly what happened.

It is an excellent refresher of important facts and the sequence of events of the period.


BY MAJ BARTON M. HAYWARD, USA

This volume is one of the GREAT BATTLES OF HISTORY series. The late Miss Sandoz has created a work so convincing that one is almost able to taste the dust and hear the whine of bullets.

The author has been unusually kind to Major Marcus A. Reno, a most maligned man. The motivations which led Custer and his command to their tragic deaths are developed with the accuracy that only a writer so intimately connected with the history of the plains can give.

BY LTC WALTER J. FAUSTINI, Brazilian Army

This book traces the evolution of nationalism and revolution in Latin America.

The author—who immigrated to South America seeking refuge from the nationalism of Nazi Germany—gives the background of each of the 17 Republics, and points out some factors that make up the nationalistic movements in Latin America.

Revolution is the search for social advancement, and its goals are to give the nations “the necessary minimum of political and social cohesion, without which no body politic can survive.” Sometimes, the solutions are not in the Anglo-Saxon pattern of democracy. The responsibilities and roles of the United States, both active and in the form of a “Yankeephobia,” are properly assessed.


BY MAJ VLADIMIR A. POSPISIL, USA

In this book, Claude Manceron recreates Austerlitz minute by minute, hour by hour. The reader becomes a privileged witness, first in the headquarters of the Emperors as they prepare to trap Napoleon’s Grand Army, and then in the bivouac of Napoleon where his plan, elaborated bit by bit, changes the trap into a countertrap.

Using contemporary documents, memoirs, letters, orders of battle, and other pertinent material, the author takes the reader to the battlefield and then along the route of retreat.


BY COL DOUGLAS P. HARPER, USA

Here is a perceptive and well-written account of a Swiss journalist’s observations and impressions of many aspects of present-day life in Communist China.

Mr. Stucki’s findings are that, despite undeniable progress in some areas, the Communists have turned the Chinese mainland into a huge reservoir of conformity in which history is distorted, the mind controlled, and the individual debased.


BY LTC NORMAN T. STANFIELD, USA

The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 is of distinct interest to military readers because it is recognized as one of the prime watersheds of the cold war. As such, students of national strategy will find The Missile Crisis an excellent reference source for this confrontation between the two major nuclear powers.

The strategic problems and considerations which faced President John F. Kennedy, plus the reasons for the various decisions made, are described and recorded by a reporter in a reporter’s style, on an hour-by-hour and day-by-day basis.

In the future, historians will be able to analyze this crisis in its total context as a major event of the cold war, but, pending this undiscernible future treatment, this book stands as an excellent, readable, and detailed report.
MILITARY BOOKS


By LTC MICHAEL M. MRYCKO, USA

In his contribution to the group of Watts' histories of the US Navy, the author covers in clear, easy-to-read language the problems faced and met by the US Navy from the last decades of the 19th century to the years following World War I. The title is somewhat a misnomer inasmuch as the "battleship" occupies only a small part of the central theme of the author's presentation.

This work provides an interesting overview of the period. It suffers somewhat by the lack of documentation and a bibliography, particularly in covering controversial issues. The book is recommended for light reading.


By MAJ CHARLES L. MCNEILL, USA

This volume is a thorough examination of the events and personalities of the Greek Civil War, 1944-49.

The guerrilla war waged by the Communist-led National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS) was almost successful, but when US aid enabled the government forces to take the initiative, the insurgents' defeat was guaranteed. There were other factors contributing to this defeat such as the closing of the Yugoslav frontier to the guerrillas and the split in Communist leadership.

This book is well worth reading, for it clearly reveals that Communist-inspired insurgency can be defeated if the Free World stands firm.


By LTC PAULO A. F. VIANA, Brazilian Army

The book describes Field Marshal Suvorov's campaigns in Poland, Turkey, Italy, and Switzerland, and how the Russian forces achieved success through his revolutionary ideas on warfare, emphasis on training and physical fitness, stress on mobility, and concern for the troops' welfare.


By COL PAUL L. BOGEN, USA

This book is subtitled Democracy in the Dominican Republic. It might better be described as a commentary on the lack of democracy in the Dominican Republic from May 1961 to May 1964. While there is a chronological sequence, the chapters are also commentaries on selected subjects and groups.

Much of the book is written in an autobiographical vein. The prejudice, bias, and anecdotal reference normally found in autobiographies are interspersed in the commentary and in essays on a number of varied political, economic, and sociological subjects.

Dr. Bosch has done an excellent job of presenting his analysis of the social structure of the Dominican Republic. He also generalizes from his analysis and shows the relationship of the situation in that country to other Latin-American nations.

This is a valuable treatise for the student of developing areas and for the military scholar.