

MANEUVER CENTER OF EXCELLENCE





Table of Contents

The Self Study Program is currently hosted online at [Warrior University](#), a website which requires AKO access. To download .pdf books/articles (where available) either log-in to the Warrior University or contact Joe.Byerly@us.army.mil

Introduction to the Program.....	2
Combined Arms Operations.....	7
Training.....	14
Military Leadership.....	20
Leader Development.....	28
Learning Adaptation and Innovation.....	38
Strategy and the Political Dimensions of War.....	44
The Nature and Character of War and Warfare.....	53
Counterinsurgency.....	60
Mission Command.....	68
Afghanistan.....	72
The Study and Use of Military History.....	80
Technology, Doctrine, and Combat Developments	88

Still in Development:

Armor and Cavalry Heritage, Tactics, and Small Unit Actions
Infantry Heritage, Tactics, and Small Unit Actions
Enemy Organizations and Potential Adversaries in the Operating Environment
Profession of Arms
Logistics
Operational Art, Multi-National Operations, and Joint Warfare
Global and Regional Security Issues
Moral, Ethical, and Psychological Dimensions of War

Maneuver Leader Self Study Program

Introduction

As the Army comes out of a decade of war, we all have a duty to examine the tenets that underpin our profession and to make the lasting changes in the profession necessary to strengthen the Army's enduring culture.

-Army Profession (AP) Campaign Annual Report CY2012

This self study program consists of books, articles, doctrine, films, lectures, and practical application exercises to help educate maneuver leaders about the nature and character of war, as well as their responsibilities to prepare their Soldiers for combat, lead them in battle, and accomplish the mission. The intent is to enhance understanding of the complex interaction between war and politics and to improve the effectiveness of maneuver leaders in complex environments and in combat against determined, adaptive enemies. Our Army must be prepared to fight and win our nation's wars and accomplish missions across the range of military operations.¹ A commitment to learning across your career is critical to ensuring that you continue to grow as a leader and are prepared for increased responsibility.

This series supplements the formal education you receive in our Army with a guide for self-study. ADRP 6-22 states, "Lifelong learning involves study and reflection to acquire new knowledge and to learn how to apply it when needed." Leaders do not have the time or opportunity to learn every lesson in a classroom. Soldiers must take it upon themselves to seek self improvement and gain knowledge through self study. Our Army values education and Self Study has been an important aspect of leadership development since its founding.

Generals from George Washington, to Winfield Scott, to Dwight D. Eisenhower supplemented their formal learning through active reading, study, and reflection. In 1901, the

father of the Army War College, Secretary of War Elihu Root, commented on “the great importance of a thorough and broad education for military officers,” due to the “rapid advance of military science; changes of tactics required by the changes in weapons; our own experience in the difficulty of working out problems of transportation, supply, and hygiene; the wide range of responsibilities which we have seen devolving upon officers charged with the civil government of occupied territory; the delicate relations which constantly arise between military and civil authority.” Thus, Root wrote, there was a “manifest necessity that the soldier, above all others, should be familiar with history.”ⁱⁱ

Historical perspective allows leaders to understand the character of a particular conflict, informs grounded projections of how armed conflict in general is likely to evolve, and helps leaders understand the complex interactions between military, political, and social factors that influence the situation in war. Because leaders cannot turn back time once war occurs; they must develop an understanding of war and warfare before they enter the field of battle. As Carl von Clausewitz observed, the study of war and warfare “is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self education, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man’s intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life.”ⁱⁱⁱ Clausewitz continued, that leaders should use their knowledge of war and warfare to “to analyze the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry.”^{iv}

The best approach to studying war and warfare is found in historian Sir Michael Howard’s 1961 seminal essay on how military professionals should develop what Clausewitz

described as their own “theory” of war. First, to study in width: To observe how warfare has developed over a long historical period. Next to study in depth: To study campaigns and explore them thoroughly, consulting original sources and applying various theories and interdisciplinary approaches. This is important, he observed, because as the “tidy outline dissolves,” we “catch a glimpse of the confusion and horror of real experience.” And lastly to study in context. Wars and warfare must be understood in context of their social, cultural, economic, human, moral, political, and psychological contexts because as Sir Michael observed “the roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far from the battlefield.”

To develop understanding in “width, depth, and context” we must be active learners, dedicated to self study. Self study is a critical element in the Self-Development Domain of the Army’s overall approach to leader development. The Self Development Domain is just as important as the Operational Domain (unit training) and Institutional Domain (Army schools) in developing leaders able to tackle the challenges of the 21st century. The themes and readings that will follow in the coming year are meant to help prepare you for your responsibilities as a Soldier and leader in our Army. Studying the topics, listed below, in addition to helping you develop your understanding of war and warfare, will also help you understand better our military profession, our military’s role under the Constitution, the dynamics of civil-military relations that shape policy and strategy.^v These topics are meant to help maneuver leaders develop an appreciation for leadership at the strategic level so they can place the actions of small units in context of war aims as well as develop their ability to, later in their careers, provide analysis and advice to senior military and civilian leaders on matters of policy and strategy. While developing an appreciation for the strategic level of war, maneuver leaders might consider change and continuities in war. And it is often the neglect of continuities in war, such as its

political nature; its cultural, psychological and social dimensions; its uncertainty; and its contest of wills.

Self study does not mean that you should read and think about our profession on your own. Discussion with others deepens our understanding of the material presented through different perspectives and interpretations. Discussing ideas with fellow students and leaders also helps us consider how what we learn applies to our responsibilities.

Each self study topic contains a brief summary of the chosen topic, its relevance to your responsibilities as a maneuver leader, and several questions to consider as you engage the material. Topics contain annotated bibliographies that include doctrine, films, lectures, and in some cases, practical application exercises.

Self study is not a formal or directed requirement. This program is designed to help you, on your own, and with your comrades in arms, develop the expertise that is a pillar of our Army profession. As General Albert C. Wedemeyer noted while a student at the German staff college between the World Wars of the twentieth century, “An indomitable will and broad military knowledge, combined with a strong character, are attributes of the successful leader. He must have a clear conception of tactical principles and their application. Only by continual study of military history and of the conduct of war with careful attention to current developments can the officer acquire the above stated attributes of leadership.”^{vi}

The MCoE Self Study Program is currently found online at

<https://www.warrioruniversity.army.mil/mcoe-self-study>

ⁱ “The range of military operations is another fundamental construct that provides context. Military operations vary in scope, purpose, and conflict intensity across a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, to major operations and campaigns.” JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, section V, paragraph 1a.

ⁱⁱ Elihu Root, General Correspondence to the United States Congress, 1901 (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), Washington D.C., 2011, available at <http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/address.html>

ⁱⁱⁱ Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1989. pg. 141

^{iv} Ibid.

^v MG H.R. McMaster, *The Need for a Coherent Interdisciplinary Approach to the Study of War and Warfare at West Point* August 10, 2012

^{vi} GEN Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer on War and Peace, Edited by Keith E. Eiler, Hoover Press, 1987. pg.5

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Maneuver Leader Self Study Program

Combined Arms Operations

“We have gotten into the fashion of talking of cavalry tactics, artillery tactics, and infantry tactics. This distinction is nothing but mere abstraction. There is but one art, and that is the tactics of the combined arms. The tactics of a body of mounted troops composed of the three arms is subject to the same established principles as is that of a mixed force in which foot soldiers bulk largely. The only difference is one of mobility.”

-Major Gerald Gilbert, British Army, 1907

Combined Arms are the appropriate combinations of infantry, mobile protected firepower, offensive and defensive fires, engineers, Army aviation, and joint capabilities. It is the application of these combinations in unified action that allows us to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy. By synchronizing combined arms and applying them simultaneously, commanders can achieve a greater effect than if each element was used separately or sequentially.

Combined arms capabilities are critical to success in battle, because no single arm can be decisive against a determined and adaptive enemy. To integrate all arms into the fight, maneuver leaders must have an understanding of systems' capabilities and employment methods that go beyond individual branch competencies. And maneuver leaders must be able to integrate, not only Army, but also sister service capabilities into operations with a particular emphasis on joint surveillance, intelligence, and fires capabilities.

The traditional view of combined arms has focused on only fire and maneuver. This perspective however, must be expanded in order to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative against determined enemies in complex environments. The air-ground dimension of combined arms

operations is particularly critical. Moreover, leaders must also be prepared to incorporate joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and indigenous actors into their combined arms teams in order to shape conditions, consolidate gains, and retain the initiative.

Why Does Combined Arms Operations Matter to Maneuver Leaders?

Enemy Organizations and adversarial groups ranging from irregular forces to hybrid threats with near-peer capabilities will continue to threaten U.S. strategic interests around the globe. To evade U.S. long range surveillance capabilities and precision strike capabilities, enemies have employed traditional counter-measures such as dispersion, concealment, decentralized command and control, and smaller formations.ⁱ Maneuver leaders must be expert in combined arms operations because there is no “single arm” solution to the tactical problems maneuver leaders will face. Each of the arms compensate for each other’s weaknesses. And, when employed in combination with each other, combined arms operations force the enemy to react to multiple forms of contact simultaneously.

An Approach to the Study of Combined Arms Operations:

First, maneuver leaders should become familiar with the relevant Army doctrine, which in turns can provide leaders with a context for studying history. Second, once familiar with relevant doctrine, leaders should read articles that provide an overview of combined arms operations over time as well as accounts of the evolution of combined arms since the early 20th century. Next, leaders might study a specific combined arms operation in which integration of the arms their capabilities allowed forces to accomplish their mission and defeat the enemy at minimal cost. Subsequently, the study should transition from breadth of study to focusing more on depth. Leaders should study specific episodes that illustrate how combined arms allowed

forces to accomplish their mission and defeat the enemy at minimal cost. Leaders can move into the discussion of specific vignettes, both historical and contemporary, and consider the potential next evolutions of combined arms.

Questions for Reflection/Discussion:

- 1.) What are some principles, which you have identified, that have not changed with the evolution of technology?
- 2.) As technology develops, how do you think combined arms operations will evolve?
- 3.) What deficiencies have you identified in your own understanding of combined arms operations?
- 4.) What training can I implement into my unit so that subordinates will develop a better understanding of combined arms operations?
- 5.) What are some enemy TTPs can we incorporate into our training to improve our combined arms proficiency?
- 6.) How did the leaders who led these combined arms team prepare prior to combat?
- 7.) How does the concept of combined arms operations apply in counterinsurgency or advisory operations?

Doctrinal References:

[ADRP 3-0: Unified Land Operations](#)

[ADP 3-0: Unified Land Operations](#)

[FM 3-90: Tactics](#)

[TRADOC 525-3-0](#)

Vignettes:

[*Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain: The 2nd Battalion, 26th Infantry, at Aachen, October 1944 by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel*](#)

Dr. Gabel's article details the seizure of Aachen, Germany during WWII and serves as a great example of combined arms operations. In this particular vignette, the American units defeated a numerically superior opponent who enjoyed all of the advantages of defending in urban terrain.

[*The 2008 Battle of Sadr City by D. Johnson, W. Markel, and B. Shannon*](#)

Using after-action reports, briefings, other primary sources, and interviews with combatants and officials involved in the fighting and its aftermath, the authors describe the battle, analyze its outcome, and derive implications for the conduct of land operations. Their analysis identifies

the following factors as critical to the coalition victory: supporting ground maneuver elements with integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and strike assets; the key roles played by heavy forces, snipers, and special operations forces; decentralized decision-making; capable indigenous security forces, and rapid transitions from phase to phase.

Articles

[*The True Napoleon of the West: General Winfield Scott's Mexico City Campaign and the Origins of the U.S. Army's Combined Arms Division by Jochen S. Arndt*](#)

This article from the Journal of Military History argues that that Scott organized the Army of Invasion of Mexico according to the French system of combined-arms divisions, enabling him to replicate the Napoleonic era's aggressive tactics. In this way, Scott nullified the Mexican forces' numerical superiority, overcame their fortified defensive positions, and gradually annihilated them.

[*Learning the Hard Way: The Coordination Between Infantry Divisions and Separate Tank Battalions During the Breakout from Normandy by CPT Richard S. Faulkner*](#)

This article from a 1990 issue of Armor Magazine highlights the issues faced during the breakout from Normandy because of a lack of tactical understanding of the arms outside of the individual branch competencies.

Books:

[*Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad by David Zucchino*](#)

Based on reporting that was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize, Thunder Run chronicles one of the boldest gambles in modern military history. Three battalions and fewer than a thousand men launched a violent thrust of tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles into the heart of a city of 5 million people and in three days of bloody combat ended the Iraqi war. Thunder Run is the story of the surprise assault on Baghdad—one of the most decisive battles in American combat history—by the Spartan Brigade, the Second Brigade of the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized). More than just a rendering of a single battle, Thunder Run candidly recounts how soldiers respond under fire and stress and how human frailties are magnified in a war zone. The product of over a hundred interviews with commanders and men from the Second Brigade, Thunder Run is a riveting firsthand account of how a single armored brigade was able to capture an Arab capital defended by one of the world's largest armies.

[*Closing With the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945 by Michael D. Doubler*](#)

From Normandy through the "breakout" in France to the German army's last gasp in the Battle of the Bulge, Doubler deals with the deadly business of war-closing with the enemy, fighting and winning battles, taking and holding territory. His study provides a provocative reassessment of how American GIs accomplished these dangerous and costly tasks. True, the GIs weren't fully

prepared or organized for a war in Europe and have often been viewed as inferior to their German opponent. But, Doubler argues, they more than compensated for this by their ability to learn quickly from mistakes, to adapt in the face of unforeseen obstacles, and to innovate new tactics on the battlefield. This adaptability, Doubler contends, was far more crucial to the American effort than we've been led to believe. Fueled by a fiercely democratic and entrepreneurial spirit, GI innovations emerged from every level within the ranks--from the novel employment of conventional weapons and small units to the rapid retraining of troops on the battlefield. Their most dramatic success, however, was with combined arms warfare--the coordinated use of infantry, tanks, artillery, air power, and engineers--in which they perfected the use of air support for ground operations and tank-infantry teams for breaking through enemy strongholds.

[*Combined Arms Warfare in the 20th Century by Jonathan M. House*](#)

In this book, House traces the evolution of tactics, weapons, and organization in five major militaries--American, British, German, Russian, and French--over 100 years of warfare. Revealing both continuities and contrasts within and between these fighting forces, he also provides illuminating glimpses of Israeli and Japanese contributions to combined arms doctrine. Expanding his insightful analysis of the world wars and the wars in Korea and Vietnam, House also offers much new material focused on the post-Vietnam period. Throughout, he analyzes such issues as command-and-control, problems of highly centralized organizations, the development of special operations forces, advances in weapons technology--including ballistic and anti-ballistic missile systems--the trade-offs involved in using "heavy" versus "light" armed forces, and the enduring obstacles to effective cooperation between air and land forces. (His strong critique of the "air superiority" propaganda that came out of the Gulf War is sure to spark some heated debates.) Rigorously comparative, House's study addresses significant questions about how nations prepare for war, learn or don't learn its harsh lessons, and adapt to changing times and technologies.

[*Combined Arms in Battle since 1939 by Combat Studies Institute*](#)

This is a collection of 36 vignettes of combined arms operations that illustrates and illuminates a problem with which a modern professional Soldier may someday have to contend. Each case is set in its strategic and operational context, explained in detail, and briefly analyzed. Because the case studies are short, they provide a great common starting point to begin a professional discussion with subordinate leaders.

[*The Rommel Papers by Sir Basil Lidell-Hart*](#)

When Erwin Rommel died--by forced suicide at Hitler's command--he left behind in various ingenious hiding places the papers that recorded the story of his dramatic career and the exact details of his masterly campaigns. It was his custom to dictate each evening a running narrative of the day's events and, after each battle, to summarize its course and the lessons to be learned

from it. He wrote, almost daily, intimate and outspoken letters to his wife in which his private feelings and—after the tide had turned—forebodings found expression. This book does a great job of detailing Rommel's mastery of combined arms operations.

Monographs:

[*Learning Large Lessons: The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era by Dr. David E. Johnson*](#)

The roles of ground and air power have shifted in U.S. post-Cold War warfighting operations. However, the two services largely responsible for promulgating the relevant doctrines, creating effective organizations, and procuring equipment for the changing battlefield in the domains of land and air—the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force— did not appear to be fully incorporating the lessons of post-Cold War operations in the opening stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003.. Thus, the joint warfighting potential of comprehensive ground-air integration was not fully realized. In the decade of war since OIF, the U.S. military has understandably focused on counterinsurgency and stability operations, given the demands of Afghanistan and Iraq. The lessons discussed in this book have largely not been discussed and examined since 2003. This is important, because the range of adversaries the U.S. Army could face in the future will demand joint combined arms solutions. Understanding past deficiencies is critical if the U.S. armed forces are to provide the capabilities most needed to protect and advance national interests in the future.

[*Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza by Dr. David E. Johnson*](#)

When Israel fought Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, it discovered that it was ill prepared for the challenges posed by its "hybrid" adversary. Hybrid adversaries employ effective standoff weapons (e.g., antitank guided missiles, man-portable air-defense systems, mortars, rockets, unmanned aerial systems). Thus, defeating such opponents requires different tactical and operational concepts than those used to fight the irregular adversaries — who do not have standoff weapons — that the Israelis had become accustomed to confronting. Like Israel in 2006, the United States today is likely ill prepared for hybrid warfare after years of focusing on irregular adversaries. To identify lessons that the U.S. military might learn from the Israeli experience in Lebanon, the author examines the following: the state of the Israeli military before the Second Lebanon War, the challenges that Hezbollah's hybrid warfare posed, the lessons the Israelis learned from the 2006 war, the reforms the Israeli military undertook to address its deficiencies, and how Israel fared during Operation Cast Lead three years later.

The author finds that, in facing hybrid opponents, joint combined-arms fire and maneuver are necessary; precision, stand-off fires are critical (but not sufficient); and responsive and adequate air, artillery, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support are vital. Finally, heavy

forces — based on tanks and infantry fighting vehicles — are key to fighting sophisticated hybrid opponents because they reduce operational risk and minimize friendly casualties.

Fundamentals of Combined Arms Maneuver: Armee De Terre-French Military

This document, drafted in 2011 by the French military and translated in 2012, stresses the importance of combined arms maneuver from the platoon level and higher.

The United States Army Current Capability to Conduct Combined Arms Maneuver by LTC Gordon A. Richardson

This paper examines two U.S. Army historical cases of when the Army transitioned from a predominantly, what is doctrinally known now as wide area security to combined arms maneuver. The focus of these historical cases is to analyze lessons learned from the combined arms operation because of transitioning from one type of operation to another. These case studies enable a historical perspective on lessons learned and how the U.S. Army may determine relevance in the current environment. This is to ensure it does not make the same mistakes and maintains useful practices. This paper uses the lessons learned from World War I that had many negative lessons learned and the Persian Gulf War that had many positive lessons learned to help understand and analyze the Army's current situation

ⁱ *Hard Fighting*, by David E. Johnson, page 156.

Maneuver Leader Self Study Program

Training

“There is much evidence to show that officers who have received the best peacetime training available find themselves surprised and confused by the difference between conditions as pictured in map problems and those they encounter in campaign...In our schools, we generally assume that the organizations are well-trained and at full strength, that subordinates are competent, that supply arrangements function, that communications work, that orders are carried out. In war, many or all of these conditions may be absent.”ⁱ

-George C. Marshall, 1934

As the Commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning in 1934, then COL George C. Marshall recognized the need for realistic training to prepare leaders for the challenges of combat. His experience from the First World War taught him that leaders had to make decisions in combat without having all the necessary information, perfect maps, ample time, or ideal conditionsⁱⁱ. The changes he made to the training concepts based on this experience, were key factors in preparing our Army to quickly adapt in World War II.

Marshall’s point of view that “an Army’s most perishable skills [are] the ones learned in the hard school of combat itself, where a Soldier’s imagination, inventiveness, practicality, and common sense [are] of more value than any amount of school technique learned by rote”ⁱⁱⁱ remains relevant today. It is imperative that we preserve the hard-won lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, and ensure they are incorporated into our training at all levels.

In ADP 7-0, principles of unit training are provided as a guideline when planning training events. Principles such as, Train as You Will Fight, Train Fundamentals First, and Train to Develop Adaptability are all necessary for developing leaders that are able to operate within the ambiguous environments we will encounter in the 21st Century.

Why Training Matters:

In our efforts to continue to incorporate the philosophy of Mission Command throughout the force, “It is not enough simply to allow subordinate commanders wide latitude and then demand they fill it with their initiative; to do so they must first be properly trained,”^{iv} observed Martin Van Crevald in his 1985 book on Command in War. Unit training and leader development are inextricably linked. Good training supports leader development and good leaders develop good training programs for their units. Unit training provides a forgiving, learning environment that allows leaders to grow from lessons learned on the job without fear of making irretrievable mistakes in combat that cost lives.^v

Proper training develops confidence, creating leaders and units ready to face the challenges of today’s operating environment. To build confidence, training must replicate the conditions of combat as closely as possible. Training must capture the uncertainty of combat by injecting change, rushed timelines, casualties, and bad information into all exercises.^{vi} While these concepts may seem obvious to our roles as leaders, there are plenty of examples throughout history when they were ignored, resulting in mission failure or unnecessary casualties.

How to Approach the Study of this Topic:

First, read the current operational doctrine to develop an understanding of how the Army intends to fight. Second, read the current training management doctrine in order to understand the interrelationship between “how we intend to fight” and “how we train to fight.” To gain a deeper appreciation of the relationship between the two, review past performance of the United States Army and other militaries in combat, and the training that took place prior to the conflict. Consider how well each Army’s training prior to war prepared them units and leaders for the

enemies they faced and environments in which they fought, as well as how effectively their training prepared them to adapt to unforeseen challenges and changes in the situation. Using the discussion questions, reflect on how the Army's training doctrine and historical examples relate to one another, and what this means for your responsibilities as a leader now and in the future. Speak with those leaders you know who have planned and executed great training events, and learn from them. Finally, use the tools available through the Army Training Network to develop training that properly prepares your organization for combat.

Questions for Discussion/Reflection:

- 1.) How well does my unit's training reflect the realities of combat and my vision of future battle?
- 2.) How can I design training exercises to better the 21st Century Soldier Competencies and ensure that my unit is trained in the leader, individual and collective tasks related to our platoon battle tasks and mission essential task list (METL)?
- 3.) How have different levels of preparedness equipped units for success or failure throughout our Army's history of conflict?
- 4.) What is the best training I've ever experienced? What made it good? How can I replicate those insights into training that I develop?
- 5.) Who is the best trainer I know? If I could ask this person three questions about planning and executing training what would they be?

Doctrine:

ADP 3-0

ADP 7-0

Products from the Army Training Network:

Leader's Guide to Company Training Meetings

How to Conduct a Company Level Training Meeting (Video)

How to Conduct a Battalion Level Training Meeting (Video)

Articles

[*Train Em How You Want Em to Fight! Five Principles for Nurturing Initiative before you Get to Combat by Major Chad Foster*](#)

To conduct operations consistent with the philosophy of mission command in combat, we must emphasize decentralized operations based on mission orders in training. Junior officers and Soldiers need to act with autonomy and initiative down to the squad level, and micro-managed scripted training will never accomplish this desired end-state. In this

article, MAJ Chad Foster offers five guiding principles to follow when planning training to ensure “that all our Soldiers and leaders think creatively and act with aggressiveness and common sense in the absence of exact orders.” Foster advocates outcomes-based training rather than the “task, conditions, standards” approach to teach subordinates to focus on the results of their efforts instead of the steps to getting there. He concludes by stating that these principles are not dogma, but should be considered and built upon by thinking junior leaders.

[Building the New Culture of Training by Robert W. Cone](#)

This article featured in the January-February 2013 issue of Military Review addresses the deficiencies in core competencies and training management that have arisen because of our necessary focus on two wars. General Cone discusses the way ahead with commanders taking ownership for training and the incorporation of emerging technologies to improve efficiency in training.

Books:

Taking the Guidon by Tony Burgess and Nate Allen

While the aim of this book is to prepare officers to lead company level organizations, the concepts discussed on training management are relevant at all levels of leadership. Understanding these concepts will allow leaders to plan quality training regardless of the resources at hand.

Common Sense Training: A Working Philosophy for Leaders by Arthur S. Collins

Although this text was first published in 1978, the pitfalls and problems commanders faced when properly planning and resourcing training are still true today. This text provides a great rallypoint for leaders to discuss training in their own units.

America's First Battles, 1776-1965 by Charles E. Heller and William A. Stoffit

This book is collection of articles that address the performance of the American Army in their first battles of major conflicts. A major focus of the book is on the training that was conducted prior to the conflict and how it influenced the outcomes during the initial stages of combat.

Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions by Gary Klein

How do these individuals make the split-second decisions that save lives? Since 1985, Klein has conducted fieldwork to find out how people tackle challenges in difficult, non-routine situations. Sources of Power is based on observations of humans acting under such real-life constraints as time pressure, high stakes, personal responsibility, and shifting conditions. The professionals studied include firefighters, critical care nurses, pilots, nuclear power plant operators, battle planners, and chess masters. In addition to

providing information that can be used to develop training that better prepares Soldiers for the realities of combat decision-making, the book presents an overview of the research approach of naturalistic decision making and expands our knowledge of the strengths people bring to difficult tasks.

The Craftsman by Richard Sennett

This book is about what it means to claim expertise in a practical and physical profession. It is about how to think critically and professionally about skill development, commitment, judgment, and the pursuit of expertise as a way of life. In other words, how to think about the purpose for training in a profession, not just in an organization. Military professionals, craftsmen with a unique obligation in American society, also have a moral obligation to develop those who follow them. This requires a different mindset for training from that of the industrialized mobilization model that served the Army in the 20th Century. New operating environments and professional expectations require new Army standards and rules based upon human expertise and accountability.

Back to Basics: A Study of the 2nd Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD

This book analyzes the dismal performance of the Israeli military during the 2nd Lebanon War, due in large part to how they prepared prior to the conflict. Following the war, the Army captured their lessons learned and adjusted their training focus. Two years later, their superb performance in Operation CAST LEAD was a testament to the training that took place in the interwar period.

Lessons For a Long War by Donnelly and Kagan

This book is a collection of essays by military officers and national security officials that provide insights into how to prepare yourself and your unit for the threats we are likely to face in the 21st century.

This kind of War by T.R. Ferenbach

Is a study in how ill-prepared the U.S. Army was at the start of the Korean War. One of the main lessons of the book is that lack of training readiness nearly resulted in defeat and was the cause of unnecessary casualties when Army forces were committed to the Korean Peninsula to defend against North Korea's surprise attack.

Monographs

[The Evolution of Army Training Management Doctrine 1945-1988 by Anthony J. Gasbarre](#)

This study traces the evolution of Army training management doctrine from 1945-1988. It explores the changes that have taken place in the doctrine by examining the purpose of training, key training concepts, the training process, and the operational doctrine of the

time. This study also provides a great resource for books, and articles that directly relate to unit training prior to major conflicts.

ⁱ *Infantry in Battle: From Somalia to the Global War on Terror*. Joanie Horton. United States Infantry School, 2005 p.3

ⁱⁱ *Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939*. Roger J. Spiller. U.S. Command and General Staff College Press, 1992 p. 9

ⁱⁱⁱ Ibid.

^{iv} *Command in War*. Martin Van Crevald. Harvard University Press, 1985 p.271

^v *Introduction to ADP 7-0*

^{vi} *Lessons For a Long War: How America Can Win on New Battlefields*. Donnelly and Kagan. American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research, 2010 p.73

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Maneuver Leader Self Study Program

Military Leadership

“The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army. It is possible to impart instruction and to give commands in such a manner and such a tone of voice to inspire the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey. The one mode or the other dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due to others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he who feels, and hence manifests, disrespect toward others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself”

-LTG John M. Schofield, 1879

Leadership in the military is unique in three ways. First, as noted by Sir Michael Thomas Howard, the British historian, leaders in the military may “exercise [the purpose of their profession] only once in a lifetime, if indeed that often”.ⁱ Because conflicts are sporadic, it is impossible to predict when maneuver leaders will be called upon to lead Soldiers into battle. Second, wartime leadership is *in-extremis* leadership. Maneuver leaders must overcome moral challenges including the need to ensure ethical behavior in environments of persistent danger and the burden of life-and-death decisions.ⁱⁱ Finally, maneuver leaders are constantly in a state of upward mobility usually spending no longer than two years at any given position of responsibility. Each new rank brings a change in scope of responsibility, complexity of problem sets, and type of leadership challenges. It is for these reasons that self-study of military leadership is critical.

As defined in ADP 6-22, “a leader is anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. Leaders from corporal to general motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking, and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization.”ⁱⁱⁱ Our

Army identifies attributes and competencies that leaders must develop over time. *Character, Intellect, and Presence* are what leaders should *be* and *know* and these three attributes shape how individuals learn and behave in their environment.^{iv} *Leads, Develops, and Achieves* are competencies that the Army identifies as critical to successful leadership.^v

Why is the Study of Military Leadership Important to Maneuver Leaders?

Soldiers will follow a good leader anywhere and under any conditions of battle. While many factors decide the outcomes of battles, leadership is often the most important. Military history provides countless examples of battles that were won or lost because of leadership. In times of peace we can also find examples of how exceptional leadership and vision prepared our Army to adapt during times of war. Studying military leadership, allows us to examine the *Character* of past leaders, mature our *Intellect*, *Develop* ourselves and others, and *Lead* our organizations to *Achieve* results in both training and in combat. In short, the experiences of others can help us develop our own idealized view of leadership in combat.

An Approach to the Study of Military Leadership

First, begin with reading ADP 6-22, to develop an understanding of the Army leader attributes and competencies as a framework for assessing military leadership. Reflect and consider those attributes and competencies in context of your own thoughts about military leadership and write down your assessment of your own strengths and weaknesses. Second, read vignettes and watch videos that reveal how leadership determined the outcome of battles. Studying leaders in an extreme environment is like using a laboratory centrifuge; great leaders will be separated from the rest of the pack^{vi}. Also, study military leaders during times of peace, because it is preparation of themselves and their units that contributed to success or failure in combat. Read biographies and autobiographies to understand better how leaders learned and

applied what they learned to their responsibilities. Consider how your own background and experiences have shaped and are shaping your leadership philosophy, style, and effectiveness as well as your ability to take on additional responsibilities in war and peace. Discuss what you learn with peers, mentors, and subordinates. Discussing leadership with mentors is a great way to quickly synthesize their lessons and incorporate them into your own practices. Lastly, reflect on your personal leadership experiences and compare them with those you've known or read about. Use the questions below to reflect on what you've learned and evaluate your own leadership.

Questions for Discussion/Reflection:

- 1.) What leadership attributes and competencies am I strong in? Which ones am I weak in?**
- 2.) What attributes and competencies did successful leaders exhibit?**
- 3.) What were some of the factors that led leaders to make bad decisions in combat?**
- 4.) What is my leadership philosophy?**
- 5.) What are some of the practices that leaders adopted early in their careers that led to their later success?**

Doctrine:

ADP 6-22

ADRP 6-22

Articles:

[Reflections on Leadership by Robert Gates](#)

In this article, Former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, discusses the type of leaders required to lead our military in the 21st Century. He describes the necessity for candor, credibility, and dissent.

[Whence Patton's Military Genius? By Roger Nye](#)

The article is adapted from Nye's book, *The Patton Mind: The Professional Development of an Extraordinary Leader*. The author attributes one of the keys to Patton's successes in war was his desire to develop himself through reading and writing.

[The Making of a Leader: Dwight D. Eisenhower by Robert C. Carroll](#)

This article examines the formative career of Dwight Eisenhower as he progressed up the ranks. It is written from the perspective of how a leader is made. The author does a great job of telling the story about how Ike developed his own professional knowledge and leadership abilities throughout his career. It may inspire the occasional Army officer who faces a career assignment not preordained by conventional wisdom to be on the perfect glide path to greatness.

Books:

[Leadership: The Warrior's Art by Chris Kolenda](#)

This is collection 19 essays that examine the crucial role leadership plays in combat. It covers both classic and modern concepts of leadership and uses case studies from Alexander the Great through World War II to illustrate principles of leadership in historical contexts.

[Great Commanders- CSI Press](#)

This title is a collection of 7 essays on leaders who history has identified as great commanders. By reading this, leaders may garner insight into the qualities and abilities possessed by these commanders.

[Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War by Eliot Cohen and John Gooch](#)

In this title, several intellectual shortfalls of commanders, such as the failures to learn, to anticipate, to adapt, are analyzed. Each is then followed by the study of a pivotal battle or campaign which easily could have turned out differently, but for the "pathways to misfortune" which intervened

[Once an Eagle by Anton Meyer](#)

A work of fiction, this novel follows the lives of a military officer and his adversary over a lifetime. One is a professional who puts duty, honor, and the men he commands above self-interest. The other brilliantly advances his career by making the right connections. This book provides leaders a base for a great discussion on leadership through the ranks, the profession of arms, and

[Wrath of Achilles: Essays on Command in Battle \(.pdf\)](#)

This book is made up of 9 historical essays about battles that place in the 19th and 20th Centuries. The authors focus on the leadership successes and failures that played key roles in the outcomes of those events.

Washington's Crossing by David Hackett Fischer

Fischer's narrative reveals the crucial roles of contingency and bold leadership in the events that turned the tide in the Revolutionary War. We see how the campaign unfolded in a sequence of difficult choices by many actors, from generals to civilians, on both sides. While British and German forces remained rigid and hierarchical, Americans evolved an open and flexible system that was fundamental to their success. The startling success of Washington and his compatriots not only saved the faltering American Revolution, but helped to give it new meaning.

The Reason Why: The Story of the Fatal Charge of the Light Brigade by Cecil Woodham-Smith

The Charge of the Light Brigade on the 25th October 1854 was one of the three famous engagements that formed the Battle of Balaklava. The Charge, a famous military blunder, was barely over before the process of transforming it into myth began. In this study, Cecil Woodham-Smith shows that responsibility for the fatal mismanagement of the affair rested with the Earls of Cardigan and Lucan, and a combination of poor leadership, pride, and obstinacy proved to be fatal.

The Battle of the Generals: The Untold Story of the Falaise Pocket: The Campaign that should have won World War II by Martin Blumenson

In the months following the D-Day landings in Normandy, Allied forces fought to dislodge defending German troops from northern France. A huge encirclement at Falaise destroyed the German position but allowed the escape of many troops, prompting accusation that the war in Europe could have been won months earlier. The author examines the complex, behind-the-scenes relationships of generals Eisenhower, Montgomery, Bradley, and Patton to provide a command-level view of the war.

We Were Soldiers Once..and Young: Ia Drang- The Battle that Changed the War in Vietnam

On Nov. 14, 1965, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry, commanded by Lt. Col. Moore and accompanied by UPI reporter Galloway, helicoptered into Vietnam's remote Ia Drang Valley and found itself surrounded by a numerically superior force of North Vietnamese regulars. Moore and Galloway here offer a detailed account, based on interviews with participants and on their own recollections, of what happened during the four-day battle. Much more than a conventional battle study, the book is a frank record of the emotional reactions of the GIs to the terror and horror of this violent and bloody encounter. Both sides claimed victory, the U.S. calling it a validation of the newly developed doctrine of airmobile warfare. Supplemented with maps, the memoir is a vivid re-creation of the first major ground battle of the Vietnam War.

The Last Place on Earth by Roland Huntford and Paul Theroux

While the subject of this book isn't focused on a military endeavor, the parallels to military leadership are easily drawn. The authors details the race to the South Pole in 1911 between Britain's Robert Scott and Norway's Roald Amundson through letters, interviews, and journal entries. Both men were required to exhibit exceptional leadership in extreme environments. Scott, whose team perished in the expedition, didn't study his craft, was a toxic leader, and was more worried about his potential for promotion within the Royal Navy. Admunson, who spent years reading and preparing for the expedition, anticipated friction, and showed a great deal of empathy for his crew, brought everyone home alive and won the race.

Gates of Fire by Steven Pressfield

This is a novel of historical fiction based on the battle of Thermopylae in 480 B.C. It's a great study of leadership because Pressfield does an excellent job of capturing leader attributes and competencies throughout the text, and the human condition of battle that is depicted is timeless. The book offers several points of discussion for leaders to discuss with subordinates.

Biographies and Memoirs:

Company Commander: The Classic Infantry Memoir of World War II by Charles B. Macdonald

This is a memoir of a leader, who was a brand new company commander in combat. The book details his struggles and triumphs, and how he got his veteran Soldiers to follow him in combat.

Platoon Leader: A Memoir of Command in Combat by James R. McDonough

This book chronicles the author's experiences as an officer in the Vietnam War during a year-long tour of duty. In sharing his experiences, McDonough explores the ethics and morals of war, the struggles of leadership in combat, and the grim realities of combat.

Knight's Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel by Davis Fraser

An in-depth biography of Field Marshall Erwin Rommel written with the cooperation of Rommel's son.

The Korean War by Matthew Ridgway

In this book, General Ridgway describes how he took a dispirited Army and rebuilt it in a few short months, leading into battle against the Chinese and North Korean forces. This book takes a close look at MacArthur, his failings and brilliance, and a hard look at the idea of limited war.

[Patton: A Genius for War by Carlo D'Este](#)

This title includes his student years at West Point, his experience as a tank officer in WWI and various interwar staff assignments. The author emphasizes Patton's lifelong study and preparation for war and his conviction that God not only chose him specifically to lead an army but also stood ready to intervene to assure him battlefield victories. D'Este has much to say about Patton's impulsiveness, impatience and tactlessness, showing how these qualities often got him in trouble with the public as well as with his superiors. The account of Patton's campaigns from North Africa through Sicily, Normandy and the Ardennes enables leaders to understand why the general is regarded as one of the great military leaders.

[Grant Memoirs](#)

In Grant's memoirs, we are introduced to one-man's view of events that unfolded during the Mexican-American and Civil Wars. Because of the quality of writing, readers are transported into the mind of U.S. Grant as he tackled complicated problems, dealt with a myriad of personalities in his subordinate commanders, and came to terms with war-time decisions. This book offers many insights for leaders who may one day lead Soldiers in combat.

[Creighton Abrams- A speech Given by Lewis Sorley at FPRI \(.pdf\)](#)

Monographs:

[Fox Conner and Eisenhower Relationship](#)

The author of this monograph discusses the relationship between Fox Conner and Dwight Eisenhower, and gives plenty of examples of how it ultimately influenced Eisenhower's professional character. There are a myriad of lessons discussed in this paper that are applicable to leaders today.

[Secret of Future Victories by Paul Gorman](#)

General(R) Paul Gorman tells the stories of Marshall, McNair, Dupuy, who conceived, nurtured, and drove the evolution of new training that shaped leaders who would lead formations in war.

Additional Resources:

[Leader Challenges on milSuite](#)

A leader challenge is an interactive, video-based vignette that features a dilemma-type scenario that a leader has experienced. It can be used both in an online environment and/or in LPD programs. The Leader Challenge program builds on the basic idea that actual leadership experience is what develops leaders the most, and challenging experiences are the best leader development curriculum. All of these are based on actual events, with videos by the actual leaders who experienced it.

[Great Captains in American History Podcasts:](#)

This program sponsored by the Foreign Policy Research Institute covers those American military leaders who made great marks on U.S. history through their generalship. The distinguished scholars David Eisenhower, Jim Lacey, Edward G. Lengel, Peter Mansoor, Allen Peskin, Jean Edward Smith, Lewis Sorley, and Samuel Watson will cover great military leaders from General George Washington to General David Petraeus. Each podcast is almost an hour in length and is available in both audio and video formats.

Film:

[Paths of Glory](#)

[Band of Brothers](#)

[Glory](#)

[The Caine Mutiny](#)

ⁱ General Washington

ⁱⁱ FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 7-1

ⁱⁱⁱ 6-22

^{iv} APD 6-22 p. 6

^v Leadership Challenge

^{vi} Jim Collis Great By Choice

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Maneuver Leader Self Study Program

Leader Development


“The best leaders create environments that allow individuals to grow and trust subordinates.”
-General Odierno

The purpose of this topic is to help educate maneuver leaders about the nature and importance of leader development in our Army. Good leaders produce more leaders, not more followers. Developing leaders is not a matter of resources; it is mainly a matter of commitment.

The Myths: Leader development is having OPDs and NCOPDs regularly. Leader development is your assignment progression over time. Leader development is counseling and mentoring. Leader development is something that TRADOC does – meaning it is synonymous with education.

As defined in the Army Leader Development Strategy, leader development is, “A continuous, progressive process by which the synthesis of an individual’s training, education, and experiences contribute to individual growth over the course of a career”. Leader development is a mutually shared responsibility across three domains: the institutional Army (education or training institutions), the operational force (organization or unit), and the individual. As illustrated in the below diagram, the three components of leader development occur in each of these domains. Surrounding the model are peer and developmental relationships that provide context and enhance professional growth. These relationships are critical to overall development and involve sharing, counseling, reflection, coaching, mentoring, and 360 degree assessments like the current Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback (MSAF) program. These relationships and programs increase a leader’s self-awareness through objective feedback from multiple perspectives.

How Leaders Develop




Army Leader Development Model

There is a distinction between leader development and leadership development (defined as, enhancing a leader's ability to influence others within a given social context), the Army merges the two in its description of a developmental process that is intended to produce a leader embodying the attributes and competencies defined in ADP 6-22 , *Army Leadership*.

Developmental processes, such as that depicted in the Army Leader Development Model, describe how a leader within an organization develops. Consistent with the Army model, most literature on developmental processes highlights three components of development: **Challenging Experiences**, the **Readiness of the Individual to Respond to the Challenge**, and **Reflection**.

Readiness of the Individual. We have to assess the readiness of the subordinate with respect to the challenge for which they are about to be presented and we must decide if it is appropriate. A basketball team of 9 yr olds should probably not be “challenged” with playing the Lakers. There is no hope, and it is very doubtful that any development will occur. What is more likely is an emotional outcome of crushing failure. The Asymmetric Warfare Group coined the phrase, “Training at the Threshold of Failure”. It would be simple to replace “training” with “development”:

“Training at the Threshold of Failure” model
(Asymmetric Warfare Adaptive Leader Program)



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Implied in all of the above is that the senior leader must have a pretty specific understanding of the subordinate's capabilities, if the experience is to be challenging, yet attainable (the sweet spot). Said another way, en masse development has some utility, but the best development occurs when it is individualized.

When discussing *Challenging Experiences*, we often equate that to challenging training events; ones that have curveballs thrown in to test our agility, or mental resolve, etc. That is a normal association, but experiences can come in many forms: challenging educational experiences, a challenging public speaking engagement, counseling a troubled family, or being given a staff project that appears on the surface to be “too hard and too complex” for what you believe your capabilities to be. Anything that stretches one's capacity can be considered a challenging experience.

Reflection is probably the most important part of the developmental process and the most misunderstood and least applied. As soon as we complete the latest task, assignment, or mission

and no matter how challenging it was, we move immediately to the next task. Reflection includes feedback (to include 360s), coaching and mentoring. Self-reflection is also a powerful tool, but it is not enough. If you reflect wrongly, or in a shallow fashion, then you might misinterpret the lessons you learned from that experience. This is where more experienced leaders coach, counsel, share, explain, and put into context what they think you might have learned from that experience. That feedback might not be 100% accurate either, but if nothing else, it has given you a different perspective.

The Army grows its own leaders. Unlike large organizations in the civil sector, the uniformed Army does not routinely recruit, select, and assign mid-grade and senior level leaders from outside its service. *Development of a senior uniformed leader begins two decades prior to the organization's employment of that individual.* The Army develops adaptive leaders through training, education and experiences within a mission command climate.

How is the Army doing with respect to developing leaders? The survey indicates that we can do better. Over the past three years, “Develops Others” has been our lowest rated leader competency. The two highest rated competencies have been “Achieves Results” and “Leads Others”. In short, it appears that we are strong at “doing”, but weak at “giving”.

Why is the study of leader development important?

Do not assume that you already “know” what leader development is. To paraphrase numerous articles and books on developmental systems, three things must be present for a *developmental system* to be effective: *Intention, ownership and accountability.* *Intention* is the organization's desired outcome of development. The organization must fill in the blank of the following sentence, or the developmental activity will be just that-activity with no purpose: “We want to develop leaders who _____. *Ownership* means that senior leaders of the

organization establish leader development as a priority, not just in writing, but in word, deed, and action. Ownership also relates to the individuals' within the organization being prepared and are willing to develop. **Accountability** entails senior members being held accountable for how well they have developed those junior to them (subordinates), and individuals being held personally accountable for their own growth.

You will be leading others your entire time you are in our Army. The best leaders understand that it is never about them, it is about those whom they lead. The following approach to the study of this topic is meant to help you develop yourself, and in turn be better prepared to develop others.

An Approach to the Study of Leader Development.

Read the Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) and the Maneuver Leader Development Strategy (MLDS) along with the Army leadership doctrine. Then select an article such as *The Building Blocks to Leader Development* to help you gain a broader perspective on leader development. Next, select a book such as *High Flyers* to then mature your own theory of leader development.

Finally, after reading a book and an article on leader development, transition to a book or article on how military leaders developed. There are a few books listed under this topic, and several more under the self study topic on Military Leadership.

Questions for Discussion

1. Do you believe that Army's Leader Development "System" as described on page 4 possess all three components? Why or why not?
2. Does the Army Leader Development Model accurately describe how our leaders develop and for what outcome? Why or why not?

3. Where do you think the most development occurs? Why?
4. Who do you believe is ultimately responsible for your development as an Army leader?
- 5.) How can you improve your ability to develop yourself and other as leaders?

Doctrinal References:

ADP/ADRP 6-22: *Army Leadership*, Aug 12

Commander's Handbook for Unit Leader Development-CAL

Today's fast-paced, deployment-focused Army demands that a commander's first priority is a trained and ready unit. Leader development makes a substantial contribution to a unit's ability to train effectively and accomplish its mission. Yet commanders across the Army acknowledge the constant challenge to effectively implement unit leader development.

This handbook is designed to provide commanders with an efficient and effective way to develop leaders.

Leader Development Improvement Guide (LDI Guide)-CAL Sep 12

This guide provides Army leaders at all levels with ideas and activities for professional growth, development, and continuous learning that can be incorporated into an Individual Development Plan (IDP) or used informally when a leader wants to improve in a particular area. Leaders at all levels can use this guide as a handbook to jump start their ideas for self development.

Developing Leadership During Unit Training Exercises-CAL

The purpose of this handbook is to provide unit leaders with techniques to develop leadership during unit training exercises. The wording of this handbook is written for either an officer or noncommissioned officer serving as a trainer, observer, or controller is developing the leadership of a counterpart leader during an exercise at a CTC. The same techniques found in this guide can be applied by unit leaders during home station training, readiness exercises, and battle staff drills.

Maneuver Leader Development Strategy (MLDS)

The Maneuver Leader Development Strategy (MLDS) will describe how we train and educate agile and adaptive maneuver leaders who can lead Soldiers and accomplish the mission, while confronting complex environments and adaptive enemies. The MCoE and unit commanders develop maneuver leaders in a deliberate, continuous, and progressive life-long process that synthesizes the knowledge, skills, abilities, and attributes gained through training, education, and

experience in the institutional, operational, and self-development domains. Through this life-long process, maneuver leaders develop competencies necessary to expand their perspectives beyond the tactical and operational levels, to include the development of strategic leadership ability. Broadening assignments - experiences and education in different organizational cultures and environments – encourage developing the capability to learn, and contribute outside one's own perspective level of understanding for the betterment of the officer and the maneuver force. The MLDS provides the vision and guidance for developing maneuver leaders across the force. This includes professional military education and functional training for officers and noncommissioned officers at the MCoE; maneuver leader development through training and experience within the operating force at home station, combat training centers, and while deployed; and in maneuver leaders' individual self-development efforts

Articles:

Improving the Leader Development Experience in Units, COL Doug Crissman, Mar 13.

The Center for Army Leadership's 2011 annual assessment of attitudes and perceptions on leader development (CASAL) identified "Develops Others" as the lowest-rated leader competency for the fifth year in a row with just over half of Army leaders regarded as effective at developing others by their subordinates. The CASAL further revealed one fourth of those surveyed indicated their units placed a "low" or "very low" priority on leader development activities. Feedback also highlighted varying degrees of leader and subordinate understanding of their individual responsibilities as "givers" and "receivers" of leader development. These trends span multiple years and clearly illustrate a deficiency in the perceived effectiveness of Army efforts to "raise the next generation" in the eyes of its most important audience – today's junior leaders. The decade of attention and energy demanded by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has diluted the Army's knowledge and experience base of "what right looks like" in leader development domain. The Army must now seize the opportunity to improve the consistency and effectiveness of its unit-level leader development efforts to deliver capable leaders to the Army of 2020 and beyond.

The Building Blocks of Leader Development, COL (R) Joe Leboeuf, PHD, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University

For many organizations in today's fast paced world, leader development takes a back seat to immediate operational requirement-expanding the business, increasing stock prices, maximizing shareholder value. The need to get things done today is in constant tension with the need to invest the same energy in the systematic development of the current and future leadership in the organization.

Books:

Switch- Chip and Dan Heath

In a compelling, story-driven narrative, the Heaths bring together decades of counterintuitive research in psychology, sociology, and other fields to shed new light on how we can effect transformative change. *Switch* shows that successful changes follow a pattern, a pattern you can use to make the changes that matter to you, whether your interest is in changing the world or changing your waistline.

High Flyers- Morgan McCall Jr.

Full of case studies, this book challenges that idea that the best senior leaders are those that have risen to the top by survival of the fittest. Rather, the best senior leaders are those that have the ability to learn from experiences and are life-long learners.

Leadership and Self-Deception- Arbinger Institute - Berrett-Koehler

Using the story/parable format so popular these days, *Leadership and Self-Deception* takes a novel psychological approach to leadership. It's not what you do that matters, say the authors (presumably plural--the book is credited to the esteemed Arbinger Institute), but why you do it. Latching onto the latest leadership trend won't make people follow you if your motives are selfish--people can smell a rat, even one that says it's trying to empower them. The tricky thing is, we don't know that our motivation is flawed. We deceive ourselves in subtle ways into thinking that we're doing the right thing for the right reason. We really do know what the right thing to do is, but this constant self-justification becomes such an ingrained habit that it's hard to break free of it--it's as though we're trapped in a box, the authors say.

Change or Die- Alan Deutschman

After a hard-hitting and succinct introduction, Deutschman systematically explains nine facets of personal change. Integrating findings from a variety of disciplines, his strategies are innovative and seamlessly supported by riveting business stories. His stories and analysis stay close to the heart by encouraging continuous curiosity about the self. Listen and learn how to realistically embrace your realities, find inspiration and support from others, behave consistently with your intentions, and be constantly aware of opportunities for learning and growth.

Crucial Conversations- Kerry Patterson

The authors define crucial conversations as those where 1) stakes are high, 2) opinions vary, and 3) emotions run strong, or in other words, much of both our professional and personal lives.

We're all involved in crucial conversations at home and at work but most of us are not very aware of the interpersonal dynamics at play and/or we're unskilled in how to respond differently. The book helps the reader first understand the principles involved in "crucial conversations" but then also helps the reader develop real skills and abilities to choose or change their communication patterns.

The Speed of Trust- Stephen Covey

Trust, says Stephen M.R. Covey, is the very basis of the new global economy, and he shows how trust—and the speed at which it is established with clients, employees, and constituents—is the essential ingredient for any high-performance, successful organization. For business leaders and public figures in any arena, *The Speed of Trust* offers an unprecedented and eminently practical look at exactly how trust functions in our every transaction and relationship—from the most personal to the broadest, most indirect interaction—and how to establish trust immediately so that you and your organization can forego the time-killing, bureaucratic check-and-balance processes so often deployed in lieu of actual trust.

Books and Articles specific to the military:

George C. Marshall: The Education of a General by Forrest C. Pogue

This book, which covers the life of Marshall up to the Second World War, shows the growing professionalism of the United States Army and provides some insights into the skills required to rise to great responsibility within our Army.

Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance by Martin Van Creveld

Asserting that training reflects the changing nature of war itself, van Creveld traces the evolution of the education of military commanders from Pericles to Eisenhower, making specific recommendations for present reform

The Patton Mind by Roger Nye

General Patton was an avid reader and left behind an extensive library of military titles, many of which contained his notes and critiques. Nye, a military writer, has studied Patton's personal papers, file cards, and the Patton Collection at the West Point Library and attempts to show how these books influenced the general's thinking about tactics, strategy, and leadership. The book has great photos, an extensive bibliography, and a list of titles from the West Point collection (for which it can serve as an excellent guide).

Command Culture by Jorg Muth

Command Culture explores the paradox that in Germany officers came from a closed authoritarian society but received an extremely open minded military education, whereas their counterparts in the United States came from one of the most democratic societies but received an outdated military education that harnessed their minds and limited their initiative. On the other hand, German officer candidates learned that in war everything is possible and a war of extermination acceptable. For American officers, raised in a democracy, certain boundaries could never be crossed. This work for the first time clearly explains the lack of audacity of many high ranking American officers during World War II, as well as the reason why so many German officers became perpetrators or accomplices of war crimes and atrocities or remained bystanders without speaking up. Those American officers who became outstanding leaders in World War II did so not so much because of their military education, but despite it.

The Making of a Leader: Dwight D. Eisenhower by Robert C. Carroll (.pdf)

This article examines the formative career of Dwight Eisenhower as he progressed up the ranks. It is written from the perspective of how a leader is made. The author does a great job of telling the story about how Ike developed his own professional knowledge and leadership abilities throughout his career. It may inspire the occasional Army officer who faces a career assignment not preordained by conventional wisdom to be on the perfect glide path to greatness.

A Self-Directed Officer Study Program by Paul Van Riper, USMC (.pdf)

This essay written in 1982, by Paul Van Riper, offers leaders a glimpse into his own development. Van Riper, who eventually became a three-star general, discusses the importance of reading and writing, how it influenced him, and how it can provide the framework for making leaders more effective.

Videos:

[Daniel Pink's Drive presented by RSA Animate \(Available on You Tube\)](#)

Maneuver Leader Self Study Program

Adaptation and Innovation

“There are no crystal balls that can predict the demands of future armed conflict. That is why I believe our ability to learn and adapt rapidly is an institutional imperative.”

-- General Martin Dempsey¹

Adaptation and innovation are particularly relevant to today’s Army given the challenges faced in recent wars and the uncertainty of future armed conflict. Our ability to meet the operational demands posed by a variety of enemies and their capabilities, countermeasures, and adaptations will be part of our nation’s tactical, operational, and strategic landscape. As we look forward to an uncertain future, we must adapt, innovate, and institutionalize both past experiences and future opportunities to better prepare us for the *next* war in whatever context that conflict will emerge. As Sir Michael Howard observed, “steer between the danger of repeating the errors of the past because he is ignorant that they have been made, and the danger of remaining bound by theories deduced from past history although changes in conditions have rendered these theories obsolete.”²

In other words, war audits how well military institutions and states prepare during periods of relative peace, and how their force planning processes succeed in capturing emerging technologies and innovative new methods. Armed conflict also audits how responsive commanders and institutional leaders are to recognize opportunities or challenges that emerge from the violent interactions against a thinking opponent who demonstrates the capacity to generate surprise by employing unanticipated tactics or technology. As we look to recent

¹ “A Campaign of Learning to Achieve Institutional Adaptation,” U.S. Department of the Army 2010, pp.34—35.

² Michael Howard, “The Use of Military History”, in Michael Howard, ed., *The Causes of War and Other Essays* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983), p.195

conflicts and potential asymmetric adversaries, the need to create a force capable of both innovation and adaptation is imperative.

In his book, *Military Adaptation in War*, Williamson Murray notes that the difference between adaption and innovation is the environment in which they occur.³ Adaptation occurs during conflict when “there is little time, but there is feedback of combat results, which can suggest necessary adaptations.”⁴ Adaptation is the act of adjusting one’s actions, assumptions, or predictions about the operational environment in a way that alters interaction with that environment either in the immediate timeframe or in preparation for future interaction (assumedly to better achieve one’s goals). Individuals and units constantly adapt, as a result of field problems as well as operational deployments. Innovation, on the other hand, occurs during periods of peace and is characterized by having “time available to think through problems.”⁵ . Innovation is the act of taking adaptations and institutionalizing them within an organization so that the next leader or unit will be able to succeed in a similar fashion. If your company improves its performance next week because of experiences it had this week, it has adapted. But, if the company that replaces you in an area of operation next year is able to incorporate the adaptations your company has learned because of its home-station training programs, that is innovation.

Why is the topic important for Maneuver Leaders?

Our Army of today, recognizing the uncertainty involved with future operational environment, seeks to develop adaptable leaders and units. The U.S. Army’s capstone, calls for Operational Adaptability, for “a mindset based on flexibility of thought” and leaders who are

³ *Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change*. Williamson Murray, Cambridge University Press, 2011. P.2

⁴ *Ibid*, 2

⁵ *Ibid*, .2

comfortable ”with collaborative planning and decentralized execution, a tolerance for ambiguity, and a willingness to make rapid adjustments according to the situation.”

An Approach to the Study of this Topic:

When approaching the study of this topic, review portions of Army history during which the Army adapted in combat and innovated during the interwar periods. Examine how these adaptations and innovations came about: At what level did they occur? How long did it take for the unit to adapt? In what context did the adaption occur? What leadership roadblocks did they have to overcome? Also, examine adaptations and innovations that failed and review the causes. Finally, look at yourself and your unit and use the discussion and reflection questions to determine if you are creating an environment that fosters adaptation, flexibility of thought, and innovation.

Questions for Reflection/Discussion:

- What obstacles prevent innovation and adaptation?
- What are the essential elements of adaptation and innovation?
- What role does an organizational institution or culture play in innovation and adaptation?
- How does a leader adapt? How does a unit adapt?
- How does a leader foster an adaptable mindset in his or her junior leaders?
- When and under what conditions does adaptation become innovation?
- What are the challenges, inhibitions, and dangers of adaptation and innovation? How do we balance the benefits and drawbacks of adaptation and innovation?

Books:

[Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change by Williamson Murray](#)

Military Adaptation in War addresses one of the most persistent, yet rarely examined, problems that military organizations confront: namely, the problem of how to adapt under the trying, terrifying conditions of war. This work builds on the volume that Professor Williamson Murray edited with Allan Millett on military innovation (a quite different problem, though similar in some respects). In Clausewitzian terms, war is a contest, an interactive duel, which is of indeterminate length and presents a series of intractable problems at every level, from policy and strategy down to the tactical. Moreover, the fact that the enemy is adapting at the same time presents military organizations with an ever-changing set of conundrums that offer up no easy solutions.

[Military Innovation in the Interwar Period by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett](#)

This study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in innovating exploitation by the seven major military powers. This volume of comparative essays investigates how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explains much of the strategic and operative performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II.

[The Dynamics of Doctrine by Timothy Lupher \(.pdf\)](#)

The "Dynamics of Doctrine" describes how the German Army of the First World War changed from a force of battalions, whose doctrine was based on a profound mistrust of the common soldier, to an army of "fire" teams where tactical judgment was expected of the most junior rifleman. Unfortunately for Germany, the army did not change fast enough. The damage wrought by the shoulder-to-shoulder assaults of 1914 and the inflexible defensive tactics of 1914 through 1916 could not be undone by the stormtroop tactics and mobile defense of 1917 and 1918. The result was catastrophic defeat. The lessons are clear: encourage innovation; learn from the battlefield; don't wait for a new manual to change the way you fight.

[Learning under Fire: The 112th Cavalry Regiment in World War II by Colonel James Powell](#)

James S. Powell thoroughly mines primary documents and buttresses his story with pertinent secondary accounts as he explores in detail the ways in which this military unit adapted to the changing demands of its tactical and strategic environment. He demonstrates that this learning was not simply a matter of steadily building on experience and honing relevant skills. It also required discovering shortcomings and promptly taking action to improve—often while in direct contact with the enemy.

[Strange Defeat by Marc Bloch](#)

Bloch takes a close look at the military failures he witnessed, examining why France was unable to respond to attack quickly and effectively. He gives a personal account of the battle of France, followed by a biting analysis of the generation between the wars. His harsh conclusion is that the immediate cause of the disaster was the utter incompetence of the High Command, but his

analysis ranges broadly, appraising all the factors, social as well as military, which since 1870 had undermined French national solidarity

Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War by Robert A. Doughty

French leaders, favoring a multi-front strategy, believed the Allies could maintain pressure on several fronts around the periphery of the German, Austrian, and Ottoman empires and eventually break the enemy's defenses. But France did not have sufficient resources to push the Germans back from the Western Front and attack elsewhere. The offensives they launched proved costly, and their tactical and operational methods ranged from remarkably effective to disastrously ineffective. Using extensive archival research, Doughty explains why France pursued a multi-front strategy and why it launched numerous operations as part of that strategy. He also casts new light on France's efforts to develop successful weapons and methods and the attempts to use them in operations.

[Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945](#) by David Johnson

Johnson examines the U.S. Army's innovations for both armor and aviation between the world wars, arguing that the tank became a captive of the conservative infantry and cavalry branches, while the airplane's development was channeled by air power insurgents bent on creating an independent air force. He maintains that as a consequence, the tank's potential was hindered by the traditional arms, while air power advocates focused mainly on proving the decisiveness of strategic bombing, neglecting the mission of tactical support for ground troops. Minimal interaction between ground and air officers resulted in insufficient cooperation between armored forces and air forces

Book Chapters:

- (1) [Christopher R. Gabel, "Tank Destroyer Force," in *A History of Innovation: U.S. Army Adaptation in War and Peace*, ed. Jon T. Hoffman \(Center of Military History, U.S. Army: Washington, D.C., 2009\), pp. 63-72.](#)

No all innovations are successful. The Army's development of the tank destroyer proved to be ineffective in World War II, leading to degradation of capabilities and resources that could have been applied elsewhere.

- (2) [Terry L. Beckenbaugh, "Artillery Speed Shifter," in *A History of Innovation: U.S. Army Adaptation in War and Peace*, ed. Jon T. Hoffman \(Center of Military History, U.S. Army: Washington, D.C., 2009\), pp. 139-146.](#)

This chapter provides an example of tactical adaptation that translated into innovation during the Vietnam War.

- (3) [Keith Bickel, *Mars Learning: The Marine Corps' Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915 - 1940* \(Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 2001\), see Chapter 2, "Historical and Institutional Context for Small Wars Learning."](#)

This book examines the development of the USMC's small wars doctrine. Chapter 2 focuses on the experiences of the U.S. Army in the Philippines and other "small wars" of the era and how some of those lessons came to be used and captured by the Marines. Additionally, it highlights some of the challenges faced by Army personnel during these wars. Particularly in the fighting against the Moros, Army units had to adapt to the unique tactics employed by the adversary.

Articles:

- (1) [Williams, COL Thomas R.. "Understanding Innovation," in *Military Review* July – August 2009.](#)

This article discusses the balance that the Army must make between innovation and its other responsibilities. While adaptation and innovation are bedrock necessities of preparing for future conflicts, not all adaptations are created equal. The desire to improve cannot overwhelm the necessity to meet other standards.

- (2) [David Ucko, "Innovation or Inertia: The U.S. Military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency," in *Orbis* 2008.](#)

This article examines the Department of Defense's attempts to institutionalize the ability for our military to conduct stability operations, in an institutional culture geared towards conventional style combat.

- (3) [To Change an Army by Don Starry-Military Review \(.pdf\)](#)

In this article, published in 1983, Starry discusses the necessary ingredients to create a culture of adaptation and innovation in our Army. He uses historical examples from previous wars to illustrate his points.

- (4) [How Militaries Learn and Adapt: An Interview with MG H.R. McMaster](#)

Papers:

- (1) [Mueller-Hanson, Rose A. et al., "Training Adaptable Leaders: Lessons from Research and Practice," U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Research Report #1844, 2005.](#)

"This paper addresses...training and development to promote adaptability for the next generation of military leaders: junior level officers. To date, little is known about whether adaptability can be trained, and, assuming it can be trained, the best means of doing so. However, recent research and practical applications have begun to shed some light on these issues, and in this paper we suggest that adaptive performance can be enhanced through training" (page 1).

Maneuver Leader Self Study Program

Strategy and the Political Dimensions of War

No one starts a war - or rather no one in his sense ought to do so - without first being clear in his mind what he tends to achieve by that war and how he tends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective.”¹

There is no dearth of definitions of military strategy. “Tactics,” wrote Carl von Clausewitz, is the art of using troops in battle; strategy is the art of using battles to win the war.” Liddell Hart, a British soldier and historian, described military strategy as the “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.” The British historian Michael Howard observed that “strategy concerns the deployment and use of armed forces to attain a given political objective. An Army officer turned academic put it this way: “At its most basic, strategy is a matter of figuring out what we need to achieve, determining the best way to use the resources at our disposal to achieve it, and then executing the plan.”² And if, for a moment, we take a step back from these military-focused definitions, it is worth noting that grand strategy is about how nations integrate their political, economic, and military goals in order to preserve their long-term interests in times of war and peace.

For the purposes of this essay, however, the focus will be on military strategy and the importance of connecting military tactics and operations to desired political outcomes. Just as you study the importance of combined arms and the need to integrate all arms into the fight, maneuver leaders must have an understanding of the need to connect battle field actions to political objectives.

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, p.579

² Christopher Bassford, Policy, Politics, War, and Military Strategy; available on line at <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/StrategyDraft/>. This was published in 1997 and updated in 2006.

In war, politics is as contested as territory. Holding territory requires an understanding of the politics that govern the territory. No matter how threats and conflicts are characterized – whether conventional, small, irregular, or hybrid – what is common to virtually all such contingencies is that the political landscape will drive the character of these conflicts. In virtually any scenario in which the United States Army will be involved, the politics of the situation on the ground will shape the context for the intervention and how the conflict unfolds.

This political dimension of war is not new to the United States Army. Throughout its history, the Army has engaged in “politics on the ground.”³ Virtually all of the wars in which it has fought have involved the problem of managing local actors in order to restore stability and basic order. U.S. Army officers directly supervised the creation of new governments in a range of wars. These include the well-known success stories of Germany and Japan during World War II, as well as Italy and Korea. In addition, cases that have traditionally garnered less attention include the Mexican War in the 1860s, reconstruction during the Civil War, Puerto Rico and Cuba during the Spanish American War. Governance operations took place during the Cold War period too: the Dominican Republic 1965, Grenada in 1986, and Panama in 1989. Not counting the more recent post Cold War period, Army personnel under the theater commander’s operational control supervised and implemented political and economic reconstruction. In virtually all of the Army’s major contingencies Army personnel remained on the ground overseeing the political transitions that were essential to the consolidation of victory.

3 Nadia Schadlow, *Organizing to Compete in the Political Terrain* Army Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, August 2010. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1007>

Why Does Strategy Matter to Maneuver Leaders?

An understanding of the components of strategy - the tactical and operational elements that must coalesce in order to achieve political outcomes - can contribute to your development as leaders. It can offer a richer understanding of the elements that will drive a war to victory, or defeat.

As other essays in this series explain, maneuver leaders must be able to integrate sister service capabilities into operations: capabilities such as intelligence and fires. The ability to integrate is required in the strategic domain as well, since maneuver leaders will often be required to draw upon other types of non-combat expertise - from development know-how, to economics, to knowledge of infrastructure and rule of law - to achieve U.S. objectives. The 2009 Army Capstone Concept captured this requirement in its concept of wide area security. Wide area security is the application of the elements of combat power in coordination with other military and civilian capabilities to deny the enemy positions of advantage; protect forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities; and consolidate tactical and operational gains to set conditions for achieving strategic and policy goals. Army forces use combined arms maneuver and wide area security operations to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. They establish wide area security to protect forces, populations, infrastructures, and activities. Wide area security also denies the enemy the ability to gain physical, temporal, or psychological advantages. Effective wide area security is essential to consolidating tactical and operational gains that, over time, set conditions for achieving strategic goals.

A consideration of strategy can also help you anticipate (and thus prepare better for) the many factors that can and often do, go wrong in war. For instance, in his classic essay, *The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy*, Michael Howard explained that war is conducted along four

dimensions: the operational, the logistical, the social, and the technological. Successful strategy requires taking into account of all of these dimensions, but under different circumstances, one or another might dominate. Howard pointed out that during the American Civil War, the North's victory was not due to the operational capabilities of its generals, but to its capacity to mobilize its superior industrial strength and manpower into armies. Ultimately, he observed, the logistical dimension of strategy proved more significant than the operational.

More recently, in Afghanistan, the logistical dimension of strategy was critical as well. The need to maintain reliable supply lines to a land-locked country shaped U.S. strategy toward Pakistan, which in turn had significant negative implications for U.S. and allied troops on the ground, since Taliban safe havens were operating from Pakistan. Your actions as leaders in wartime will be magnified, shaped, and often necessarily constrained by how tactics and operations are connected to broader political goals.

Moreover, by thinking strategically - remembering the moving parts that are driving toward the desired political end state - you will be better prepared to anticipate what your adversary may be considering and employing against you. Most likely, he is pursuing more than one line of effort to defeat you. The 9/11 attacks were not solely tactical successes for Al Qaeda - they were linked to a broader political campaign designed discredit American actions and objectives in the Middle East. Throughout the Iraq war there were countless examples of U.S. effort to build trust among Iraqi civilians that were deliberately undermined by radical Sunni and Shia-backed militias who were thinking about their desired political end-state. As leaders, you will need to develop tactics and operations that make it harder for enemies to turn U.S. actions to their advantage; this requires an understanding of political dynamics at play. Strategy, like war itself, is interactive.

An Approach to the Study of Strategy

First, maneuver leaders should become familiar with some of the classical thinking about strategy. You should read all or at least parts of parts of *On War*. If that seems intimidating, you might first read several articles that synthesize Clausewitz's views, and then dive into the parts of *On War* that interest you. You should also read some of the classic modern thinkers on military strategy, such as Michael Howard (see the article noted below). This will help provide a context for original texts that you might read.

Second, you should explore relevant Army doctrine that captures the importance of strategy. Some examples of this doctrine are included below. While it might not engender the most fast paced reading, some of it is actually well-written and it provides insights into contemporary debates about how the Army is thinking, which will help you engage in contemporary discussions.

Third, you should read case studies of strategies in war. A good place to start would be to read two books, *Makers of Modern Strategy* (which is probably worth having on your bookshelf) and *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*. The First title includes essays by renowned historians and thinkers and essay subjects include ones on Napoleon, Jomini and Clausewitz, World War I, Russian strategy, World War II, conventional war and revolutionary warfare. The second title focuses on how rulers and states develop strategy through seventeen essays ranging from the ancient past to modern day. As a part of your case study reading, it would also be worth reading some of the more recent articles and discussions about the problems of strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq. Your generation of soldiers has been shaped by these wars so understanding the debates about them will be important as you continue to grow as leaders.

Questions for Reflection/Discussion:

What is strategy? How would you define it when talking to your cohorts?

As you read about specific wars throughout this course of Self Study and more broadly, keep in mind the political aims of these wars. Are U.S. civilian leaders clear about these aims? Are their military counterparts clear about these objectives? How did the battles and operations in these wars contribute to the achievement of these aims? How were they shaped by them?

Are there strategic principles that endure? What are they?

What are some examples in war in which tactics and operations did or did not advance the political outcomes that the United States sought to achieve?

How did our enemies, in various wars, exploit the politics of war?

What training can I implement into my unit so that subordinates will develop a better understanding of military strategy?

Readings

Doctrinal References:

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*; October 2011

This supersedes the 2008 Field Manual, FM 3-0, *Operations*. It provides a common operational concept for a future in which Army forces must be prepared to operate across the range of military operations, integrating their actions with joint, interagency, and multinational partners as part of a larger effort. It explains how full spectrum operations recognized the need to conduct a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations simultaneously and builds upon that concept by explaining how success requires fully integrating Army operations with the efforts of joint, interagency, and multinational partners. These linkages are important elements to successful executive of military strategy, as discussed above.

[Strategy, United States Marine Corps, MCDP 1-1, November 1997.](#)

Though published over 15 years ago this is a very well written and clear introduction to strategy. It is designed, as the foreword notes, to help Marines think through the implications of their actions on the military strategy being employed and the political objectives that strategy is intended to achieve. It can help soldiers as well. It later became the draft of a book by Christopher Bassford, cited above.

[FM 3-07 Stability Operations, October 2008:](#)

This manual explains that because the conflict is likely to be characterized by clashes of ideologies and cultures, the “greatest threats to our national security will not come from emerging ambitious states but from nations unable or unwilling to meet the basic needs and aspirations of their people. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different terms from the wars of our past. However, time may be the ultimate arbiter of success: time to bring safety and security to an embattled populace; time to provide for the essential, immediate humanitarian needs of the people; time to restore basic public order and a semblance of normalcy to life; and time to rebuild the institutions of government and market economy that provide the foundations for enduring peace and stability. This is the essence of stability operations.”

[The Army Capstone Concept—Operational Adaptability: Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict, 2016–2028 \(TRADOC Pam 525-3-0\).](#)

New Capstone Concept: <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-0.pdf>

Articles

See Hew Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,” *Survival*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Autumn 2005): 33-54.

David Jablonsky, "[Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I.](#)" *Parameters*, Spring 1987. pp. 65-76 and David Jablonsky, "[Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part II.](#)" *Parameters*, Summer 1987. pp. 52-67.

Organizing for Victory, by James Dobbins, Prism 1, No. 1. See http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/prism1-1/6_Prism_51-62_Dobbins.pdf

Christopher Bassford, Review Essay of Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Berlin, 1832) <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/DefAnReview.htm>

“The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,” by Allan R. Millet, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Watman, *International Security*, Vol. 11, No. 1. (Summer, 1986), pp. 37-71.

Nadia Schadlow, “War and the Art of Governance,” *Parameters*, Autumn 2003; <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/03autumn/schadlow.pdf>

Books:

[***On War, Carl Von Clausewitz, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1989.***](#) Note that it is worthwhile to try to get this edition, particularly since their introductory essay is so informative.

This is of course the classic text. It is, for good reason, quoted everywhere, all of the time. It is hard to think that by now as Army soldiers you have not come across many such quotes. Clausewitz wrote with elegance and confidence. He sought to identify enduring principles of war (e.g., seize the initiative) but explained that its character would shift and change over time. He helps the reader understand that changes occur against the backdrop of some enduring principles. Clausewitz joined the Prussian army at 12 and fought against the armies of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. It took him fifteen years to write *On War*, which was eventually published in 1832, after his death. Hopefully it will not take you 15 years to read it, but even if it does, it is worth it.

[**B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, \(London: Faber and Faber, 1967\).**](#) (.pdf)

This book documents Hart's view that "throughout the ages decisive results in war have only been reached when the approach has been indirect." Hart wanted to examine the causes of World War I's high casualty rate. He arrived at a set of principles that he considered the basis of all good strategy. In his words: In strategy the longest way round is often the shortest way there; a direct approach to the object exhausts the attacker and hardens the resistance by compression, whereas an indirect approach loosens the defender's hold by upsetting his balance.

[***Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, eds. Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, Felix Gilbert, Princeton University Press, 1986.**](#) (There is the older version from 1943 which is also considered a classic and contains mostly different essays. It is harder to find).

The synopsis from the publisher is accurate: "The subjects addressed range from major theorists and political and military leaders to impersonal forces. Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Marx and Engels are discussed, as are Napoleon, Churchill, and Mao. Other essays trace the interaction of theory and experience over generations--the evolution of American strategy, for instance, or the emergence of revolutionary war in the modern world. Still others analyze the strategy of particular conflicts--the First and Second World Wars--or the relationship between technology, policy, and war in the nuclear age. Whatever its theme, each essay places the specifics of military thought and action in their political, social, and economic environment."

[***The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, Alvin Bernstein Cambridge University Press, 1994**](#)

Moving beyond the limited focus of the individual strategic theorist or the great military leader, *The Making of Strategy* concentrates instead on the processes by which rulers and states have formed strategy. Seventeen case studies--from the fifth century B.C. to the present--analyze through a common framework how strategists have sought to implement a coherent course of action against their adversaries. This fascinating book considers the impact of such complexities

as the geographic, political, economic and technical forces that have driven the transformation of strategy since the beginning of civilization and seem likely to alter the making of strategy in the future

[Grand Strategies In War and Peace, by Paul Kennedy, Yale University Press, 1991](#)

This is an edited collection and is a good place to get a sense of what Grand Strategy is all about - that is, how countries integrate their overall political, economic, and military aims to preserve their long term interests. Its ideas are relevant today, as many believe we are entering a period of American decline and that the resources we can bring to bear to win wars are limited. The book has short, incisive essays by experts: you could read about German Grand Strategy in World War II, by Dennis Showalter, or about the evolution of Soviet Grand Strategy by Condoleezza Rice, or about how Winston Churchill used coalition strategies in World War II, by Eliot Cohen.

Monographs

[America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, by James Dobbins, John McGinn, et al. 2003.](#)

The book provides an overview of more than 50 years of U.S. efforts to transform defeated and broken enemies into democratic and prosperous allies. The authors conclude that rebuilding Iraq will be difficult but possible, and use historical perspective to illuminate today's headlines. The book says that the post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan set standards for successful post-conflict nation-building that have never again been matched. In recent years the United States has a mixed record of success in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Now Iraq looms as the greatest nation-building challenge since 1945.

Podcasts:

[In Our Time, Clausewitz and On War](#)

Melvyn Bragg and his guests discuss On War, a treatise on the theory and practice of warfare written by the Prussian soldier and intellectual Carl von Clausewitz. First published in 1832, Clausewitz's magnum opus is commonly regarded as the most important book about military theory ever written. Informed by its author's experience of fighting against the mighty armies of Napoleon, the work looks not just at the practicalities of warfare, but offers a subtle philosophical analysis of the nature of war and its relationship with politics. Notions such as the Clausewitzian Trinity have had an enormous effect on later military leaders.

Maneuver Leader Self Study Program

The Nature and Character of War and Warfare

“War is more than a mere chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.

As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity... ; of the play of chance and probability... ; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.”¹

– Carl von Clausewitz in *On War*

War has an enduring nature that demonstrates four continuities: a political dimension, a human dimension, the existence of uncertainty and that it is a contest of wills.² Clausewitz, author of the most comprehensive theory of war, provided a description of war’s enduring nature in the opening chapter of *On War*. He observed that all wars involve passion, often lying with the hostile feelings of the people, otherwise states would avoid war altogether by simply comparing their relative strengths in “a kind of war by algebra.”³ He emphasized wars’ uncertainty, stating that war often “[resembles] a game of cards.”⁴ Finally, war is always a matter of policy, as “The political object...will thus determine both the military objective...and the amount of effort it requires,” which is a rational process of directing hostile intent normally left to government.⁵ While these continuities are present in all wars, every war exists within social, political and historical contexts, giving each war much of its unique character (e.g. levels of intensity, objectives, interactions with the enemy, etc.).⁶

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ind. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 89.

² H.R. McMaster, “The Geopolitical Lessons of the Iraq War” (Comments, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, March 21, 2013).

³ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 86.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 81.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 88.

Conversely, warfare has a constantly changing character. Although simply “the means by which war has to be fought,” the influence of context is again paramount.⁷ Technology has a significant influence on warfare, but other influences like doctrine and military organization are also important. Changes in the character of warfare may occur slowly over generations or quite rapidly. Additionally, these changes clearly affect the tactical art of employing units and weapons and, to a lesser extent, the operational art of linking military objectives to achieve strategic ones. Both continuities in the nature of war and the changes in the character of warfare influence strategy. The greater influence on strategy, as Clausewitz observes, comes from the nature and character of war because the “most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”⁸

Why this Topic Matters

Clausewitz identifies “danger, physical exertion, intelligence and friction as the elements that coalesce to form the atmosphere of war, and turn it into a medium that impedes activity.”⁹ This general friction makes military forces less effective in combat and his prescription is experience.¹⁰ The U.S. Army’s officer and NCO leaders have acquired considerable wartime experience since September 11th, 2001. This experience is unquestionably beneficial as the Army prepares for future conflicts and these leaders assume responsibilities at the operational and strategic levels. Those who know the hazards, confusion and complexity of war firsthand are more likely to effectively visualize, describe and direct their units towards mission success. However, leaders must place their experiences within the context of a broad understanding of

⁷ Ibid., 85.

⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*, 88.

⁹ Ibid., 122.

¹⁰ Ibid., 122-123.

war and warfare. Doing so will prevent them from assuming that experience in one conflict will necessarily translate into success in the next.

Furthermore, maneuver leaders should consider how their experiences in both conflict and peacetime training relate to the broad range of future contingencies. Consider, for example, how the 1991 Persian Gulf War informed our operational success early in Operation Iraqi Freedom, but was unhelpful in identifying and dealing with the problem of insurgency. Similarly, our approach to counterinsurgency in Iraq did not transfer directly to Afghanistan later in that war. Looking forward, how certain are we that targeted counterterrorist operations, uncoupled from other operations, can deliver our strategic objectives? Studying the nature of war and the character of warfare will help you place your experiences in context and develop your own understanding of the changes and the continuities of war.

How to Approach this Topic

Fully studying the nature of war and the character of warfare requires historical and theoretical study. Historical provides exposure to the continuities and changes in war and warfare. First, study in *width*. To observe how warfare has developed over a long historical period. Next, study in *depth*. Study campaigns, and explore them thoroughly, consulting original sources and apply various theories and interdisciplinary approaches. “This is important,” observed Sir Michael Howard, because as the “tidy outline dissolves,” we catch a glimpse of the confusion and horror of real experience.” And lastly study in *context*. Wars and warfare must be understood in context of their social, cultural, economic, human, moral, political, and psychological contexts because “the roots of victory and defeat have to be sought far from the battlefield.”

Next, the study of classical theory will help mature your understanding of the continuities of war. A great place to begin is with Clausewitz's *On War*. Eisenhower read this treatise fully three times through, showing that it is simultaneously important and difficult to grasp.¹¹ Clausewitz formulated his theory by comparing dualisms, usually with contradictions between abstract and material concepts, resulting in ideas like the paradoxical trinity.¹² Following his logic normally requires using secondary works as guides. Christopher Bassford's essay "Clausewitz and his Works," particularly the section "*On War*," serves as a quick primer, while Peter Paret's introductory essay in his edited volume of *On War* provides more depth. The benefit of *On War* is greatest in the whole rather than its parts, but with regard to this subject, Book One is essential while Books Two and Eight are highly relevant.¹³ After understanding his theory, begin exploring some of his individual themes and the distinctions between war and warfare through the articles presented below. To develop additional breadth beyond Clausewitz, read Bassford's "Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction", Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* and Michael Handel's *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. Though simpler to read than Clausewitz, Sun Tzu's work is equally susceptible to reduction. Handel's book and his essay "Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: *The Art of War* and *On War* Compared" provide useful comparisons of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.

Finally, doctrine is less a guide to this subject than it is an opportunity for exercising critical thought about it. Doctrine traditionally prescribes how the Army expects to fight, so it usually relates to warfare, tactics and operations. The Marine Corps's MDCP 1-1 is an exception, as it aims to teach strategic thought directly, but as with Clausewitz it is more descriptive than prescriptive. Doctrine seeks to anticipate and account for future changes in

¹¹ Matheny, 53.

¹² Antulio Echevarria, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 21.

¹³ Ibid.

warfare, so it is appropriate to critically evaluate recent doctrine in light of recent experiences. Compare, for example, how suitable FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency was for operations in Iraq versus Afghanistan, then consider its applicability for future conflicts. Finally, ADPs 1-0 and 3-0, the Army's two capstone documents, consider the probable range of future land operations through a variety of possible contexts for the next war. The maneuver leader should always critically evaluate doctrine, but when the doctrine is untested the best approach is to consider it through a developed understanding of the nature of war and the character of warfare.

Questions for Discussion/Reflection

1. How do the Army's recent experiences demonstrate the difficulty of accounting for the continuities of war: the political dimension, the human dimension, uncertainty and that war is a contest of wills?
2. What are some recent changes in warfare and how have they affected the military art at the tactical and operational levels?
3. Consider the most probable scenarios for the Army in future conflict. How different are the potential social, political, cultural and technological contexts we might face?
4. How well do recent doctrinal revisions consider the nature and character of war, and the changing character of warfare?

Doctrine

U.S. Department of the Army. *ADP 1-0 The Army*. Army Doctrinal Publication, 2012.

U.S. Department of the Army. *ADP 3-0 Operations*. Army Doctrinal Publication, 2012.

U.S. Department of the Army. *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*. Field Manual, 2006.

U.S. Marine Corps. *MCDP 1-1 Strategy*. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication, 1997.

Articles

[Bassford, Christopher. "Clausewitz and his Works." The Clausewitz Homepage.](#) Professor Bassford provides easily understood background on Clausewitz, the evolution of his theory starting with his earlier works, and a brief discussion of its structure.

[Bassford, Christopher. "Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction." The Clausewitz Homepage.](#) Jomini was Clausewitz's contemporary and his principal competition. His numerous works, most notably *The Art of War*, heavily influenced American military thought as early as the 1820s

when Dennis Hart Mahan and Sylvanus Thayer taught his principals to the future generation of American Civil War commanders at West Point. Although no longer widely read, Jomini's influence on current operational concepts remains. Although conventionally seen as antagonists, Bassford highlights their numerous similarities.

[Beyerchen, Alan. "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War." *International Security* 17, no. 3 \(Winter 1992-1993\).](#) Perhaps one of the most important pieces of recent Clausewitzian scholarship, Professor Beyerchen argues that Clausewitz perceived the later mathematical concept of nonlinearity and implicitly incorporated it into his theory of war. Nonlinearity occurs when the relationship between variables is disproportional, meaning that outputs of a nonlinear system are often disproportional to their inputs. Although a challenging article, it effectively explains why war is so inherently unpredictable.

[Gray, Colin. "War: Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity." *Parameters* 40, no. 2 \(Summer 2010\), 5-13.](#) Professor Gray is perhaps the foremost modern Clausewitzian strategist. He argues that war has an identifiable enduring nature and that many often confuse changes in warfare for a change in war's nature.

[Handel, Michael. "Clausewitz in the Age of Technology." In *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*. New York: Routledge, 1996.](#) Professor Handel seeks to update Clausewitz's paradoxical trinity by including technological change. Handel argues that technological change is so persistent that it represents a law on par with passion and enmity, chance and probability, and the primacy of policy as part of war's nature. While it clearly runs counter to Clausewitz and his modern day supporters, the article certainly advances the discussion about how we should regard technology's influence on war.

[Handel, Michael. "Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: *The Art of War* and *On War* Compared." *Professional Readings in Military Strategy*, no. 2 \(1991\).](#) As he does in *Masters of War*, Handel compares the methodologies and conclusions of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, arguing that they have more in common regarding war's nature than most realize.

[Waldman, Thomas. "Politics and War: Clausewitz's Paradoxical Equation." *Parameters* 40, no. 3 \(Autumn 2010\), 48-60.](#) While politics in war is a separate self-study module in this program, Waldman's essay clearly articulates how the political dimension is a primary component of war's enduring nature in Clausewitz's theory.

Books

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Ind. ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. The seminal theory on war, this is the most widely used English translation today. Paret provides a detailed explanation of Clausewitz and the evolution of his theory in the first introductory essay. Michael Howard and Bernard Brodie, a principal architect of nuclear strategy, provide essay's arguing for Clausewitz's continued

relevance. As noted previously, Books One, Two and Eight provide are the most complete and most relevant to studying the nature of war and its changing character. Book Three primarily addresses issues at what we would consider the operational level today, similar to Jomini's principals, while the remainder mostly address contemporary issues of warfare in the 19th Century.

Handel, Michael. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Franck Cass, 2001. This study thoroughly compares the theoretical approaches and conclusions of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung, Jomini and Machiavelli. He concludes that there is considerably more agreement among them regarding war's enduring nature than conventional analysis suggests. Chapter 9, in particular, addresses Clausewitz's view on the enduring nature of war.

[Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Translated by Lionel Giles. 1910. Reprint. Project Gutenberg eBook.](#)

The translator's introduction provides an important background on what scholars general know about Sun Tzu, the context of his time period, and how the work came into existence. Read casually, *The Art of War* appears little more than an assembling of maxims instructing commanders for fighting effectively in ancient China. Read more critically, it has as much to say about war's nature as it does about warfare in that period.

DRAFT

Maneuver Leader Self Study Program

Counterinsurgency

“Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge.”

--T.E. Lawrence

“The shooting side of the business is only 25% of the trouble and other 75% lies in getting the people of the country behind us.”

--Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer

Counterinsurgency is the use of all elements of a nation’s power—including not only combined-arms operations but also psychological, political, economic, intelligence, and diplomatic operations—to defeat an insurgency. An insurgency is an organized uprising that uses violent and nonviolent means to overthrow an existing government or to wrest away control, either de jure or de facto, over part of its territory. Insurgencies typically have political or religious motivation but criminal gangs can also become powerful enough to imperil a state’s authority. Most insurgencies utilize a combination of guerrilla and terrorist tactics—the former are hit-and-run attacks directed primarily at government security forces, the latter are attacks directed primarily against civilians—supported by propaganda and political organizing.

Successfully countering an insurgency will require commanders to skillfully synchronize multiple lines of operations, acting in concert with host-nation forces as well as representatives of other U.S. government agencies. International organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the news media are also likely to be present on the battlefield, and the successful commander must interact with them constructively, and if possible use them to achieve campaign objectives, even though they are outside the military chain of command.

Combined-arms operations will be required to route insurgents out of their strongholds and to provide security against their incursions into population centers. But, while the aggressive pursuit of insurgent forces is necessary, it is insufficient to achieve victory—and if undertaken in indiscriminate fashion can actually backfire by creating more insurgents than you capture or kill. Insurgents, in fact, count on security forces to over-react and thereby to drive more recruits into their ranks.

The basis of successful counterinsurgency is acquiring intelligence to identify an enemy that often hides in plain sight. Some of that intelligence can be acquired by technical means, but there is no substitute for the situational awareness provided by security forces (whether American or host-nation) who are in daily contact with the population. Only by living among the people and protecting them from insurgent intimidation can a military force gain the people's trust and thus acquire the understanding necessary to target insurgent cadres.

Securing the population is thus the most important line of operations. As John Paul Vann, an American adviser in Vietnam, said, "Security may be ten percent of the problem, or it may be ninety percent, but whatever it is, it's the first ten percent or the first ninety percent. Without security nothing else will last." The security line of operations must be buttressed by attempts to win the trust of the populace and enhance the legitimacy of the counterinsurgents. This does not necessarily mean increasing the capacity of the host-nation government--if the government is widely seen as corrupt or illegitimate, making it more powerful can be self-defeating. Nor does it necessarily involve spending lots of money on expensive public-works projects that the locals may not want and will be unable to operate on their own. It does mean addressing the desire of the people for self-determination and the delivery of some basic governmental services. How "self determination" and "services" are defined will vary from country to country and even from

village to village. It is the foremost responsibility of a commander in a COIN environment to understand the unique human and geographical terrain on which the maneuver forces operate.

T.E. Lawrence attributed his success in aiding the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire to “hard study and brain-work and concentration,” an example at odds with what he denounced as the “fundamental, crippling, incuriousness” of many fellow officers who were “too much body and too little head.” Future combat leaders should heed Lawrence’s injunction to study hard, especially when preparing for COIN—the most intellectually challenging realm of warfare.

Why Does COIN Matter to Maneuver Leaders?

Even though U.S. forces have left Iraq and there is a planned reduction in U.S. forces in Afghanistan, the era of counterinsurgency is far from over. Irregular warfare is the oldest form of warfare—it long predates the rise of conventional armies in ancient Mesopotamia around 3000 BC. Irregular warfare has been ubiquitous throughout history and is more important than ever today, at a time when conventional warfare is growing increasingly rare. America’s enemies understand that to fight the U.S. armed forces with conventional forces in the open field is tantamount to suicide—as Saddam Hussein discovered for himself. Irregular-warfare tactics, on the other hand, have shown a far higher likelihood of success against American military forces. Our enemies study, and are inspired by, the examples of Vietnam, Beirut (1983), Somalia (1993), Iraq, Afghanistan and other conflicts where irregular forces have inflicted significant setbacks and even defeats on American forces. Moreover the conditions for the growth of insurgency—chiefly a lack of effective governance—exist in many areas of the world, especially

in Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Latin America and Southeast Asia. For all these reasons irregular warfare will continue to be prevalent.

An Approach to the Study of COIN:

First, maneuver leaders should become familiar with the relevant Army doctrine, which in turn can provide leaders with a context for studying history. Second, once familiar with relevant doctrine, leaders should read books and articles that provide an overview of irregular warfare operations since ancient times as well as accounts of its evolution since the early 20th century. Next, leaders might study a specific COIN operation in which integration of whole-of-government efforts made possible the defeat or significant diminution of the enemy. Examples include the Philippine Insurrection, the Boer War, the Huk Rebellion, the Malay Emergency, the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland, the 1980s war in El Salvador, the “surge” in Iraq, the Second Intifada, and Colombia’s campaign against the FARC in the past decade. Conversely leaders should also look at unsuccessful COIN campaigns to see what mistakes to avoid. Examples include the American Revolution, the Irish War of Independence, Yugoslavia during World War II, the French wars in Indochina and Algeria, the US war in Vietnam, and the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan.

Questions for Reflection/Discussion:

- 1.) What are some principles, which you have identified, that have not changed with the evolution of technology?
- 2.) As technology develops, how do you think insurgency and counterinsurgency will evolve?
- 3.) What deficiencies have you identified in your own understanding of COIN?
- 4.) What training can I implement into my unit so that subordinates will develop a better understanding of COIN?

- 5.) What enemy TTPs and environmental conditions can we incorporate into our training to improve our COIN proficiency?
- 6.) How did the leaders who led successful COIN operations in the past prepare prior to combat?

Doctrinal References:

FM 3-24: Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual

FM 3-07: Army Stability Operations Field Manual

Articles

["Letter from Iraq: The Lesson of Tal Afar," by George Packard, *The New Yorker*, April 10, 2006.](#)

How the 3rd ACR turned around an insurgent stronghold in Iraq and thereby created the template for wider-scale COIN in Iraq.

["The Colombian Miracle" by Max Boot and Richard W. Bennett, *The Weekly Standard*, December 7, 2009](#)

How President Alvaro Uribe beat back the FARC with a "democratic security" strategy to produce one of the most successful COIN campaigns of modern times.

["28 Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency" by David Kilcullen.](#) The author presents a tactical-level guide, based on lessons from personal experience. He emphasizes the necessity of proper mental preparation and unit training, and offers a series of recommendations for applying concepts and ideas for operations.

Books:

[*Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present* by Max Boot](#)

An important and ambitious book. Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of two earlier books on related subjects, examines the history of guerrilla warfare from ancient times to the present day and concludes that "it is a form of combat which has been immanent in all cultures at all times, whenever one side was too weak to face another in open battle." In the first three parts of the book, Boot examines the origins of guerrilla warfare, guerrilla campaigns in the age of democratic revolutions and European power campaigns to suppress resistance to colonial rule. Subsequent parts examine the growth of terrorism; guerrilla campaigns that arose out of the World Wars; the Chinese revolution and decolonization struggles in Indochina, Algeria and Malaya; leftist guerrilla and terrorist groups from the 1950s through the 1970s; and, finally, the rise of Islamist militancy from 1979 to the present. The book is impressive not only because of its scope and readability but also because the author has

connected the general histories of these conflicts thematically. *Invisible Armies* helps readers better understand the history of guerrilla warfare, the nature of contemporary conflicts and the challenges to international security that lie ahead.

[*Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula \(1964\)*](#)

A concise and compelling distillation of the lessons of COIN based on the experience of the author—a French officer—in Greece, China and Algeria.

[*Lawrence of Arabia by Jeremy Wilson \(1989\)*](#)

Few guerrillas have been more famous or more mysterious than T.E. Lawrence. His official biographer, Jeremy Wilson, does much to demystify him in this exhaustively researched text, which is a surprisingly brisk read despite its 1,188 pages. Lawrence's story was extraordinary: He went from working as an obscure archaeologist in Syria to acting as the key adviser to the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire from 1916 to 1918. After the war, he became known as "Lawrence of Arabia" (an appellation coined by a Chicago newspaperman), wrote a classic book ("Seven Pillars of Wisdom," which is also strongly recommended), and as an adviser to Winston Churchill at the Colonial Office helped redraw the map of the Middle East. But, recoiling from his fame, he enlisted under an assumed name in the Royal Air Force and then the Royal Tank Corps in the 1920s. Like all great romantic heroes, he died young (at 46), in a motorcycle accident. Controversy about him has raged ever since: Was he gay? Was he mad? Was he a compulsive liar? Wilson offers as definitive an answer to these questions as we are likely to get.

[*The Sabres of Paradise by Lesley Blanch \(1960\)*](#)

Blanch (1904-2007) was one of those intrepid Britons who journeyed everywhere and wrote evocatively about her experiences. In this book she offers an unforgettable portrait of the violent and beautiful Caucasus. Her focus is on Shamil, the legendary Muslim guerrilla who resisted Russian conquest from 1834 to 1859. "To the Russians," she writes, "he was known as the Red Devil; he wore a crimson tcherkesska [a kind of long coat], his beard was red, his legend steeped in blood and daring." Blanch's account sounds starkly modern: She notes that Shamil and his fellow mountaineers saw their resistance as a holy war "of resistance to the Infidel invaders." And much like some modern jihadists, Shamil alienated the populace with his draconian decrees, setting the stage for his eventual defeat at the hands of a Russian general—a proto-Petraeus—who was wily enough to win over the populace rather than simply put them to the sword.

[*Into the Land of Bones by Frank L. Holt \(2005\)*](#)

This excellent and concise account of Alexander the Great's foray into Afghanistan in 329 B.C. is a reminder that guerrilla warfare is not a recent invention—it is in fact older than civilization itself. Fresh off his dismantling of the Persian Empire, Alexander found the obstreperous tribes of Central Asia harder to subdue. Entire Macedonian detachments were lost in ambushes, and Alexander himself was wounded twice. Frank Holt, a classicist at the University of Houston, narrates his struggle in clear prose that makes this ancient campaign come alive and gives greater appreciation for the challenges that confront all counterinsurgents in Afghanistan.

[*Bing West, The Village \(1972\)*](#)

A first-person account of the Marines' Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam, a program to embed squads at the village level.

Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (2008)

This book contains 14 essays that examine developments in counterinsurgency from the early 20th century to the present. Each essays concludes with lessons that can be learned from them.

Owen West, The Snake Eaters: an Unlikely Band of Brothers and the Battle for the Soul of Iraq (2012)

An advisor in Iraq recounts how he and his immediate predecessors helped the Iraqi army turn around an insurgent stronghold in Anbar Province.

Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (2012)

The single best history of the war in Iraq, written by a widely respected New York Times military correspondent and a retired Marine general.

Emile Simpson, War From the Ground Up (2012)

After completing 3 tours in Afghanistan as a British Officer, Emile Simpson has compiled a collection of little-known case studies ranging from Nepal to Borneo, and draws heavily on personal anecdotes from the frontline, related to historical context and strategic thought, to offer a re-evaluation of the concept of modern conflict.

James Spies, LSC Chewing Sand

This book takes readers through a process for understanding how revolutions begin, how insurgents employ differing strategies and tactics, and how the counterinsurgent force must combat these insurgents.

Monographs:

“Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” by Frank Hoffman, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies—An influential monograph that popularized the term “hybrid wars,” referring to conflicts that have been conventional and irregular aspects. This is not a new development—the American revolutionaries who fought against Great Britain utilized both guerrilla and conventional tactics—but it is one that will be a growing challenge in the future, as witness organizations such as Hezbollah.

Movies:

The Battle of Algiers (1966)

Produced by one of the FLN insurgents who battled the French, this is nevertheless a largely fair and accurate account of the 1957 struggle pitting the FLN against French paratroopers in the capital of Algeria. A classic depiction of how brutality on the part of security forces can backfire.

Michael Collins (1996)

Starring Liam Neeson as the Irish revolutionary who successfully combined guerrilla and terrorist tactics to drive the British out of southern Ireland.

[Lawrence of Arabia \(1962\)](#)

The great David Lean film, starring Peter O'Toole, as Lawrence of Arabia, one of the most famous insurgents and one of the most successful military advisers of the 20th century.

DRAFT

Maneuver Leader Self Study Program

Mission Command

“Victory or defeat in battle changes the situation to such a degree that no human acumen is able to see beyond the first battle. Therefore no plan of operation extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with the main hostile force... The advantage of the situation will never be fully utilized if subordinate commanders wait for orders, it will be generally more advisable to proceed actively and keep the initiative that to wait to the law of the opponent”

-Helmuth von Moltke the Elder

The Army’s philosophy of command is Mission Command; it is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of Unified Land Operations.ⁱ Mission Command was born out of necessity in the 19th Century. The advent of more lethal weapons and the mobilization of large societies, required Prussian corps, division, and brigades to disperse their troops in battle, leaving the senior commanders unable to fully view or control their troops during battle.ⁱⁱ As a result, junior leaders were required to use judgment and initiative to act decisively in the absence of detailed orders from commanders. Today, the philosophy of Mission Command is guided by six principles: Build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk. In addition to being a philosophy, Mission Command also refers to the war-fighting function, which encompasses the tasks and systems that enable a commander to practice the art of command. Leading consistently with the philosophy of Mission Command allows units to take advantage of fleeting opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative in combat.

Why Does Mission command Matter to Maneuver Leaders?

The past decade of war has reinforced the importance of Mission Command. As small units conduct decentralized operations across wide areas in rapidly changing environments. Operations are complex, involving continuous interactions between friendly forces, enemy organizations, and civilians as well as interaction with other factors that affect the mission such as time, terrain, and local political dynamics. Simply giving subordinates task and purpose is not enough for effective Mission Command. Collaborative planning and feedback throughout the operations process is critical to developing and maintaining a common understanding of the situation and the mission. Leaders must strive to improve their ability to communicate their intent, desired end-state, concept of operation, and understanding of the situation so subordinates are able to take initiative consistent with the mission.

How to Approach the Study of Mission Command and Apply it:

Leaders should start by familiarizing themselves with ADP 6-0. ADP and ADRP 6-0 are the Army's keystone publications for Mission Command. ADP 6-0 is a concise publication that provides readers with an overview of the philosophy, and warfighting function, while ADRP 6-0 provides more extensive detail. Also, review ADPs 3-0 and 5-0 to better understand how Mission Command nests within Unified Land Operations. Next, select an article or book about Mission Command to mature your own understanding of the philosophy. History provides countless examples of battles won through the independent initiative of subordinate leaders. Finally, reflect on your own experiences and how the principles of Mission Command influenced the outcomes of a mission or training exercise.

Doctrinal References:

ADP 3-0: Unified Land Operations

ADP 5-0: The Operations Process

ADP 6-0: Mission command

ADRP 6-0: Mission command

ADP 6-22: Army Leadership

Questions for Reflection/Discussion:

- 1.) How can leaders establish a command climate that fosters Mission Command?
- 2.) What can I do to promote the principles of Mission Command within my organization?
- 3.) What practices hinder the execution of mission oriented orders?
- 4.) How have commanders and leaders effectively implemented the principles of Mission Command in combat? Where have they failed?
- 5.) How do the principles of Mission Command apply to training, maintenance, and other key tasks in units?
- 6.) How have advent of Mission Command information systems (CPOF, etc.) effected the implementation of the philosophy of Mission Command?

Articles

[*Afragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle by John T. Nelson II*](#)

[*The Evolution of Mission Command in U.S. Army Doctrine, 1905 to Present by Col. Clinton J. Ackner, III*](#)

[*Mission command: Do We Have the Stomach For What Is Really Required? By Col. Tom Guthrie*](#)

[Mission Command at the Company level by the Company Command Team](#)

Books:

[*Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies by Eitan Shamir.*](#)

On today's complex, fragmented, fast-moving battlefield, where combatants adapt constantly to exploit one-another's weaknesses, there is a demonstrable requirement for military commanders to devolve a high level of autonomy of decision-making and action to leaders on the ground. An effective model for doing this has existed for some time in the form of *mission command* and has been utilized by the U.S., Israeli, and British Armies—but with mixed success. This book examines in depth the experiences of the armed forces of each of these countries in implementing mission command, and reveals the key factors that have determined the success or failure of the implementation—factors such as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the spread of low-intensity conflicts and operations other than war, and differences in how military cultures interpret, articulate, and exercise the command function. It has

significant implications for both the development of military doctrine and the training and education of tomorrow's military leaders.

[Command in War by Martin Van Creveld](#)

The author traces the command from ancient Greece to Vietnam, treating historically the variety of problems involved in decision making, communication, weaponry, and logistics. The book demonstrates how command has worked in key battles- including Napoleon's victory at Jena. Moltke's Konigraatz Campaign, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and U.S. actions in Vietnam – and discusses the search for certainty in command – certainty about the intentions of the enemy, the environment of battle, and the character of one's own forces.

[Studies in Battle Command by CSI Press](#)

This compilation contains 24 essays focused on specific battles throughout history, and the leaders who led their Soldiers to victory and defeat. Each case study reviews how the leader saw the enemy, himself, the battle, and the future. This book offers a professional perspective on command and leadership.

Vignettes:

[Mission Command Case Studies](#) at the Army Training Network

ⁱ ADP 6-0

ⁱⁱ John T. Nelsen II, "A Case for Decentralized Battle."

Maneuver Leader Self Study Program

Afghanistan

The U.S. experience in Afghanistan over the past decade offers myriad lessons for the U.S. Army as it continues military operations in support of the Afghan government and prepares for future conflicts of similar complexity.

The Evolution of the Afghan Conflict: 2001-2013

The American campaign in Afghanistan was launched in response to al-Qaeda's use of Afghan territory, granted by the Taliban government, to plan and launch the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. At the outset, the objectives of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan therefore included the defeat of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliated groups in Afghanistan, as well as the development of a stable and legitimate Afghan government that would serve as a U.S. partner in denying the use of Afghan territory to terrorist networks. A principal strategic rationale underlying the efforts of the United States and its NATO partners in Afghanistan was the notion that fragile states with weak institutions, particularly those dangerous and volatile regions, have the potential to serve as safe havens for transnational terrorist groups.

Even as American objectives and the rationale for U.S. engagement in Afghanistan have remained broadly consistent over the last decade, the character of the Afghan conflict and the strategies the U.S. has pursued to achieve its aims have evolved repeatedly between 2001 and the present. In 2001, U.S. forces, in tandem with the Northern Alliance, overthrew the Taliban regime in two months with only several hundred deployed troops. This early and decisive victory was followed by a period of optimism from 2002 to 2004, marked by what initially appeared to be a successful exercise in post-war reconstruction and state-building. In 2005, however, having reconsolidated in safe havens across the border in neighboring Pakistan, the Taliban mounted a significant resurgence, enabled in part by the population's resentment the Afghan government's apparent corruption and ineffectiveness. The size of the American force

deployed in the country at the time was judged insufficient to contend with the Taliban's reemergence across the country.

A surge of American troops into Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010 marked a new evolution in the conflict and enabled the pursuit of better resourced counterinsurgency operations. The current stage of the conflict, as the U.S. and NATO transition security responsibilities to Afghan forces in 2013 and 2014, presents different and equally complex challenges for the U.S. military. In the coming years, U.S. forces will be expected to enable their Afghan counterparts to contend with an ongoing insurgency, while preparing for and supporting an orderly Afghan presidential election in 2014, and at the same time guarding against the continued threat of transnational terrorism emanating from the tribal regions of Pakistan.

The Afghan conflict has been one of the most complex and challenging in the history of the U.S. military. Not only is Afghanistan's physical terrain intensely inhospitable; the country is also characterized by deep cultural and social divides between regions, and across ethnic and tribal groups. The tumultuousness of the last thirty years in Afghanistan and the volatility of the surrounding region have likewise presented deep challenges for U.S. forces. The anti-Soviet jihad, the subsequent Afghan civil war, and the following years of Taliban rule resulted in the erosion of Afghan governing institutions and the rule of law, while leaving deep divisions within Afghanistan's society and political space. In addition, even as the causes of conflict in Afghanistan since 2001 have at times appeared intensely local—manifested through tribal infighting and family vendettas—violence in the country has in fact been consistently fueled and manipulated by Afghanistan's neighbors, particularly Iran and Pakistan, whose interests in the outcome of the Afghan conflict are shaped by broader geopolitical considerations (namely their competitions with the United States and India, respectively).

Why Does Afghanistan Matter to Maneuver Leaders?

In its complexity and diversity, the Afghan experience is rich with lessons for the American military and its civilian interagency counterparts. In the years ahead, U.S. forces may again be called upon to assist or intervene in weak states experiencing protracted instability or rebuilding after years of violence. Like the conflict in Afghanistan, these interventions may involve a combination of counterinsurgency, stabilization, or counterterrorism operations, along

with security force assistance, counter-narcotics, and counter-organized crime missions. Drawing upon the many lessons of the Afghan conflict, maneuver commanders must be prepared to:

- Enable and conduct mutually supporting operations involving a wide range of U.S., coalition, and host-nation military, civilian, and law enforcement stakeholders pursuing complementary security and governance objectives.
- Facilitate and contribute to the integration of military and law enforcement operations against convergent networks of threats that frequently emerge in fragile, post-conflict states (including insurgents, weapons/IED-facilitators, and traffickers of narcotics and other illicit goods).
- Sustain operational partnerships with host nation forces that are in the early stages of development, while establishing mechanisms to encourage transparency and cooperation on the part of host nation leaders at the local and national levels (many of whom may be inclined to advance their parochial interests at the expense of the success of the joint mission).

Finally, although U.S. force levels in Afghanistan are declining, it is likely that American units will remain deployed in the country long after 2014. Afghanistan will remain a vital front in the war to defeat al-Qaeda and allied insurgent and terrorist groups, which retain safe-havens in the tribal areas of Pakistan, and which are intent on returning to and restoring safe-haven in Afghanistan. Maneuver leaders will continue to engage the problem of Afghanistan, and must understand the conflict not only as a case study, but as one in which they may well be personally engaged.

An Approach to the Study of Afghanistan:

Maneuver leaders should first understand the strategic context of the war in Afghanistan, asking how and why U.S. strategy in Afghanistan evolved from 2001 to the present. As they study Afghanistan, leaders should consider the connection between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of the conflict. They should ask how the actions of American units on the ground fit into U.S. strategy, and whether tactical and operational successes genuinely furthered strategic

objectives and contributed to the long-term viability of the Afghanistan state. They should be attentive to cases in which short-term expedients were pursued by military and civilian actors at the cost of long-term stability.

Leaders must also understand how Afghanistan's (and Pakistan's) history and culture determined the conditions under which U.S. forces have operated. Failed and fragmented states are products of their history, and cannot be stabilized without attention to the patterns of political stability and the fault lines determined by a society's past, and the success of U.S. units restoring stability and countering the insurgency in Afghanistan frequently depended on knowledge of local culture and history.

Given its complexities, Afghanistan offers valuable case studies for how commanders and staffs adapted or failed to adapt to unexpected and unprecedented challenges, both kinetic and political (i.e. Afghan partners whose corruption or abuse of power antagonized the population.) Leaders should also consider how U.S. and NATO staffs calibrated the scope and ambition of their operations to limited resources and shifting strategic guidance. Leaders should consider the role of Pakistan in the resilience of the insurgency in Afghanistan, as well as the complexities of the U.S.-Pakistan alliance. In thinking about Pakistan, they should ask how military leaders should respond to the intervention of outside powers in a theater of operations.

Leaders should also understand Afghanistan's lessons on the integration of civilian and military efforts to establish security, enable host-nation military and law enforcement organizations, and promote the rule of law. They should ask how military and civilian leaders at all levels could have avoided the interagency conflicts that have at times undermined the execution of U.S. strategy, while also identifying instances of successful civil-military integration.

Questions for Reflection/Discussion:

1.) How has the legacy of twenty years of internal conflict, from 1979 to 2001, presented unique challenges to American-led state-building and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan?³) How can the Afghan experience provide a framework to analyze security and governance problems—and identify their potential solutions—in other fragile states?

- 2.) Identify the objectives of the principal insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan. How have the strategies of these groups evolved since 2001? Are there circumstances in which any of these groups could enter the Afghan political process without undermining key U.S. objectives??
- 3.) Which regional actors have a stake in the outcome of the Afghanistan conflict? What are their interests and their strategies for advancing those interests?
- 4.) What non-lethal and political lines of operations has the insurgency pursued in support of their objectives in Afghanistan? How, and to what extent, has the insurgency used subversion, propaganda, and the provision of governance and services to further its objectives?
- 5.) How has the insurgency's deep familiarity with Afghan culture given it advantages over the coalition? In what ways has the coalition learned to tailor operations to the complexities of Afghan culture?
- 6.) What are the root causes of the current level of corruption within the Afghan government? How can the U.S. influence Afghan partners to counter corruption and organized crime? What strategies has the coalition employed to counter corruption, and how successful have they been?
- 7.) What are the major sources of income for insurgents? What are the respective roles of military and civilian agencies in targeting insurgent finance, and how do civ-mil efforts need to be integrated to counter this threat?"
- 8.) What approaches has the international coalition taken toward the narcotics trade in Afghanistan? How can the coalition target the intersection between the convergent threats of narcotics trafficking, organized crime, and the insurgency?
- 9.) Is it acceptable to assume more tactical risk to yourself to protect the Afghan population and their property? What are the tactical and strategic implications of collateral damage?
- 10.) What are the most successful patterns of center-periphery relations in Afghan history? How can the international coalition support the central government in securing territory and expending government capacity on the periphery?
- 11.) What should be the American role in assisting Afghanistan's government and military following completion of the withdrawal of ISAF combat troops in 2014? What are the likely

operational shortfalls of the ANSF, and what challenges will prevent the Afghan government from securing the country after 2014?

12.) What lessons do the successes and failures of the Afghanistan campaign since 2001 teach about what types and sizes of military units are best suited to which missions? What forms of non-military support do military units need to accomplish counterinsurgency, stabilization, and support to foreign military missions?

13.) What non-military roles and missions is the military postured and prepared to enable now and in an enduring capacity in Afghanistan?

14.) What lessons does Afghanistan offers about achieving successful civil-military integration? When and why did civil-military integration fail or fall short of its potential, particularly at the tactical and operational levels, in Afghanistan?

15.) What challenges has coalition warfare presented for the American military in Afghanistan? In what cases have U.S. forces best integrated their efforts with those of European and other allies?

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Maneuver Leader Self Study Program

The Study and Use of Military History

“Learning is not attained by chance; it must be sought for with ardour and attended to with diligence.” ~ Abigail Adams to John Quincy Adams, May 10, 1780

In 1775, the Second Continental Congress nominated George Washington to take command of the soon-to-be-formed Continental Army. Even though he served at various command and staff positions during the Seven Years’ War, his experience alone had not prepared him for the task he was about to undertake. To put this sudden transition into perspective, this would be the equivalent of a battalion commander suddenly becoming the Chief of Staff of the Army. What he lacked in experience, however he made up for in self-study. Washington took his military education seriously, grasping every opportunity to increase his knowledge in the art of war. He bought every military science and history book he could find, taking notes in the margins and eventually producing orders from them. In short, Washington was self-taught in the art of generalship.

Why is the Study of Military History Important for Maneuver Leaders?

Today’s Army leaders should follow Washington’s example of self study. History does not provide a blueprint or a roadmap, but it provides a context that helps equip an agile mind to make informed decisions. History provides context as maneuver leaders reflect on personal experience in training and combat. The study of history should be, as Clausewitz suggested, “meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, *to guide him in his self-education*, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man's intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life.” Although there are clear practical applications of the study of war and

warfare, such as understanding the fundamentals of combined arms operations, the purpose of studying war through the lens of history would be as Sir Michael Howard observed, not to, “make us cleverer for the next time,” but instead to help make maneuver leaders “wise forever.”

Studying past battles helps leaders understand their responsibilities. In particular they will appreciate the importance of discipline and the need to build confident, cohesive teams that are resilient to the debilitating effects of combat trauma and the corrosive effects of persistent danger. It is difficult to improve upon John Keegan’s observation that:

What battles have in common is human: the behaviour of men struggling to reconcile their instinct for self-preservation, their sense of honour and the achievement of some aim over which other men are ready to kill them. The study of battle is therefore always a study of fear and usually of courage; always of leadership, usually of obedience; always of compulsion, sometimes of insubordination; always of anxiety, sometimes of elation or catharsis; always of uncertainty and doubt, misinformation and misapprehension, usually also of faith and sometimes of vision; always of violence, sometimes also of cruelty, self-sacrifice, compassion; above all, it is always a study of solidarity and usually also of disintegration – for it is toward the disintegration of human groups that battle is directed.”¹

Maneuver leaders must steel their soldiers and units against “disintegration” and how they prepare their soldiers and units for battle will depend, in large measure, on their own vision of future combat, a vision that Keegan argued requires a “long historical perspective.” If leaders are not able to think about and understand war and warfare, they will be less effective at the tactical as well as the strategic levels.

¹ Keegan, *The Face of Battle*, p. 83.

An Approach to the Study of Military History:

History is most useful when it is studied in three dimensions: First, study in **width**: Observe how warfare has developed over a long historical period. Next, study in **depth**: Take one campaign or battle and examine it in minute detail. Read letters, memoirs, diaries, and even historical fiction. This is important, Sir Michael Howard observed, because as the “tidy outline dissolves,” we “catch a glimpse of the confusion and horror of real experience.” And lastly to study in **context**. Warfare must be understood in its social, cultural, economic, human, moral, political, and psychological contexts because, as Howard observed, “the roots of victory and defeat often have to be sought far from the battlefield.” Failure to study wars in context, leads to a superficial view of war with lessons and conclusions divorced from their proper context,

Studying military history in width, depth, and context is a life-long effort and should be approached systematically over the course of a career. To begin your study of this topic, select an article like *Military History and the Study of Operational Art* or a book like *The Past is Prologue: the Importance History to the Military Profession* to mature your understanding of the connection between the study of history and the military profession. Next, select a book from one of the conflicts listed below to study a war in width. Then, select a campaign or battle within that war and by using the end notes or bibliography, you will find additional reading that will allow you to study in depth. Finally, take the opportunity to determine the causes and root of that conflict, by studying it in context.

Questions for Discussion/Reflection:

- How are strategy, operations, and tactics connected? What are some examples of when the three were disconnected? What were the results?
- What are principal or recurring causes of military success or failure?
- How did other leaders learn and apply military history to their duties and responsibilities?
- What are the elements of the American military experience and how do they help us think about the Army’s role in national security today?
- What are some of the continuities in warfare? What are some of the changes?

Articles

Military History and the Study of Operational Art by Milan Vego (.pdf)

This short and concise article reviews the importance of the study of history, its pitfalls, and provides the reader with several historical anecdotes.

The Use and Abuse of Military History by Sir Michael Howard (.pdf)

This article is based on a lecture by Professor Howard and addresses the following themes: The value of military history to the profession, the pitfalls of history, and how to study history.

Books

Why Study History?

The Past is Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession eds Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnerich

The Past as Prologue explores the usefulness of the study of history for contemporary military leaders. It illustrates the great importance of military history while simultaneously revealing the challenges of applying the past to the present. Essays from authors of diverse backgrounds - British and American, civilian and military - come together to present an overwhelming argument for the necessity of the study of the past by today's military leaders in spite of these challenges. The essays of Part I examine the relationship between history and the military profession. Those in Part II explore specific historical cases that show the repetitiveness of certain military problems.

A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History By Jessup and Coakley

The guide consists of four parts. Part One is general in nature and deals with the uses of military history and suggested methods of reading and study. Part Two is a guide to the areas of study and the materials available for study in each. It consists of seven bibliographical essays - one on the great military historians and philosophers with whom all students of military history should have some acquaintance, two on world military history, three specifically on American military history, and a final essay on the merging of American and world military history since the end of World War II. Each of the period essays weaves its bibliographical information into the framework of a discussion of the main military developments of the era covered, introducing, where pertinent, varying historical interpretations of events and issues. Each contains at the end an alphabetical listing of all works mentioned. Part Three deals with U.S. Army historical programs and activities and how the Army uses or has used military history. Part Four similarly deals, albeit more briefly, with military history outside the Army - in other elements of the Department of Defense, in foreign military establishments, and in the academic world.

War in History:

Ancient Warfare:

[*The Peloponnesian War by Donald Kagan*](#)

This title about the Peloponnesian War is a work of history written for general readers, offering a fresh examination of a pivotal moment in Western civilization. With a lively, readable narrative that conveys a richly detailed portrait of a vanished world while honoring its timeless relevance, *The Peloponnesian War* is a chronicle of the rise and fall of a great empire and of a dark time whose lessons still resonate today.

The Eye of Command by Kimberly Kagan

Based on analysis of the works of Roman military authors, Julius Caesar and Ammianus Marcellinus, Kimberly Kagan argues that historians cannot explain a battle's outcome solely on the basis of soldiers' accounts of small-unit actions. A commander's view, exemplified in Caesar's narratives, helps explain the significance of a battle's major events, how they relate to one another and how they lead to a battle's outcome. The "eye of command" approach also answers fundamental questions about the way commanders perceive battles as they fight them—questions modern military historians have largely ignored.

Early Modern European Warfare

[*The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 by Geoffrey Parker*](#)

Well before the Industrial Revolution, Europe developed the superior military potential and expertise that enabled her to dominate the world for the next two centuries. In this title, Geoffrey Parker discusses the major changes in the military practice of the West during this time period—establishment of bigger armies, creation of superior warships, the role of firearms—and argues that these major changes amounted to a "military revolution" that gave Westerners a decided advantage over people of other continents.

Napoleonic Warfare

[*The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon by Gunther E. Rothenberg*](#)

In a comprehensive study of a crucial era in warfare—from the last decades of the ancient régime to Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo—Rothenberg describes the organization, training methods, equipment, tactics, and strategy of France and its adversaries. He also explores staff systems, logistics, fortifications, medical services, and insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Overview of History of European Wars:

[*War in European History by Michael Howard*](#)

War in European History is survey of the changing ways that war has been waged in Europe, from the Norse invasions to the present day. Far more than a simple military history, the book serves as a succinct overview of the development of European society as a whole over the last millennium. From the Norsemen and the world of the medieval knights, through to the industrialized mass warfare of the twentieth century, Michael Howard illuminates the way in which warfare has shaped the history of the Continent, its effect on social and political institutions, and the ways in which technological and social change have in turn shaped the way in which wars are fought

American Revolution:

[*Washington's Crossing by David Hackett Fischer*](#)

Fischer's narrative reveals the crucial roles of contingency and bold leadership in the events that turned the tide in the Revolutionary War. We see how the campaign unfolded in a sequence of difficult choices by many actors, from generals to civilians, on both sides. While British and German forces remained rigid and hierarchical, Americans evolved an open and flexible system that was fundamental to their success. The startling success of Washington and his compatriots not only saved the faltering American Revolution, but helped to give it new meaning.

[*War of American Independence by Don Higginbotham*](#)

As opposed to a blow-by-blow description of the battles, Higginbotham dissects the military policies of the new nation from their heritage throughout the colonial period to the execution of the war. His book provides a behind-the-scenes look at the causes and effects of the war.

Civil War:

[*Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era by McPherson*](#)

This book fully integrates the political, social, and military events that crowded the two decades from the outbreak of one war in Mexico to the ending of another at Appomattox. Packed with drama and analytical insight, the book vividly recounts the momentous episodes that preceded the Civil War--the Dred Scott decision, the Lincoln-Douglas debates, John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry--and then moves into a masterful chronicle of the war itself--the battles, the strategic maneuvering on both sides, the politics, and the personalities.

The Philippine War:

[*The Philippine War, 1899-1902 by Brian McCallister Linn*](#)

From the pitched battles of the early war to the final campaigns against guerrillas, Linn traces the entire course of the conflict. More than an overview of Filipino resistance and American pacification, this is a detailed study of the fighting in the "boondocks." In addition to presenting a detailed military history of the war, Linn challenges previous interpretations. Rather than being a

clash of armies or societies, the war was a series of regional struggles that differed greatly from island to island. By shifting away from the narrow focus on one or two provinces to encompass the entire archipelago, Linn offers a more thorough understanding of the entire war.

World War I:

The First World War: A Very Short Introduction by Michael Howard

This Very Short Introduction provides a concise and insightful history of the Great War--from the state of Europe in 1914, to the role of the US, the collapse of Russia, and the eventual surrender of the Central Powers. Examining how and why the war was fought, as well as the historical controversies that still surround the war, Michael Howard also looks at how peace was ultimately made, and describes the potent legacy of resentment left to Germany.

World War II:

[*A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War by Murray and Millett*](#)

The authors analyze the operations and tactics that defined the conduct of the war in both the European and Pacific Theaters. Moving between the war room and the battlefield, we see how strategies were crafted and revised, and how the multitudes of combat troops struggled to discharge their orders. They also present incisive portraits of the military leaders on both sides of the struggle.

The Korean War:

[*The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 by Clay Blair Jr.*](#)

This title offers a complete and detailed portrayal of the conflict, featuring day-by-day, unit-by-unit accounts and analysis of high-level defense policy through ground-level leadership.

The Vietnam War:

[*Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning: The World of the Combat Division in Vietnam*](#)

1991 Persian Gulf War

[*Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War by Rick Atkinson*](#)

The author follows the 42-day war from the first night to the final day, providing vivid accounts of bombing runs, White House strategy sessions, firefights, and bitter internal conflicts.

Iraq 2003-2010

[*Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq by Gordon and Trainor*](#)

Written by the chief military correspondent of the New York Times and a prominent retired Marine general, this is the definitive account of the invasion of Iraq. *Cobra II* describes how the American rush to Baghdad provided the opportunity for the virulent insurgency that followed. As Gordon and Trainor show, the brutal aftermath was not inevitable and was a surprise to the generals on both sides. Based on access to unseen documents and exclusive interviews with the men and women at the heart of the war, *Cobra II* provides firsthand accounts of the fighting on the ground and the high-level planning behind the scenes.

[The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama by Gordon and Trainer](#)

In this follow-up to their national bestseller *Cobra II*, Michael Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor deftly piece together the story of the most widely reported but least understood war in American history. This account of the political and military struggle between American, Iraqi, and Iranian forces brings together vivid reporting of diplomatic intrigue and gripping accounts fighting that lasted nearly a decade. *The Endgame* presents a chronicle of the occupation of Iraq to the withdrawal of American troops that is sure to remain the essential account of the war for years to come.

Monographs

[Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: the Evolution of Operational Warfare. By Robert Citino](#)

This work explores the development of operations from the Second World War to the opening of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Citino studies how armies learn and adapt themselves for success on the battlefield. His analysis spans a number of different wars, including some, such as the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971, that have received bare mention in other works. Citino demonstrates that history can be a useful guide or fickle companion to the serving officer depending upon how that officer chooses to use the material.

The Perils of History- Hattendorf Prize Lecture by N.A.M. Rodger

[Link to the Maneuver Center of Excellence Battle Bibliographies](#)

This link contains a list of annotated bibliographies of over 50 battles that will allow leaders to study war in depth.

Maneuver Leader Self Study Program

Technology, Doctrine and Combat Developments

“By the 20th century, military organizations confronted the problem of not only adapting to technological changes in peacetime...but also to the fact that war itself has inevitably turned up the speed of technological change.”ⁱ -**Williamson Murray**

Technology influences the conduct of war. Since the Industrial Revolution, technological advances have greatly increased the lethality and complexity of the battlefield, shaping and reshaping all levels of war from tactics (repeating rifles) to strategy (nuclear weapons). For example, today, with the diffusion of advanced technologies, non-state actors have the ability to fight using weapons that were once only available to nation states. These capabilities include advanced anti-tank weapon systems, air defense systems, long range rockets and missiles, and armed unmanned aerial vehicles. In recent years, advances in communications and information technologies combined with new surveillance and targeting systems and very capable unmanned aerial vehicles have allowed us to remove key insurgent leaders from the battlefield with minimum collateral damage. But technology is only one of several aspects of developing future force capabilities; and it is potentially critical that technological changes are integrated into new doctrine and organization changes to ensure effective application to fight and win.

The Army develops future force capabilities through the process of combat developments. Combat development should be based on the Army's vision of future which is informed by the analysis of current threat capabilities and trends, strategic policy, and military budgets. It determines doctrine (How we will fight), organization (How we are organized to fight), training (How we train to fight), and material (What we fight with).

Why is this topic important for Maneuver Leaders?

First, the study of this topic helps us think about future war and expose flaws in unrealistic silver-bullet solutions to complex problems. In the 1990s, proponents of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), Military Transformation, and a New American Way of War argued that technology would lift the fog of war. Near-certainty in war, combined with precision strike capabilities would make wars fast, cheap, efficient, and decisive. Lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan exposed flaws in concepts like Dominant Battlespace Knowledge, Rapid Decisive Operations and Shock and Awe. These concepts neglected the interaction with enemies and adversaries who adopted traditional counter-measures like dispersion, concealment, and decentralized command and controlⁱⁱ, still requiring us to fight in close combat with our enemies for periods that might outlast popular perceptions. And future enemies and adversaries will observe US combat developments carefully and develop both tactical and technological countermeasures. It is this interaction with enemies in wartime and adversaries between wars that ensures that no one capability or one service or one arm is decisive. The machine gun led to the tank. The tank led to the antitank missile. The bomber led to the radar. The submarine led to the sonar.

Second, understanding the role technology plays in the conduct of war allows us to anticipate opportunities and challenges that present themselves both in battle and during periods of peace. Think about the opportunities and challenges associated with current technologies like social media. It can connect families during deployment, offer opportunities for collaboration and discussion, and mobilize popular support for armed forces, but it can also catalyze protests in days that popular movements once took months or years to build.ⁱⁱⁱ Blogs, tweets, pictures and videos, have had strategic and tactical consequences. Social media, and other developing technologies, follow in the footsteps of earlier technologies like the telegraph, the steam engine,

and the rifle; they had immediate impact on the conduct of war, and were combat multipliers for those militaries who understood their capabilities and limitations, and incorporated them into their combined arms teams.

An Approach to the Study of this Topic:

First, read *The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine* to gain an understanding of the role technology plays in the development of our doctrine. Second, read Chapter 3 (Force Design and Weapons Development) of *Victory Starts Here* to see how the Army has transformed since the 1980s and incorporated technological changes into force structure and weapon development. Then, select a book or article to see further examples of how changes in technology directly affected the conduct of war. Pay special attention to the armies that were able to capitalize on these changes, and those that were slow to adopt them. Finally, examine the combat developments that arose from false assumptions and resulted in failure or lost lives on the battlefield.

To understand what capabilities we should develop to ensure the combat effectiveness of the future force, it is important that maneuver leaders consider the problems we are trying to solve. The following are the first order questions the Maneuver Center uses to guide combat development efforts and integrate solutions across doctrine, organization, training, material (technological) solutions, leader development, personnel policies, and facility (infrastructure) improvements.

Maneuver Warfighting Challenges:

1. How to develop and sustain a high degree of situational understanding while operating in complex environments against determined, adaptive enemy organizations

2. How to conduct effective air-ground combined arms reconnaissance to rapidly develop the situation in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations.
3. How to conduct maneuver and integrate all arms and joint capabilities to seize and retain the initiative and defeat capable, determined enemy organizations in all types of terrain including dense urban areas (includes offense and defense).
4. How to conduct security operations across wide areas to secure the force, critical infrastructure, or critical activities (e.g. development of indigenous security forces or establishment of legitimate governance/rule of law).
5. How to retain freedom of movement and action at the end of extended and contested lines of operation during high tempo, decentralized operations.
6. How to conduct security force assistance (Foreign Internal Defense) and conduct effective multinational operations (including combat advisory) across the range of military operations.
7. How to exert influence over a broad range of actors and organizations to shape conditions or consolidate gains consistent with the mission.
8. How to establish and maintain effective communications and defeat enemy attempts to interrupt critical satellite, terrestrial, and CYBER capabilities.
9. How to protect the force from Remote Anti-Armor Mines (RAAMs); Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environment (CBRNE); unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV); and other emerging long range threats.
10. How to defeat enemy anti access capabilities, conduct forcible entry and rapidly transition to offensive operations to envelop or turn enemy out of defensive positions.
11. How to develop resilient and adaptive Soldiers and units to operate effectively in environments of complexity and persistent danger.

Questions for Reflection/Discussion:

- 1.) What problem were those undertaking technological, doctrinal, or organizational change trying to solve (e.g. restore tactical and operational mobility in WWI; improve ability to strike targets with greater precision)?
- 2.) What were the keys to success in implementing change and did leaders at the time recognize those keys to success? Why or why not?
- 3.) What were the obstacles to effective change? How did the leaders overcome those obstacles?
- 4.) How did the force adapt to the change that was introduced? Were solutions integrated across technology, doctrine, and organization?
- 5.) What technologies have been introduced during times of peace that proved disappointing during actual conflict? Why did they disappoint? What assumptions underpinned expectations?
- 6.) What existing technologies could be integrated more fully into the military to increase effectiveness?
- 7.) What aspects of warfare haven't changed despite technological advances?

Articles:

[Technology, Ground Warfare, and Strategy: The Paradox of American Experience by Alex Roland](#)

[The Human Element: When Gadgetry Becomes Strategy](#)

[Why the U.S. Army Needs Armor: The Case for a Balanced Force](#)

Books:

[The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976 by Robert Doughty \(.pdf\)](#)

In this short book, the author does a great job of showing how improved conventional weapons, increased mobility, nuclear weapons, national policy, and branch and inter-service rivalries all influenced the development of our doctrine.

[The Echo of Battle by Brian Linn](#)

From Lexington and Gettysburg to Normandy and Iraq, the wars of the United States have defined the nation. But after the guns fall silent, the army searches the lessons of past conflicts in order to prepare for the next clash of arms. In the echo of battle, the army develops the strategies, weapons, doctrine, and commanders that it hopes will guarantee a future victory. He explores the army's forgotten heritage of deterrence, its long experience with counter-guerrilla operations, and its successive efforts to transform itself. Distinguishing three martial traditions--each with its own concept of warfare, its own strategic views, and its own excuses for failure--he locates the visionaries who prepared the army for its battlefield triumphs and the reactionaries whose mistakes contributed to its defeats.

[Men, Machines, and Modern Times by Elting E. Morison](#)

This title offers 8 essays of historical accounts taken from the 19th Century to highlight some main themes: the nature of technological change, the fission brought about in society by such change, and society's reaction to that change.

[The Pursuit of Power: Technology, armed force, and society since A.D. 1000 by William H. McNeill](#)

In this title of military, technological, and social history, the author explores a whole millennium of human upheaval and traces the path by which we have arrived at some of the complexity that now confront us. His central argument is that a commercial transformation of world society in the eleventh century caused military activity to respond increasingly to market forces as well as

to the commands of rulers. Only in our own time, suggests McNeill, are command economies replacing the market control of large-scale human effort.

[Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military](#)

In peacetime, Rosen finds, innovation has been the product of analysis and the politics of military promotion, in a process that has slowly but successfully built military capabilities critical to American military success. In wartime, by contrast, innovation has been constrained by the fog of war and the urgency of combat needs. Rosen draws his principal evidence from U.S. military policy between 1905 and 1960, though he also discusses the British army's experience with the battle tank during World War

[Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present by Martin Van Creveld](#)

In this title published in 1991, Van Creveld considers man's use of technology over the past 4,000 years and its impact on military organization, weaponry, logistics, intelligence, communications, transportation, and command.

[On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield by Meir Finkel](#)

The author addresses the question: How can armies cope effectively with technological and doctrinal surprises? This book is broken into three parts. The first deals with the challenge of force building against surprise in combat. The second part treats theoretical aspects of recover, based on conceptual and doctrinal flexibility, and cognitive-command flexibility. In the third part, the author presents 7 historical case studies that illustrate how the presence (or absence) of these elements affects and army's ability to deal with battlefield surprise.

[Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 by Robert A. Doughty](#)

Monographs:

[Victory Starts Here: A Short 40-year History of Training and Doctrine Command](#)

[Lessons from the Army's Future Combat Systems Program](#)

[Big Five Lessons from Today and Tomorrow](#)

Videos:

[The Strange Tale of the Norden Bombsight by Malcom Gladwell](#)

ⁱ Military Adaptation in War with Fear of Change by Williamson Murray

ⁱⁱ Hard Fighting by David Johnson

ⁱⁱⁱ Capstone for JOINT FORCE 2020

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